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In the post-war period Japan has experienced radical social and economic 
transformations, asserting itself as the world’s second largest economy by 1968. 
Housing and construction have been at the heart of this revitalization, a key socio-
economic policy, and a stabilizing factor during rapid modernization. Housing and 
Social Transition in Japan explores the nature of the Japanese housing system, 
focusing on how it has been embedded in wider structures of social and economic 
change.
While Japan demonstrates many of the characteristics of western housing and 
social systems, including mass home ownership and consumption-based lifestyles, 
economic growth and modernization have been achieved in balance with indigenous 
social values and practices. This book presents a number of perspectives on the 
Japanese housing system, outlining a comprehensive account of its dynamic role 
during a period of unprecedented social and economic change.
Leading Japan-based specialists address a range of topical issues, questioning 
prevailing assumptions formed in western societies concerning the role of housing 
and dwelling in processes of social change. This book generates an original 
consideration of the way housing structures and practices have contributed to the 
evolution of modern Japan and its twenty-fi rst century reorientation.
As well as providing challenges and insights for the academic community at 
large, this book will also supply a good introduction to the study of Japan and its 
housing, economic, social and welfare systems generally.
Yosuke Hirayama is Professor of Housing and Urban Studies at Kobe University 
in Japan. He is the author of several books on housing and urban transformations 
in Japanese, and has also published widely in international housing and urban 
research journals. He is a founding member of the Asia-Pacifi c Network for 
Housing Research.
Richard Ronald is a Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Housing, 
Urban and Mobility Studies at Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, 
and was formerly a Research Fellow at Kobe University in Japan. He is a former 
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Preface
Few societies have demonstrated such rapid levels of urban and social change 
as Japan. While the Japanese home and housing system have been at the heart 
of transformations, their role has been relatively obscured in popular discourses 
within and beyond Japan. Indeed, there are a preponderance of clichés concerning 
Japanese housing that swing between images of the traditional Zen house, typifi ed 
by an elegant simplicity of space and the harmony of the household, to concepts 
of ultra-modern urban housing and box-like living units. Academic books have 
tended to focus on housing dimensions in terms of either architecture or economic 
mechanisms, and have subsequently tended to romanticize the exotic and unusual 
elements of Japanese dwelling, or reduce it to a quantifi able element within the 
nexus of the Japanese economic miracle. 
The purpose of this volume is to move beyond reductive discourses and 
engage with Japanese housing in more normalized and comprehensive terms. The 
authors assembled for this edition work on Japanese housing within a number 
of arenas ranging from economics, to urban and city planning, to social policy 
and anthropology. They also constitute a group of local specialists that engage 
in debates on the role and impact of housing in society, both domestically 
and internationally, within a fi eld recognized as ‘housing studies’ within the 
international literature. Each chapter represents a consideration of the key factors 
and key issues, normally including original empirical data, relating to the main 
dimensions of the housing system, from which the reader can begin to consider 
housing in Japan as a dynamic element within a holistic and comprehensible 
socio-economic and cultural system.  
The idea for this volume began in a number of conversations in our research 
offi ces at Kobe University and at Asia-Pacifi c Network for Housing Research 
(APNHR) conferences. We were struck by the points raised above, but also, 
specifi cally, by the lack of material in English about Japanese housing by Japanese 
specialists compared to the volume of published material, and interest in Japan, 
by foreign researchers. We were further concerned with the lack of attention 
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housing receives in analyses of structures and processes of change in Japanese 
society. This edition therefore seeks to fi ll these gaps and address these concerns 
by assembling contributions from salient Japanese specialists in a single volume, 
and by analytically embedding housing and urban dimensions in the consideration 
of Japan’s recent history. As Japan has represented somewhat of an enigma in 
comparative social, economic and urban research, we also hoped that our analysis 
would provide a challenge to some of the assumptions that prevail in the research 
fi eld as a result of the predominance of cases drawn from western contexts which 
are normally assumed to be universally relevant.   
We have a number of acknowledgements to make and thanks to give. First, we 
must thank Ray Forrest of Bristol University in the UK for helping us crystallize 
the book project and pursue its inclusion in the Housing and Society series. 
Second, our appreciation goes to Seita Mori at Kobe University for all his work 
in editing the graphic materials included in this book. We also would like to thank 
the editorial staff at Routledge for their patience with us. Institutionally, we also 
need to acknowledge the support of the Faculty of Human Development at Kobe 
University, the Japan Foundation and the Japanese Society for the Promotion of 
Science, who provided research grants and fellowships that made this volume 




Does the housing system matter?
Yosuke Hirayama and Richard Ronald
Introduction
In the post-war period Japan has experienced some of the most radical social and 
economic transformations of any modern society, from clambering out of the ruins 
of military defeat in 1945 to asserting itself as the world’s second largest economy 
by 1968. Housing and construction have been at the heart of the rebuilding and 
revitalization of the Japanese economy, a key policy in the state’s socio-economic 
agenda, as well as a stabilizing factor in social development during a period of 
rapid modernization. Housing market volatility has also been at the centre of 
Japan’s economic troubles over the last decades, and emphasis remains on housing 
and the housing market in strategies to restructure and regalvanize the Japanese 
economic machine.
This book seeks to put together a number of perspectives on the Japanese 
housing system in order to provide a comprehensive and multifarious account 
of the dynamic role of the housing system during a period of unprecedented 
social and economic change in one of the most enigmatic social, political, and 
economic systems in the industrial/post-industrial world. We explore the nature 
of the Japanese housing system, focusing on how it is embedded in the wider 
structure of social and economic transformation. While Japan demonstrates many 
of the characteristics of western housing and social systems, including mass 
home ownership and consumption-based lifestyles, extensive economic growth 
and rapid urban modernization has been achieved in balance with an assertion 
of many indigenous social values and practices. The case of Japan illustrates the 
diversity of modern housing systems as well as the embeddedness of housing 
in social diversifi cation and broader processes of social change and economic 
development.
Yosuke Hirayama and Richard Ronald
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The rise and fall of the post-war Japanese housing system
The Japanese housing system in the post-war period developed in a very 
particular context. A key element, which characterized the basic course of post-
war Japanese society, was the effort made to catch up with western ‘advanced’ 
nations, particularly in terms of economic productivity, where ‘modernization’ 
was often equated with ‘westernization’. The formation of the housing system 
in Japan, as in western countries, was associated with the expansion of housing 
construction, mortgage markets, the growth of the owner-occupied sector and 
government intervention in the housing market. Nevertheless, the trajectory of the 
housing system in Japan has been distinctive and strongly differentiated from that 
of western societies.
From the end of the war through the 1970s, the massive infl ow of population 
into urban areas and the considerable increase in the number of households put 
increasing stress on the demand for housing, which led to the acceleration of 
housing construction. The economy developed at a striking pace with an average 
annual growth of approximately 10 per cent between the middle of the 1950s and 
the early 1970s. An increasing number of middle-class families were nurtured 
by state policies and expected to purchase or build their own home. There was 
a cycle in which the mass construction of owner-occupied housing stimulated 
economic growth which, in turn, expanded the acquisition of owner-occupied 
housing. Since housing prices initially rose rapidly and stably, owning a house, 
which was accompanied by a considerable capital gain, was an effective means 
of accumulating a valuable asset. The combination of economic development, a 
growing middle class and mass home ownership was increasingly regarded as 
central to social stability. The conservatives formed the LDP (Liberal Democratic 
Party) in 1955 and have almost exclusively held power ever since. Critically, 
they have been concerned with economic growth through the promotion of mass 
production of owner-occupied housing, backed by strong connections in business 
circles, and in particular the construction, housing and real estate sectors.
While the post-war Japanese state sought to catch up with the levels of 
development of western countries, by putting overwhelming priority on economic 
growth, the nature of development completely diverged from that of European 
welfare states that had emerged in the immediate post-war period, in terms 
of the formation of housing provision strategies (Harada, 1985; Hirayama, 
2003a; Holliday, 2000; Izuhara, 2000; Ohmoto, 1985; Ronald, 2004). Japanese 
governments have never set out to expand the social housing sector nor accepted 
the concept of universal citizenship rights to housing. In the post-war period, 
while education and health services have developed relatively universally and 
comprehensively among various public welfare provision programmes, direct 
provision of housing welfare has been placed in a residual position. Nevertheless, 
the fact that Japan did not adopt European welfare state models does not imply 
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that the Japanese government has not been concerned with housing provision. 
The relationship between the state and housing in post-war Japan developed in 
very specifi c terms. Centrally, since the period immediately after the war, the 
Japanese government has sought to nurture the creation of a society and an 
economy orientated around the middle classes and middle-class home ownership 
(Hirayama, 2003a).
Private home ownership has been the dominant housing tenure in Japan. 
According to the Housing and Land Survey in 2003, the level of owner-occupied 
housing was 61.2 per cent. The home ownership sector was vigorously stimulated 
by generous state subsidy along with economic development and the growth of 
the middle class. The ratio of private rental housing was the second highest at 
26.8 per cent. However, the government has never directly supported private 
rental housing. There has been little assistance for the construction of private 
rental housing and absolutely no provision of rental subsidy. Direct provision of 
rental housing by the public sector has been residual. The ratio of publicly rented 
housing was 6.7 per cent.
The housing system in Japan was essentially workable under unparalleled 
conditions of economic growth and social stability. Over the past few decades, 
however, the housing context has been transformed by a more volatile, uncertain 
economy and increasing social fragmentation. Many academics and popular 
discourses assert that the 1990s generated a turning point for Japan in terms of the 
overall restructuring of social, economic, political and institutional orders. The 
housing system is no exception, and has indeed been central to the structure and 
effect of transformation. The so-called bubble economy, which began with the 
unprecedented rise in real estate and stock prices in the latter half of the 1980s, 
collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s and in the early 
2000s, Japan experienced the worst recession of the post-war period, with an 
increasing social destabilization of the middle classes. The 1990s have become 
known as the ‘lost decade’ in Japan. When the bubble burst, land and housing 
prices fell sharply for the fi rst time since the end of the war, and the security of 
residential property as an asset was fundamentally undermined (Forrest et al., 
2003; Hirayama, 2003b).
Demographic composition has also been dramatically changing due to an 
unprecedented increase in the elderly and a drop in the fertility rate. While the 
proportion of conventional family households is in decline, single, elderly-only 
and couple-only households are increasing. As regards to politics, it has become 
diffi cult for the LDP to remain in power without forming reluctant coalitions with 
the other parties. Public faith in the state has been in decline and value systems 
have begun to unravel in tandem with the new social and economic realities the 
Japanese face. Consequently, the nature and function of household formation and 
the traditional housing system in Japan is undergoing a marked and fundamental 
transition.
Yosuke Hirayama and Richard Ronald
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Since the middle of the 1990s, the system of housing production and consumption 
has been increasingly deregulated, moving clearly towards a greater emphasis 
on market mechanisms (Hirayama, 2005; Oizumi, 2002). In an increasingly 
globalized economic environment, the housing system in Japan, as in many other 
countries, has been experiencing volatile economic conditions, greater social 
fragmentation and pressure to cut back on social spending and public subsidies. 
In context of the broader structure of change, there have been similar trends 
between Japan and other industrialized countries in terms of attempts to promote 
market-based housing provision. This does not mean that there is a convergence in 
housing systems among industrialized societies including Japan. The interaction 
of broader trends and indigenous local contexts in each society will lead to a more 
diversifi ed variety of housing systems and it is expected that the nature of Japan’s 
housing system will not be normalized by globalizing forces but will maintain its 
distinctiveness.
As housing has been the corner stone of the social mainstream, a catalyst of 
economic growth and the basis for social and welfare relationships, volatility 
in the housing market, fragmentation of households and value systems, and the 
growing demographic imbalance between young and old, have put the housing 
system under considerable strain and begun to test sustainability. At the beginning 
of the twenty-fi rst century, after more than a decade of economic insecurity and 
stagnation, the government has begun to take more radical steps in social and 
economic policies. Housing is again at the centre of transitional initiatives to revive 
Japanese cities, elevate the global status of the capital (Saito and Thornley, 2003), 
and revitalize the economy through increased marketization and reconstruction 
(Hirayama, 2005). 
Housing and social transition in Japan
Housing research in the international academic arena has been developed and 
dominated mainly by western-based researchers, and so housing theories and 
empirical research have developed in terms of western norms. The experiences of 
Japan as well as other non-western industrialized countries, however, demonstrate 
considerable diversity among modern housing systems and the ways in which 
housing is intertwined with broader processes of social and economic change. 
In most cases of comparative housing research led by western researchers, the 
housing situations in non-western societies have been tacitly characterized as 
‘unique’, ‘enigmatic’, ‘exceptional’, ‘ethnic’, ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘lagging cases’, 
and been seen as useful as long as they reinforce dominant theories.
Although there has been a growing body of housing research and literature 
within Japan, like many industrialized societies outside the occident, it has been 
largely ignored unless it has been expressed in English or appeared in European 
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and North American literatures. The specifi c consideration of housing and social 
change in Japan in English has been dominated by historical approaches or an 
emphasis on Japan’s special architectural and urban characteristics. Normative 
comparative understanding of Japanese housing systems and practices remain 
largely undeveloped. Critically, in understanding the increasing diversity of 
housing systems in the modern world, comparative approaches must be more 
diversifi ed, based on insights on housing practices and networks in each society, 
and grounded in indigenous context.
Beyond housing, there is little consensus on how to approach the analysis 
of social change in Japan more generally. Western models of interpretation of 
Japanese society have arguably been ethnocentric, based on assumptions about 
social structures and subjectivities. Models like those of Nakane Chie (1973) of 
the ‘Vertical Society’, Ruth Benedict’s (1947) ‘Moralist’ model and Chalmers 
Johnson’s (1982) ‘Developmental State’ continue to exercise infl uence despite 
empirical and theoretical fl aws and the scale of social and economic change in 
Japan in recent decades. Within Japan, discourses of ‘Nihonjinron’ or theories of 
Japaneseness, which emphasize the unique aspects of Japanese culture, have until 
recent years also dominated perceptions of social processes, and while some have 
been critical of exclusivist currents (Dale, 1986), others have identifi ed the benefi ts 
of applying an approach free of the universalism and ‘pervasive rationalism of 
western social thinking’ (Clammer, 1995).
This volume analyses housing in the case of Japan with the aim of contributing 
to the de-construction of the dominant norm in housing studies and the 
diversifi cation of the understanding of relationships between housing and social 
change. Perspectives will be drawn together from Japan-based authors engaging 
with Japanese society in terms of housing as one of its most central and dynamic 
elements, and central to contemporary issues concerning social change and 
emerging social inequalities. Our approach refl ects debates that are currently being 
played out within the Japanese policy sphere and academic forum with particular 
refl exivity to comparative theoretical discourses concerning housing and society, 
and political and economic developments globally. The main purpose of this book 
is to consider different elements of the housing system and different aspects of 
related social change in Japan in context of their implications for understanding 
housing and social transformation in general as well as the consequences for 
Japanese society itself. 
Western political-economists have focused on recent social change in Japan in 
terms of reform of the institutional structures which maintain the core character 
of ‘Japanese economic nationalism’ (Schaede and Grimes, 2003), while social 
theorists have focused on the effects of economic change on consumption and 
patterns of identifi cation (Clammer, 1995, 1997). Our approach to social change 
in Japan, by focusing on housing as a point of interaction between macro socio-
economic forces and micro subjective relations, incorporates structural elements 
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as well as social relationships and identities. Each chapter deals with different 
elements of the housing and social system, from individual, family and cultural 
processes to policy, political economy and state responses. Moreover, each chapter 
engages with theories and literatures derived both within and without Japan.
In advanced industrialized societies, housing defi nes social relationships and 
signifi es the class and status of the household or neighbourhood. Housing and 
the home is a source of identity and identifi cation (Rapoport, 1981) and has been 
emphasized as a critical locale for the ‘self’ and ontological security (Saunders, 
1990). Furthermore, housing shapes economic relationships between individuals, 
households, institutions and the state, especially where family-owned properties 
constitute a household’s largest investment and asset, and reservoir for individual 
and family welfare exchanges and services. The housing system also mediates the 
relationship between capital, the most mobile element of the economic sphere, 
and land, the least mobile (Stephens, 2003), and thus links domestic economic 
processes with national and international ones.
Japan’s system of housing is particularly central to economic development as 
well as family welfare, employment, security, inequality and social-class relations 
– perhaps more so than any other advanced industrialized economy. Indeed, 
Japan’s brand of capitalism and modernity is peculiar by western expectations, 
which offers substantial opportunities to examine the relationships between 
housing and society in conditions which contrast substantially with those assumed 
in mainstream housing and urban studies (Ronald, 2004).
‘Transition’ is an important way of considering social processes and the 
dynamics of modernity, and how different elements of the social system interact 
and develop. During conditions of turbulence the Japanese government has in 
the past turned to housing policy as a means to stabilize families and infl uence 
economic recovery and growth. In the early post-war era, catching up with 
the economies and societies of the West was the main objective of social and 
economic policies. Since the collapse of the economic bubble in the early 1990s, 
however, the direction of policy and social development has become unclear and 
‘fragmentation’, ‘confusion’ and ‘anxiety’ have become the zeitgeist watchwords, 
while the government has begun to rally around ‘marketization’ and ‘deregulation’ 
as solutions to apparent crisis. As ‘transition’ also implies a state of transformation 
to an undefi ned future state, it is particularly apt in consideration of the state of the 
Japanese housing and social system at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century.
For early post-war generations, housing provided stability and, due to the 
expansion of home ownership, a means for families to accumulate substantial 
capital assets. Since the 1990s, however, the natures of housing markets, global 
economic pressures and changes in employment structures have led to increasing 
instability. The vicissitudes of the Japanese housing market have become entangled 
with global patterns of volatility, instability and transformation. Japan stands on 
a unique axis as a mature industrialized economy with modernized social and 
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economic structures and institutions similar to western societies, but also as a 
non-western, culturally distinct society located at the heart of the Asian political-
economic nexus. Japan’s position in the world economy and its growing integration 
with East Asian economies has mediated a specifi c pattern of development in 
recent decades where housing markets and housing investments are playing an 
increasing part in the security of households, bolstering economic growth and the 
restructuring of markets and fi nance.
The nature and pattern of social transformation in Japan, therefore, provides the 
opportunity to gain critical and substantial insights into the effects of globalization 
and social change on a specifi c housing system and society. How Japan is 
changing has become a central topic of socio-economic analyses as Japan resisted 
global rules for its domestic markets for decades and appears to be continuing to 
attempt to manage the effects of globalization via practices of ‘guided markets’ 
and ‘managed competition’ (Schaede and Grimes, 2003). Even Japan’s recent 
renewed commitment to restructuring, deregulation and the principles of neo-
liberalism, appears constrained by bureaucratic processes and confl ict between 
the conservative and more radical elements within the ruling political elite.
How local elements interact with globalization is largely unpredictable and 
the forces of globalization, whether they are ideological, social or economic, are 
leading to different types of developments in different parts of each society. The 
effects of wider changes on the housing situation are thus subject to the social, 
economic, political and institutional contexts of particular countries, and Japan 
has demonstrated some specifi c and peculiar outcomes in relation to the housing 
sphere. Essentially, the Japanese housing system is undergoing drastic changes 
due to the increasing uncertainty of economic conditions and the fragmentation of 
the social structure, and its new direction is unclear at present. More universally, 
the combination of broader changes and indigenous contexts are leading to 
the production of more diversifi ed housing systems. As a new housing system 
emerges in Japan, it will be infl uenced by wider trends but with localized effects, 
and will move along a new trajectory radically divorced from the earlier context 
of policy and system development. What is increasingly apparent, and what is a 
central message of this book, is that housing matters and has become critical in 
the shaping of socio-economic relationships and changes at multiple levels across 
and beyond Japanese society.
Examining the housing system
This book considers the dynamic relationship between the housing system and 
social transition in terms of numerous elements and perspectives. Each chapter 
deals with a particular aspect of housing and change in Japan and can be read as an 
individual paper in its own terms. However, there are a number of key phenomena 
that are consistently addressed in determining the post-war trajectory of housing 
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and society. Rapid economic growth and urbanization have been fundamental 
contextual elements, as well as the growth of the company system, political 
stability and the formation of a middle-class social mainstream and ‘standard 
family’ model.
In the post-economic-bubble environment of the twenty-fi rst century there are 
three critical dimensions which have become more defi nitive in shaping social 
changes. The fi rst is demographic, as Japan has begun to demonstrate the effects 
of societal ageing (the over-65-year-old age group accounted for 19.5 per cent of 
the total population in 2004) and declining fertility (the fertility rate, indicating 
how many children an average woman is expected to give birth to, was 1.29 in 
2004). This has not only eroded the established system of housing, where the 
foundations of the housing ladder have been undermined and household formation 
and intergenerational relations have begun to fragment, but also challenged the 
sustainability of the society itself where the total population is expected to decline 
radically (by more than 7 per cent over the next 25 years), and the economically 
active population is increasingly stretched by the demands of an expanding elderly 
population. The second dimension is economic as the period of rapid economic 
growth has painfully drawn to a close, and companies, households and the state 
are increasingly under pressure to survive in an unfamiliar context of economic 
stagnation, growing global competitiveness and a post-fordist restructuring of 
production and employment. The third dimension is policy-based. After more 
than a decade of economic decline, the state has had to reorientate its practices, 
perspectives and goals. The socio-political climate has shifted towards a neo-
liberal agenda where privatization, deregulation and marketization have become 
prioritized over traditional principles of benign authority, social solidarity and 
mutual assistance.
In chapter 2, Hirayama sets out in more specifi c terms the emerging relationships 
between the state, housing policy and social formation identifi ed at the beginning 
of this chapter. In the early post-war environment home ownership and housing 
construction were seen as engines for both economic growth and middle-class 
formation and Hirayama’s argument is that the housing system has indeed been a 
central catalyst, determining much of the force and direction in socio-economic 
change following the war. The policy pillars of the modern housing system were 
established in the early 1950s, and by the 1980s Japan had surpassed housing 
shortage problems and entered an era of oversupply. Essentially, the early post-
war housing context established owner-occupation and a housing ladder that 
became defi nitive in forming a middle-class social mainstream society where the 
accumulation of housing assets was central.
The bursting of the economic bubble at the end of the 1980s initiated a period 
of economic volatility and market decline leading to the destabilization of the 
owner-occupation orientated housing system. Housing trajectories have been 
increasingly differentiated while the security and value of housing assets have 
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diminished. New social, spatial and economic patterns are emerging in urban 
areas which have been increasingly determined by the characteristics of housing 
markets and residential development. In terms of policy, housing has been dropped 
from the social agenda and instead the government has sought to deregulate and 
marketize. This reorientation refl ects a new stage and logic in policy, but sustains 
the principle that housing has broad-scale socio-economic impacts and is a catalyst 
for social change.
The structure of the housing system is examined further in chapter 3 where 
Oizumi engages with the changing dynamics of the housing industries. Housing 
construction in Japan is highly accelerated with a volume of production that far 
exceeds (by as much as fi vefold in some cases) the relative levels of building 
per capita in Europe and North America. Housing construction experienced 
substantial and sustained growth in the post-war decades, but this sector too has 
been fundamentally challenged by post-bubble social and economic changes. The 
structures of the housing industries are currently in fl ux, and the way they react 
to changing conditions will defi ne economic conditions for households and will 
shape urban environments. Specifi cally, Oizumi considers how the downturn in 
the economy and housing market affect, fi rst, structures of housing fi nance, and 
second, the construction industry.
The government housing loan system has been at the heart of the post-war home 
ownership system. However, as a result of policy shift this traditional structure of 
housing fi nance will be demolished in order for banks and private interests to 
expand into the housing loan market. This change threatens to destabilize the 
current balance within the housing fi nance system and deregulation will exacerbate 
housing and fi nancial problems for more vulnerable households. Housing stock 
and construction practices in Japan have a very peculiar character, dominated 
by the ‘scrap and build’ system and the control of house-building companies. 
Within the construction sector, intensifi ed competition and concentration among 
house-builders has been a result of changing market conditions. The sector has 
responded by putting renewed pressure on the government to deregulate further 
and stimulate more construction. Oizumi’s argument essentially asserts that 
housing fi nance and construction are key macro elements which interact strongly 
with socio-economic factors. Furthermore, these elements are in transition which 
may destabilize relationships and have long-term repercussions. 
The nature of welfare housing is complex in Japan and is also facing many 
similar pressures to the private housing sector. In chapter 4 Sato illustrates the 
residual nature of Japanese social housing policy and the unusual and substantial 
support the sector has received, historically, from the corporate sector. Housing 
as a welfare good, in terms of both subsidized rental and owner-occupied tenure, 
has been fundamentally supported by the ‘company society’, and fi rms have 
taken up the responsibilities for housing workers that are normally taken on by 
the state in other industrialized societies. Sato explores the theoretical context 
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of welfare regime theory, identifying how poorly Japan meets traditional models 
and classifi cations and how signifi cant corporate housing benefi ts have been in 
the housing system. He goes on to consider how corporate welfare has shrunk 
in recent years as a result of the economic sea change, the restructuring of the 
employment market, and the adjustments companies have made to their company 
housing property assets and employee housing subsidy packages. 
One of the key social changes consistently identifi ed in contemporary 
Japan is the growing number of older people as a proportion of the population. 
Japan demonstrates an extreme form of a demographic pattern that will have 
considerable effects across advanced industrial societies. In chapter 5 Izuhara 
explores changing relationships, in the post-bubble context, between generations 
of households and housing assets. In Japan, older generations hold a large amount 
of the accumulated national wealth which the government has began to target in 
its strategies to revitalize the economy. However, much of this equity is held in 
the form of housing and property assets and older generations tend to be ‘asset 
rich–cash poor’, which ties up capital. The baby-boomer generation in Japan has 
been a critical one in that it forged post-war family formation, led the infl ation 
of the economic bubble and shaped the modern housing market. It is now seen 
as the generation that is driving societal ageing, and is associated with growing 
problems of dependency and the potential crisis in pensions.
Izuhara begins by setting out the signifi cance of the policy debate in this area 
and the growing impetus of asset-based approaches to public policy. She explores 
the pattern of social policy and socialization of care, and how changing family 
and household relations are being impacted. State policy has set out to encourage 
the release of wealth from older generations who increasingly need to support 
themselves and provide for care from the assets accumulated over their lifetimes. 
The chapter considers in depth different strategies by which older generations are 
able, or not, to liquidize housing assets and the subsequent effects. 
In chapter 6 Hinokidani focuses attention further on the role of family and 
family formation, identifying the incongruities between housing, social policy 
and household needs. A critical contemporary change in Japan has been the 
decline in the ‘standard family’ model and lifecycle pathway. Individual living and 
households of couples without children have expanded rapidly in recent decades 
while appropriate and affordable dwelling types have been undersupplied. At 
the same time suitable family housing has been predominantly supplied in the 
owner-occupied sector and is fundamentally lacking in the private rental sector. 
Hinokidani considers the situation of women, and the needs of the growing 
number of women outside the ‘standard family’ model, in particular. The role of 
women in social life as well as the economy has been undergoing considerable 
transformation. Policy frameworks, institutional approaches and support systems 
have lagged substantially behind this transformation. Housing conditions have 
been a considerable obstacle to improving life chances and enhancing the quality of 
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living for many families, and in particular female-headed households. Hinokidani 
critically identifi es that there are many common features to women’s experiences 
of the built environment across societies, but that social and institutional responses 
have varied depending on the features of housing and the housing system as well as 
social norms. Japan’s built environment and social values demonstrate a peculiar 
pattern among advanced industrialized nations, which has structured particular 
patterns of marginalization and social inequality.
Problems of social exclusion and inequality are explored further in chapter 7 
in relation to the most marginal of housing groups, the homeless. Iwata considers 
how social changes in the nature of family support as well as economic changes 
in the employment structure have mediated new patterns of inequality. Massive 
increases in homelessness and street living have been a highly visible symptom 
of the post-bubble economy, and mark a substantial transition in the condition of 
Japanese society. ‘Social exclusion’ is a key analytical concept for understanding 
the character of homelessness in a society, and has largely been ignored in the 
understanding of social disadvantage in Japan. Iwata argues that homelessness 
should be thought of as a special form of exclusion within a framework of 
contemporary socio-economic change, and not as a surface phenomenon of 
poverty and inequality.
Iwata focuses on street homelessness in Tokyo and the processes by which 
people ended up in this condition. The features of its homeless community are 
very specifi c to the Japanese context. The homeless are predominantly older 
men who have either never married or are divorced. They largely have a poor 
education and many come from a particular category of marginal employment 
prior to becoming homeless. One of the biggest groups comes from the 
construction industry day labourer sector which has been hard hit in the post-
bubble economy. As well as considering a typology of the homeless based on 
survey research, Iwata considers government practices and policies that have 
sought to deal with the homeless through inclusion. These policies have taken 
the form of either inclusion through work or inclusion through housing. Iwata 
also addresses the relative pitfalls and successes of each of these approaches as 
well as central mediating factors.  
Housing not only concerns policy, buildings and residential practices, it is 
also at the centre of a broad network of social, cultural and political relations. 
Dwelling and dwellings have been radically transformed by urbanization and 
modernization, and they represent a key element in understanding how each 
society manifests its unique brand of modernity. Chapter 8 considers policy 
change and socio-economic developments in Japan in more socio-historical 
terms, dealing with the house and home as a nodal point of social relations. The 
interaction of dimensions of tradition and modernization in housing and social 
life are critical in understanding modern Japanese society. The resignifi cation of 
the home specifi cally, as an owner-occupied family commodity that stimulates 
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middle-class identifi cation, has been achieved while retaining strong associations 
of the house and traditional social values and relations.
Ronald examines the origins of the modern housing system beginning with the 
Meiji restoration in the second half of the nineteenth century in order to identify 
sustained aspects of social change in the process of modernization. He addresses 
changes in the meaning of the house and home and the physical form of dwellings 
as crucial elements that have mediated the interaction of the self, society and 
the built environment. The concept of ie, meaning the house, home or family, 
has historically been at the heart of Japanese culture and social organization, and 
in the pre-modern era defi ned hierarchical relationships within and between the 
household and society. Early modernizers sought to transform ie as a means to 
modernize and, to a lesser extent, westernize the family and society. Post-war reform 
sought more radical change in household behaviour and the built environment 
that would support the political hegemony and socio-political stability, and would 
drive economic expansion. Despite radical social change, the concept of ie and 
the idea of traditional family relations have remained central in modern housing 
processes, where houses have become commodities. Essentially, Ronald argues 
that ie and houses themselves have undergone radical transformation while at the 
same time mediating stability and continuity in identifi cation processes and social 
relations. In the post-bubble environment the housing system has come under 
considerable strain and the integrity of ie and modern housing practices have been 
undermined by market decline and social fragmentation.
The fi nal chapter attempts to situate the Japanese housing system within 
prevailing models of understanding of the role of housing in advanced industrial 
societies. Convergent themes from each of the chapters are brought together 
in order to demonstrate the role housing has played in facilitating stability as 
well as patterns of social change. We ultimately seek to evaluate developments 
in housing policy and system elements, accounting for their potential infl uence 
in future transformations in Japanese society. In more universal terms, we also 
explore how Japan conceptually fi ts and challenges prevailing conceptualizations 
of housing and social change. While Japan has traditionally proved a problematic 
fi t in western models of housing and social policy, recent theorizations have tried 
to integrate the Tiger economies of East Asian societies within a typology that 
accounts for greater regional variation in welfare capitalism where housing and 
home ownership assets are central politically and economically (see Esping-
Andersen, 1997; Doling, 1999; Holliday, 2000; Ronald, 2005). An obstacle to 
integrating a model of East Asian societies has been the fundamental complexity 
and diversity of policy and systems approaches across this group. Our argument 
also attempts to identify how housing plays a role in mediating both the convergent 
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2 Reshaping the housing 
system




In post-war Japan, the housing system has driven the expansion of home ownership 
as a means to facilitate the formation of a middle-class society. Associated 
with vigorous economic growth, an expanding group of households on middle 
incomes emerged who were able to purchase their own housing. In addition, 
the massive infl ow of the population into urban areas and a rise in the number 
of households provoked a tremendous demand for housing, which accelerated 
housing construction and further supported economic growth. It was assumed 
that many people in middle-class society led a ‘standard life-course’ and formed 
nuclear families constituting a normalized form of the ‘standard household’. As 
the prices of land and housing rose rapidly, owning a house, which produced a 
considerable capital gain, was an advantageous means of accumulating assets, 
and an increasing number of households designed their life-courses with a view 
to eventually becoming a homeowner. The housing system has operated as an 
instrument not only to provide housing, but also to transform social and economic 
conditions. A clear orientation towards the production of a ‘social mainstream’ 
was thus evident in the post-war housing system, in which the increase in middle-
class families promoted home ownership and the development of the owner-
occupied housing sector in turn nurtured the middle classes (Hirayama, 2003a; 
Ronald, 2004).
The strategy of the government in forming housing policy was directed 
towards encouraging middle-class home ownership. The so-called ‘three pillars’ 
of post-war housing policy were systematized by: the GHLC (Government 
Housing Loan Corporation) Act of 1950; the Public Housing Act of 1951; 
and the JHC (Japan Housing Corporation) Act of 1955. The GHLC, a state 
agency, provided middle-income households with long-term, fi xed low-interest 
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mortgages in order to facilitate access to home ownership. Public housing, 
subsidized by the national government, and constructed, owned and managed 
by local governments, was provided for low-income people with subsidized 
rents. The JHC was founded as an agency of the state to develop multi-family 
housing estates for middle-income households in large cities. The ‘three pillars’ 
of housing policy were not given equal priority. The government has particularly 
emphasized the provision of GHLC loans to facilitate home ownership while 
the direct provision of public housing has increasingly been residualized. The 
explicit bias towards encouraging the owner-occupied sector and the generous 
support for middle-class household housing purchase has been at the heart of 
housing policy in post-war Japan (Harada, 1985; Hayakawa, 2002; Hirayama, 
2003a; Ohmoto, 1985). Essentially, the combination and interaction of a growing 
middle class and home ownership were regarded as key factors in stabilizing 
socio-economic conditions.
The housing system and its socio-economic base, however, lost stability in 
the last decade of the twentieth century. The collapse of the so-called ‘bubble 
economy’ at the beginning of the 1990s triggered an economic crisis – a long 
recession, a rising unemployment rate, a decline in income and a chain reaction of 
enterprise bankruptcies. Owner-occupied housing, which used to produce capital 
gains, began to generate capital losses and the security of residential property 
as an asset was undermined severely. Associated with a more volatile, uncertain 
economy, the function of the housing system to promote home ownership has been 
weakening. The demographic composition of society has also been drastically 
transformed due to an unprecedented increase in the elderly and a drop in the 
fertility rate. The proportion of conventional nuclear family households is in 
decline, and single, elderly-only and couple-only households are increasing (see 
Izuhara and Hinokidani, in this volume). What will have the greatest impact on 
social and economic organization in the foreseeable future is a rapid decrease 
in the total population. As life-courses and household formation have become 
varied, the concept of a ‘standard household’ and a ‘standard life-course’ has 
lost its salience and former generality in the current demographic context. At the 
beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, the basis of middle-class society grounded 
on home ownership is becoming less clear.
Since the middle of the 1990s, the government has radically geared its housing 
policy towards accentuating the role of the market in providing and fi nancing 
housing, and has begun to dissolve the traditional ‘three pillars’. The GHLC will be 
abolished by the end of the fi scal year 2006 and its successor, the Housing Finance 
Agency, will withdraw from the primary mortgage market and, thereafter, deal 
only with the secondary market of mortgage securities. The JHC was reorganized 
into the HUDC (Housing and Urban Development Corporation) in 1981, then 
into the UDC (Urban Development Corporation) in 1999 and again into the URA 
(Urban Renaissance Agency) in 2004. The new URA retreated almost completely 
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from construction of new housing. New starts of public housing for low-income 
households have almost stopped and its role in housing policy will be residualized 
even more. Critically, the conventional framework of housing policy has been 
broken up and the relationship between the government and the market in terms 
of housing provision is entering a period of fundamental restructuring.
This chapter explores the processes and implications of transformations in the 
housing system in present-day Japan with particular reference to the changing 
nature of home ownership. Until the middle of the 1970s, there was an acute 
housing shortage, and the housing system was pressed to produce a large 
number of dwellings to meet the people’s housing needs. The mass construction 
of housing, particularly owner-occupied housing, played a signifi cant role in 
addressing the housing shortage and improving housing conditions. Since the 
1980s, a housing surplus has been seen with a rise in the vacancy rate, marking 
the mitigation of conventional housing problems. On the other hand, however, the 
system of housing provision has increasingly been embedded within the wider 
structure of social and economic transitions and the role of home ownership as 
a way to facilitate socio-economic restructuring has become unpredictable. The 
housing system, which used to devote itself to housing production, should now 
be understood in the context of broader change. The chapter not only looks at 
owner-occupied housing but also highlights home ownership as a catalyst for 
wider social transformations.
Home ownership and middle-class society
Before we explore the contemporary restructuring of the home ownership system, 
it is necessary to look at the traditional post-war framework of housing provision. 
Home ownership promotion facilitated by the housing system has been heavily 
implicated in economic development and the formation of middle-class society. 
This section thus provides an appreciation of the nature of the conventional home 
ownership oriented housing system as being interconnected with the shaping of 
the post-war socio-economic order.
The continuity or intermittence of Japanese society before and after the war can 
be looked at from various angles. When focusing on post-war change, however, 
one of its most clear-cut elements is the expansion of home ownership. According 
to a survey on housing situations in major cities, conducted by the government in 
1941, the proportion of owner-occupied houses was only 22 per cent while that of 
private rental houses exceeded 70 per cent (Hayakawa and Ohmoto, 1988). The 
Rent Regulation Ordinance during and immediately after the war discouraged 
the provision of private rental housing and subsequently an increasing number of 
owner-occupied private houses began to be built (Miyake, 1985). Within a short 
period after the end of the war owner-occupation became the dominant housing 
tenure, and by the 1950s the level of home ownership increased to more than half 
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the housing stock. Critically, post-war Japanese society was characterized by its 
rapid transformation into a ‘homeowner society’ (Sumita, 1980).
The housing system framework of home ownership expansion was established 
during the period of high-speed economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Along with accelerated development in industry and the economy, an increasing 
number of middle-class families were encouraged to acquire their own homes. As 
urbanization intensifi ed and the number of households rose due to a transformation 
in the dominant form of household from an extended family household to a nuclear 
household, the increasing demand for dwellings facilitated the mass construction 
of housing, which in turn stimulated economic growth further. The prices of land 
and housing rose rapidly and continuously, and at a much higher rate than income 
and consumer prices, which meant that owner-occupied housing provided owners 
with considerable capital gains. Underlying the development of home ownership 
therefore was the structural interconnection of economic growth, mass demand for 
housing, the expansion of the middle class and house price infl ation. The rise of 
‘homeowner society’ essentially corresponded with the formation of an ‘affl uent 
society’, which dynamically restructured social and economic landscapes in post-
war Japan.
The government played a key role in creating the home ownership oriented 
housing system. Among the ‘three pillars’ of housing policy, the provision of 
GHLC loans has particularly been emphasized in promoting home ownership. 
Despite rapid urbanization, the level of owner-occupied housing has remained 
at around 60 per cent between 1963 and 2003 due to the measures used to 
accelerate housing acquisition (see Table 2.1). The ratio of private rental housing 
has been the second highest at around 25 per cent. However, housing policy has 
not directly supported private rental housing. There has been little assistance for 
the construction of private rental housing and absolutely no provision of rental 
subsidy. Direct provision of rental housing by the public sector has been regarded 
as a marginal measure. The ratios of public housing and JHC rental housing to total 
housing have been very low, at around 5 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively.
The housing system divided mainstream society into an inside and an outside, 
generating a ‘social fl ow’ of people moving from the outside into the inside. 
The boundaries dividing society were drawn between those on low incomes and 
those with higher incomes, and between renters and homeowners. The fi ltering 
(or trickledown) system elaborated a ‘housing ladder’ in which people were 
expected to move from a rental dwelling to an owner-occupied dwelling, and from 
a condominium to a single-family home. Mai homu, meaning ‘my own home’, 
and niwatsuki ikkodate jutaku, meaning a ‘single-family house with garden’, 
were located on and represented the top of the ladder. The housing system, which 
concentrated resources inside mainstream society, subtly coerced people into 


























































































































































































































































































































































































The system of housing provision functioned as a means to expand middle-class 
home ownership. The tenure of housing has correlated very closely with the age 
and income of a household. A young family is likely to live in a rental dwelling of 
relatively poor quality since their income tends to be low. However, as the family 
advances in age, their income generally increases so that they are likely to be able 
to purchase a better quality house. The aggregation of moves of people climbing 
up the ‘housing ladder’ created a ‘social fl ow’ which swelled the ‘homeowner 
society’. Housing policy, which vigorously promoted home ownership by means 
of GHLC loans, allotted the largest part of public funds to middle-income groups 
rather than low-income groups. This distributive pattern of public resources biased 
towards the better-off was rationalized in terms of the effectiveness of the fi ltering 
system, which was thought to improve the housing conditions of the lower classes 
through the chain reaction of household moves.
Japanese society is often referred to as a ‘company society’, and companies 
have played an important part in reinforcing the housing system (Ohmoto, 1996; 
see also Sato, this volume). A lifelong employment system and a seniority system 
for wages and promotion provided employees with a steady increase in income 
and thus enabled them to aggregate substantial fi nancial stability for housing 
purchase. Major corporations implemented in-house systems to support their 
employees in securing housing, which was embedded in the fi ltering system. 
Employee housing and rental subsidies were supplied for young employees, while 
employees at a later stage of the housing ladder could utilize a company loan 
system to purchase a house. The bigger the corporation the better the conditions 
of in-house housing systems were. According to a survey on employee benefi ts 
programmes, conducted by the Institute of Labour Administration in 2003 
and 2004, the percentages of corporations which provided corporation-owned 
employee housing, leased employee housing and loans for housing purchase were 
28 per cent, 75 per cent and 58 per cent respectively in the case of corporations 
with less than 1,000 employees, while the fi gures were as high as 78 per cent, 92 
per cent and 97 per cent respectively in the case of corporations with 3,000 or 
more employees (Institute of Labour Administration, 2004).
People’s aspirations for home ownership developed rapidly during the period 
of high-speed economic growth. Among the households who intended to improve 
their housing situation, the proportion of those who aimed at owning a house, 
which was 52 per cent in the Housing Situation Survey conducted in 1955, rose to 
74 per cent and to as high as 90 per cent in the Housing Demand Surveys carried 
out in 1966 and 1969, respectively (Tamaki, 1974). Various factors accounted for 
the development of home ownership aspirations (see Miyake, 1979). There was a 
large disparity in the physical condition of housing between the owner-occupied 
sector and the rental sector. It was next to impossible, therefore, to obtain a good 
quality dwelling in the rental housing market. Even if it was a burden to purchase 
a house, as income increased steadily, repayments on the loan were expected to 
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ease and the value of the house increase. The accumulation of an asset in the form 
of housing property was regarded as an effective means of securing the owner’s 
livelihood in their old age.
Those who own mai homu could claim that they were core members of the 
mainstream society (Hirayama, 2003a). Aspirations towards home ownership 
had an impact, not only in the economic dimension, but also socio-culturally. 
An owner-occupied house was not only defi ned in a material sense but was also 
symbolic of the new social status and attitude of the owner. Home ownership 
was linked to a socially constructed image – a combination of middle or high-
level income, stable employment and credibility, and property asset ownership. 
Owning a home meant that the owner belonged to the core of society and owning 
a niwatsuki ikkodate jutaku symbolized that the owner had climbed up the ladder 
and reached the top.
The housing system, which focused on the production of owner-occupied 
housing, inevitably generated social inequalities. While families with middle 
incomes received more allocation of public funds to obtain good-quality housing, 
low-income renters were allotted fewer funds for the improvement of their housing 
conditions. There were also large disparities in in-house housing systems between 
major corporations and small or medium-sized corporations. Despite economic 
prosperity, many people were excluded from ‘homeowner society’ and suffered a 
form of ‘housing poverty’ (Hayakawa, 1979; Honma, 1980).
It is indeed necessary to pay close attention to the dynamic nature of housing 
inequalities. The housing system was a mechanism which provided many 
households with the potential or promise of access to middle-class society. Even 
if present housing conditions were poor, as long as they were better than previous 
housing conditions and there was the prospect of obtaining a good-quality house in 
the foreseeable future, it was not hard for households to put up with poor housing 
conditions, and this was endured as a ‘temporary problem’ in the life-course. The 
system that encouraged people to purchase housing was able to operate, despite 
the poor conditions and inequalities it generated, because it was supported by 
the majority of people who placed their hopes in the ‘possibility’ of becoming 
members of the ‘homeowner society’. Many renters who aimed at purchasing 
a house regarded themselves as potential homeowners, and young people on 
low incomes, within the seniority system of wage augmentation and promotion, 
were able to expect an increase in income. In this context, the system, by means 
of encouraging people to join the ‘housing ladder’, could manipulate housing 
inequalities and frustration related to ‘housing poverty’. There were people who did 
not have any ‘possibility’ of joining the ‘social fl ow’ toward middle-class society. 
Low-income households could not afford to purchase a home and employees in 
small companies without a seniority system could not expect a steady increase 
in income. However, as long as the economy continued to grow and the majority 
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of people could climb up the ladder, social backlash over the home ownership 
oriented system was limited.
The ‘feeling of middle-classness’ expanded during the period of high-speed 
economic growth, with the popular phrase ichioku so churyu, meaning all 100 
million of Japan’s population (now around 126 million) regarded themselves as 
members of the middle class. Opinion polls regarding living standards, which 
have been conducted by the government since 1958, revealed that the proportion 
of those who saw the level of their living standards as ‘middle’ increased from 72 
per cent in 1958 to 87 per cent in 1965, then exceeded 90 per cent in 1973 and 
remained at around 90 per cent until the end of the 1970s (see Figure 2.1). The 
rate of those who considered their living standard as ‘middle of middle’ was 37 
per cent in 1958 and increased to around 60 per cent by the 1970s. Many scholars 
and commentators sought to account for this ‘feeling of middle-classness’. 
Murakami (1984) stressed that the structure of social classes had collapsed with 
the rise of the ‘affl uent society’ and instead a huge and homogeneous ‘new middle 
mass’ had emerged, while Kishimoto (1978), criticizing Murakami’s argument, 
demonstrated that the hierarchical class structure had not disappeared and that the 
‘feeling of middle-classness’ was just a social illusion. According to Imada (1989), 
there were no objective parameters to explain ‘feelings of middle-classness’ and 
people’s feelings and material conditions were unrelated.
There has been no evidence-based analysis of the ‘feeling of middle-classness’ 
related to housing in this period. It is not unreasonable, however, to consider that 
the expansion of home ownership was an engine in the formation of ‘feeling of 









































2.1 Self ranking of social class in Japan 1958–2004
Source: Cabinet Offi ce, Public Opinion Survey.
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of a property asset and membership of mainstream society, fostered a sense of 
identifi cation with the middle class. Even if a household was lower class, if they 
were able to expect to own a home in the future, they tended to regard themselves 
as a member of the middle class. The ‘feeling of middle-classness’ was born out 
of the expectation of change and improvement in living conditions rather than 
actual living standards experienced at a certain point in time. The housing system 
in forming a ‘housing ladder’ and ‘social fl ow’ supported the development of mass 
‘feeling of middle-classness’ and managed social inequalities successfully.
Residential property in an uncertain economy
It was in the 1990s that the organization of the home ownership based housing 
system began to unravel due to the overall disintegration of conventional social 
and economic frameworks. In this section I begin to address understandings of 
the transformations in the housing system within the wider context of socio-
economic restructuring. The economic bubble was a key catalyst in reshaping 
the housing system. The bubble economy began with an abnormal rise in land 
and housing prices in the latter half of the 1980s and subsequently collapsed at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Since the bubble burst, owner-occupied housing has 
generated capital losses and residential property assets have been mired in a cycle 
of devaluation (Forrest et al., 2003; Hirayama, 2003b). From the end of the war 
to the end of the 1980s, Japanese economic growth had been deeply intertwined 
with the continuous rise in real estate values. This had been considered a ‘natural 
phenomenon’ and operated as a capital gain based system. The sharp drop in land 
and housing prices after the bubble collapsed threw the Japanese economy into 
confusion and a long, deep recession (Oizumi, 1994).
Although the direct factor that caused the devaluation of residential properties 
was the bursting of the bubble, it is noticeable that the over-construction of 
owner-occupied housing further encouraged the drop in house prices. Housing 
construction was an engine for economic development in post-war Japan (see 
Oizumi, in this volume). With the fi rst oil crisis in 1973 as a turning point, 
housing policy became a direct measure for the stimulation of the economy and 
the government put increasing importance on the expansion of GHLC loans. The 
GHLC launched a series of new systems to expand home ownership. The step 
repayment system, in which the amount of repayments was lowered for the fi rst 
fi ve years, began to operate in 1979 and a two-generational mortgage system, 
in which children took over their parents’ mortgage, was established in 1980. 
Moreover, the provision of supplementary loans, which were added to basic loans, 
was implemented in 1985.
In the period during and since the bubble economy, the government has 
continuously engaged in the promotion of housing construction. In context of 
Japan–US trade friction, the production of owner-occupied dwellings was 
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furiously promoted to increase domestic demand. The GHLC expanded the 
supply of mortgages and repeatedly improved its lending conditions. After the 
bubble collapsed, the government, in order to address economic downturn, 
further encouraged housing construction. In the fi rst half of the 1990s, the total 
amount of residential loans provided by the GHLC increased to a record high 
and its lending conditions improved even more. Income tax deduction for home 
purchasers was also expanded in stages in the 1990s to stimulate the demand for 
home ownership.
Relentless aggressive policies aimed at accelerating mass construction of 
housing led to over-supply of owner-occupied dwellings, which amplifi ed the 
post-bubble devaluation of residential properties. The post-war housing system, 
which was established in an era of housing shortage and of urbanization, aimed 
to fuel housing production in order to meet the huge demand for dwellings. As 
housing construction progressed and urbanization began to subside, however, 
an era of housing surplus began in the middle of the 1980s. Since the fi rst half 
of 1970s, when the total number of dwellings exceeded that of households, the 
vacancy rate has risen, from 7.6 per cent in 1978 to 9.8 per cent in 1993, and to 
12.2 per cent in 2003. There remain numbers of substandard dwellings, and good-
quality housing is still in short supply. In this context, the housing shortage has not 
been resolved. The facts are, however, that the quantity of housing is now more 
than suffi cient and that vacancy rates are rising. Miyake (1991), having analysed 
the structure of demand for housing, called attention to the emergence of what 
he calls ‘negative demand’. As his research showed, demand for a certain type of 
housing in a certain area could drop sharply, resulting in an increase in vacancies. 
The traditional housing system operated on the assumption that ‘positive demand’ 
for dwellings would be continuously generated. The expansion of ‘negative 
demand’ in the era of housing surplus, however, has begun to affect the housing 
market more signifi cantly.
A watershed in the history of post-war housing policy is the abolition of the 
GHLC. The economic policy of the government has been traditionally Keynesian, 
and in this context the provision of GHLC mortgages was expanded in order 
to address the post-bubble recession. However, national fi nances have become 
trapped and government sector debts have risen to crisis levels. In the late 1990s, 
the government reoriented its economic policy radically towards the downsizing of 
the public sector and the deregulation of the market economy. In accordance with 
this policy shift, it was judged to be prudent to do away with the GHLC, which is a 
huge fi nancial burden, and to enlarge and deregulate the private mortgage market 
(see Oizumi, in this volume). Private lending institutions, having suffered the 
post-bubble recession, have been calling for the expansion of the private housing 
loan market. Financing for housing purchase, which was supported by Keynesian 
style governance, is now expected to be met by the market. It remains to be seen 
what will come from the abolition of the GHLC.
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The extent of housing devaluation has been strongly differentiated between 
different types of dwelling (Hirayama, 2003b). In the 1980s when the economic 
bubble swelled, the prices of all types of owner-occupied housing rose at a similar 
rate. In the 1990s after the bubble collapsed, however, the rate at which housing 
prices fell differed greatly depending on the type of owner-occupied housing (see 
Figure 2.2). The fall was greater among second-hand housing than in newly built 
housing, and for condominiums rather than for single-family dwellings. In other 
words, the depreciation of second-hand condominiums has been marked, and 
the scale of capital losses generated on condominium properties is substantial. 














































































































































2.2 Nominal housing prices of homes with GHLC loans within a 70 km radius 
of Tokyo city
Source: Government Housing Loan Corporation.
2.3 Capital loss on typical condominium unit of 70 square metres within a 70 
km radius of Tokyo city







of a newly built condominium with a fl oor area of 70 square metres was ¥55.8 
million (£279,000; ¥200 = £1) in 1991. This fell to ¥19.1 million (£96,000) by 
2003, generating a capital loss of ¥36.7 million (£184,000). Households which 
purchased a condominium in the bubble peak have lost more than half of the value 
of their property asset.
The drop in the marketability of second-hand housing was further accelerated 
by institutional factors (Hirayama, 2005). Home ownership housing policy has 
provided advantages for the acquisition of new housing in order to promote 
housing construction. The repayment period for GHLC loan was longer for new 
housing than for second-hand housing, while the GHLC excluded the purchasers 
of dwellings over 25 years old. People also show a clear preference for new 
homes. According to the survey on ‘Public Opinion on Housing’ conducted by 
the government in 2004, to the question ‘if you purchase a home, which do you 
prefer a new house or an older house’, only 1.7 per cent of the respondents opted 
for second-hand housing but 66 per cent for new housing. As a comparative 
study on house price moves in Japan and Britain showed, while the patterns of 
price changes in new and old housing have been similar in Britain, price indices 
between new and old dwellings have greatly differed in Japan (Hirayama et al., 
2003). This implies that weakness in marketability of older stock is peculiar to the 
nature of the Japanese housing market.
As the government has persistently placed importance on the expansion of 
housing construction and home ownership, Japanese homeowners are now deeply 
in debt. As shown in Figure 2.4, the total amount of outstanding housing loans 
swelled from ¥48.2 trillion (£241 billion) in the fi scal year 1980 to ¥191.5 trillion 
(£958 billion) in the fi scal year 2001. The ratio of outstanding housing loans against 
GDP rose from 19.4 per cent to 38.2 per cent during the same period. Figure 2.5 
shows the tendency of the rate of households with a debt for a residential loan 
to have increased. Particularly among households whose heads are 45–49 years 
old, the rate of those having liabilities on mortgages, which was approximately 
20 per cent in 1970, rose to exceed 50 per cent in 2000. Since the late 1990s, 
while the outstanding residential loans of the GHLC have decreased, refl ecting 
the policy of downsizing the public sector, that of private fi nancial institutions has 
increased dramatically (see Figure 2.4). The mortgage market has increasingly 
become important for the banking sector. Major corporations since the 1980s have 
shifted their means of raising funds from intermediated fi nancing by banks to 
equity fi nancing. Accordingly, the banking sector, which has been losing quality 
corporations as loan destinations, has been engaged in exploiting the retail market 
of residential loans. In the 1990s when the recession deepened, the family budgets 
of households with housing loans deteriorated. The government promoted the 
acceleration of home purchase and expanded the mortgage market despite the 
increased instability of income and employment. As a result, the number of GHLC 
loans in default over six months increased from 3,340 to 46,582 between 1990 and 
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2003. When a GHLC loan cannot be repaid, the Financial Security Association 
takes over the loan. The number of such cases increased from 4,820 in 1990 to 
17,493 in 2003.
Together with the new conditions created by the volatile economy, the security 
of owning a house as an asset has been undermined. However, whether or not 
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2.4 Outstanding mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP
Source: Government Housing Loan Corporation.
2.5 Ratio of households with debts on residential property








economic destabilization of housing property, there is some evidence that people’s 
aspirations toward home ownership have not declined signifi cantly. According 
to the Survey on People’s Consciousness about Land Issues conducted by the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2004), though the ratio of those 
who answered that they want to own land and a house decreased from 88 per cent 
in 1996 to 82 per cent in 2003, the situation in which most people desire to own 
housing and land has not changed. An owner-occupied home in the post-bubble 
period is of new type with no promise of capital gains. The research showed that 
the proportion of those who agreed that land is a more secure asset than saving or 
stock dropped notably from 62 per cent in 1994 to 33 per cent in 2003. The number 
of people who purchase real estate expecting its market price to appreciate has 
decreased. However, the value of an owner-occupied dwelling is not comprised of 
only its value as an asset. The post-bubble demand for home ownership has been 
maintained by a desire for: a house of a relatively good quality; stable housing 
tenure with no fear of eviction; a controllable living space; and the representation 
of a social status. While the nature of home ownership cannot be stationary within 
an increasingly uncertain economy, the vitality of ‘homeowner society’ appears 
persistent.
Differentiation of housing pathways
The fi ltering system played a substantial role in generating a ‘social fl ow’ of 
people climbing up the ‘housing ladder’ to nurture the ‘homeowner society’. The 
functioning of the system, however, has begun to unravel due to the reorganization 
of socio-economic conditions, and accordingly household pathways relating to 
housing and home ownership have progressively been differentiated. The fi ltering 
system is effective as long as middle-class society is stable and the majority of 
people can join the social mainstream. When the social core is destabilized, the 
‘ladder’ sways and the ‘fl ow’ no longer runs smoothly. The focus of this section 
is on the differentiation in housing trajectories caused by the disintegration of the 
traditional fi ltering system.
The system in which home ownership and middle-class society reinforce each 
other has begun to fray. Since the 1990s, the persistent recession has undermined 
the living conditions of the middle class and social inequalities in terms of income 
distribution and employment stability have expanded. An increasing body of 
literature (see Sato, 2000; Tachibanaki, 1998) has provided substantial evidence 
of widening social disparities, which have played a role in drawing attention 
to the issue of social inequality. Although the ‘feeling of middle-classness’ is 
still persistent, there is a sign that the myth of ichioku so churyu is beginning 
to crumble. The proportion of those who regarded their living conditions as 
‘middle of middle’, which was around 60 per cent in the 1970s, dropped in the 
1980s (see Figure 2.1). From the 1970s to the 1980s academic investigations 
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into social class related themes declined substantially due to the unprecedented 
economic prosperity in which it was assumed that issues such as social inequality, 
unemployment and poverty would become marginal. Along with the prolonged 
economic recession, however, research on social classes and disparities has re-
emerged and intensifi ed in the Japanese academic sphere since the late 1990s (see 
Higuchi, 2003; Otake, 2005; Shirahase, 2005).
The fi ltering system was based on the assumption that many people form a 
‘standard household’ and live a ‘standard life-course’. Household forms and life-
courses, however, have been diversifying and the composition of society has been 
fragmented (see Hinokidani, in this volume). A ‘standard’ family or life-course 
can no longer be standard in present-day Japan where: there is a high speed of 
social ageing; the fertility rate is rapidly dropping; the age at marriage is rising; 
more people remain unmarried; and the divorce rate is going up. Conventional 
family households have been decreasing, and instead single households, elderly-
only households and childless couples have been increasing. According to the 
Population Census, from 1970 to 2000, the proportion of nuclear households with 
children dropped from 46.1 per cent to 32.8 per cent while that of single households 
rose from 10.8 per cent to 25.6 per cent. This tendency is more noticeable in urban 
areas, particularly big cities.
Cohort effects in the differentiation of housing pathways have become notable. 
This has been refl ected on the tendency of home ownership levels to drop particularly 
among young households (see Figure 2.6). An increase in single households and 
couples without children among the younger generation has been a factor in the 
delay in entering the home ownership market. The young cohorts have also been 





























2.6 Home ownership rate by age
Source: Statistics Bureau, Housing Survey of Japan and Housing and Land Survey of 
Japan.
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in employment and income, which has also caused the drop in the levels of home 
ownership. Since the latter half of the 1990s, an increase in the number of young 
people who are in neither employment, education or training has been regarded as 
a new social problem. It is apparent that the young generation is not following the 
life-course of the previous generations.
The extent of the impact caused by the rise and fall of the economic bubble 
on the asset value of owner-occupied housing is differentiated between cohorts. 
Shifts in the rate of home ownership by age cohort between 1988 and 1993, which 
marks the peak of the bubble, are shown in Table 2.2. Households who purchased 
a house in this period have experienced a serious devaluation of their properties. 
Baby-boomers who were born between 1947 and 1949 have followed a life-course 
that has clearly refl ected the social and economic changes in post-war Japan. In 
the cohort of those who were born in the period 1944–8, which includes many 
of the baby-boomers, the rate of home ownership reached 66.2 per cent by 1988, 
then increased by only 4.2 per cent to 70.4 per cent in 1993. This implies that the 
majority of the baby-boomer households had purchased a house before housing 
prices peaked and that, though they have experienced a devaluation of their 
property assets, the extent of the fall has been relatively small. By comparison, 
for the cohort of those who were born in the period 1954–8, which immediately 
followed the baby-boomer generation, the rate of home ownership between 1988 
and 1993 increased by 13.8 per cent from 38.4 per cent to 52.2 per cent. It is clear 
that many households in this cohort have experienced a substantial loss in the 
value of their housing assets.
The rise and fall of the bubble caused tremendous fl uctuations in house 
prices. It is, however, not only the economic bubble, but also the moves of the 
baby-boomer generation households up the housing ladder that encouraged the 
volatility of the housing market (Miyake, 1991). Many baby-boomers entered the 
Table 2.2 Home ownership rate by age cohort between 1988 and 1993
Birth year Home ownership 
rate as of 1988 (age) 
Home ownership rate 





1959–63 17.9% (25–29) 31.7% (30–34) 13.8%
1954–58 38.4% (30–34) 52.2% (35–39) 13.8%
1949–53 56.8% (35–39) 64.5% (40–44) 7.7%
1944–48 66.2% (40–44) 70.4% (45–49) 4.2%
1939–43 72.0% (45–49) 74.0% (50–54) 2.0%
1934–38 75.4% (50–54) 77.4% (55–59) 2.0%
Source: Statistics Bureau, Housing Survey of Japan.
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home ownership market by the early 1980s and produced a large-scale ‘positive 
demand’ for dwellings, which triggered the subsequent rise of house prices. 
By the early 1990s many baby-boomers had become homeowners and house 
prices began to drop. Essentially, the satiation of baby-boomer home ownership 
demand led to growing ‘negative demand’ in the owner-occupied housing market. 
The generation following the baby-boomer generation were thus pressed into 
purchasing houses at higher prices, resulting from the market boom brought on 
by the baby-boomers, and then experienced rapid devaluation of their housing 
properties in the post-bubble climate.
The fi ltering system, which has been reinforced by housing policy, will be 
affected by the dissolution of the GHLC. Compared with the GHLC, private 
banks set narrower qualifi cations in regard to repayment capacity and credibility 
for borrowing. The abolition of the GHLC means that it becomes diffi cult for 
low-income households, workers for small-sized companies and self-employed 
people to procure a mortgage to purchase a house. The GHLC, which provided 
long-term mortgages of fi xed low-interest mortgages, mitigated the infl uence of 
the volatile capital market on borrowers. It is not certain whether or not future 
bank loan conditions will be the same as those of GHLC loans. The ‘company 
society’, which has supported the fi ltering system, has weakened due to the 
prolonged recession and a more competitive business environment. An increasing 
number of corporations have been abandoning the conventional system of lifelong 
employment and introducing a performance-based system to replace the seniority 
system for wages and promotion. There has been an increase in short-term contract 
employees, part-time workers and temporary employees. It is not clear whether or 
not the in-house housing systems implemented by corporations will be maintained. 
Some surveys have shown that more companies have begun to unload their 
properties of employee housing and to abolish internal housing-related systems 
(Japan Institute of Life Insurance, 2003; Research Institute of Employee Benefi ts, 
2003). Baby-boomers climbed up the housing ladder, supported by low-interest 
GHLC mortgages and the employee benefi t programmes of corporations. Younger 
generations, however, will not be provided the level of support that was given by 
the GHLC and the ‘company society’ in becoming members of the ‘homeowner 
society’. They are required to ascend the housing ladder by themselves under 
more competitive market conditions.
The change in the pattern of housing tenure related to household moves, as 
shown in Figure 2.7, implies that the fi ltering system has become dysfunctional 
in terms of the promotion of home ownership. Throughout the 1980s, when the 
bubble economy developed, the number of moves from rental housing to owner-
occupied housing dropped sharply and moves in the opposite direction from an 
owner-occupied house to rental house increased. This tendency signifi es that the 
extraordinary rise in house prices reduced the number of fi rst-time homebuyers 
and made it fi nancially diffi cult to maintain owner-occupied tenure. After the 
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bubble collapsed, fi rst-time homebuyers increased due to the drop in house prices 
and the entry of baby-boomers’ children as a large cohort into the home ownership 
market, and moves from owner-occupied housing to rental housing decreased. On 
the other hand, moves within the owner-occupied sector continued to gradually 
decrease even after the bubble burst. The main reason is that households who 
purchased a condominium during the bubble period became tied down by a capital 
loss. It has become diffi cult for them to sell and move out of their condominiums. 
While capital gains fuelled the fi ltering system, capital losses effectively clogged 
the fi lter.
A new phenomenon for the housing system, which should be noted, is an 
agglomeration of a huge housing stock. The continued mass construction of 
housing throughout the post-war period resulted in more than a doubling of the 
total number of dwellings from 20 million in 1963 to 47 million in 2003 (see Table 
2.1). A massively swollen housing stock is a new factor that further differentiates 
household trajectories in relation to housing.
An increasing number of younger people are expected to inherit housing assets 
which their parents’ generation accumulated (see Izuhara, in this volume). A high 
rate of home ownership in the parents’ generation combined with a decreasing 
fertility means a rise in the possibility for the next generation to inherit residential 
properties. On the one hand, the increased probability of housing inheritance 
is likely to weaken the propensity of the following generation towards house 
purchase. Younger households have the option to wait to inherit their parents’ 
housing instead of purchasing a home with the burden of loan repayment. Older 
households also maintain home ownership partly in order to bequeath a property 




































2.7 Household moves and tenure change





Reshaping the housing system
33
Land Issues in 2003, approximately a half of respondents who wished to own land 
and housing expressed the intention to leave an asset for their offspring as a reason 
why they wanted to own a real estate property (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure 
and Transport, 2004). On the other hand, however, the next generation is often 
inclined to purchase their own housing rather than waiting to inherit, because 
expanding longevity tends to delay succession, and also the location of parents’ 
homes is not necessarily desirable for the offspring. A survey of 4,914 households 
conducted by the Postal Services Research Institute in 2004 revealed that 14.1 
per cent of the respondents had inherited residential real estate. While this fi gure 
becomes higher as the respondents get older – 17.5 per cent in their 50s, 21.1 per 
cent in their 60s and 23.8 per cent in their 70s – it is as low as 9.1 per cent in their 
40s and 2.7 per cent in their 30s (Postal Services Research Institute, 2005). This 
implies that most offspring households are not likely to inherit housing property 
in their 30s and 40s when they begin to need or desire an owner-occupied home.
In addition to the effects of inheritance, there are some households who 
own one or more additional residential property beside the home they live in. 
According to the Housing and Land Survey of 2003, 7.7 per cent of households 
had one or more additional dwellings. This proportion is higher for older people 
and for those whose income is high: 21.1 per cent of households with an annual 
income of ¥10 million (£50,000) or more and 11.3 per cent of households with its 
head aged 55 or older. Of all the additional dwellings, 42 per cent are occupied 
by the owner’s relatives and 35 per cent are rented out. Although the number of 
households who own additional housing property is small, there is a possibility 
that the number of such households will increase. An increasing number of those 
households who purchase a house and then inherit their parents’ home might 
utilize the housing surplus for rental income. Homeowners who move for various 
reasons, such as occupation-related reasons, might not dispose of their house due 
to the drop in housing prices but may rent it out instead. Omi et al. (1991), through 
their research on condominiums in various cities, found that a considerably high 
proportion of owners were not living in, but renting out their properties, suggesting 
the new tendency of condominiums to be utilized as an income source rather than 
an owner-occupied dwelling.
As housing stock augments further, the structure of social inequalities relating 
to housing wealth becomes more complex. Housing and asset conditions of young 
households in the future will be partly determined by whether or not their parents 
own a house and whether they can inherit it or not. Sonoda (2000), having analysed 
the possibility for urban renters to inherit housing, found that renters with relatively 
high incomes tend to have a good prospect of housing inheritance while most low-
income renters do not have any possibility of inheriting residential property. The 
implication is that social inequalities in terms of housing within a generation tend 
to be passed down to the next generation. As the number of houses increases to 
exceed that of households, households having secondary residential properties 
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who can obtain rental income increase. It is not likely that the growing stock of 
housing is distributed evenly. While there will be an increasing number of families 
having considerable housing wealth, low-income renters whose parents are also 
renters will continue to be excluded from housing property based society.
Urban fragmentation and the home ownership market
In order to further develop understanding of transformations in the housing 
system, we should now explore the spatial fragmentation of the urban home 
ownership market as a new dynamic in the reorganization of housing conditions. 
That is to say, there has emerged a new, marked tendency in the home ownership 
markets of large cities to be divided into ‘hot spots’, where the housing market 
becomes increasingly active, and ‘cold spots’, where the market is persistently 
inactive (Hirayama, 2005). In response to the prolonged post-bubble recession, the 
government launched ‘urban renaissance’ as a key policy in the late 1990s with the 
aim of stimulating economic recovery. A series of measures such as the promotion 
of housing construction and urban redevelopment and the deregulation of urban 
planning has been vigorously put into practice (Igarashi and Ogawa, 2003). In the 
context of economic globalization, the government put particular emphasis on the 
restructuring of Tokyo as a global city (Machimura, 1992; Saito and Thornley, 
2003). Until the 1980s, the housing system accelerated the mass construction of 
dwellings in tandem with the simple force of expanding urbanization. In the 1990s 
after pressures of urbanization were subdued, however, the combination of the 
‘urban renaissance’ policy, to promote housing construction, and the protracted 
recession began to spatially differentiate patterns of growth and decline in the 
housing market, creating a novel context for home ownership.
In the central areas of large cities, particularly Tokyo, new hot spots have 
been generated by the construction of condominiums. In the post-bubble period, 
it has become possible to construct residential buildings in central city areas as 
land prices have decreased. With the persistent recession, many enterprises have 
begun to dispose of large tracts of land, which are now being utilized for new 
condominium developments (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 
2003). The increased provision of new condominiums in the city centres has 
stimulated the so-called ‘back to the city’ movements. In the big cities, where an 
increase in suburban populations and a decline in the population of the inner-city 
areas had been the conventional pattern, population fl ow to city centres reasserted 
itself in the latter half of the 1990s.
A construction boom of condominium towers of over 20 storeys refl ected 
and reinforced the appearance of the hot spots in the Tokyo metropolitan area 
(Hirayama, 2005). According to a survey by the Real Estate Economic Institute, 
in the greater Tokyo region, which includes the prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, 
Chiba and Saitama, 137 condominium towers or 35,697 units were completed. 
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New starts of high-rise housing are expected to increase further. As of January 
2003, 336 condominium towers with 109,181 units were planned to be built in the 
Tokyo region (see Figure 2.8). A condominium tower block forms a fortress-like 
‘vertical enclave’. Not only does it create an economic and social differentiation 
of space, but it is also symbolic of the fragmentation of urban space. A large-scale 
building complex is horizontally cut off from its neighbourhood and its higher 
fl oors are vertically segregated from the ground level. The complex produces 
a closed and self-contained space in itself. Within the complex, residents are 
provided with hotel-like services and have access to various facilities such as 
a fi tness room, a relaxation room, a party room and retail shops. The security 
systems to protect the complex are tight and each building is equipped with many 
surveillance cameras. Common-use areas like stairs and corridors, which were 
open to the outside air in traditional multi-family residential buildings, are enclosed 
within buildings in the newer towered condominium blocks. The architectural 
profi le of the ‘vertical enclave’ is totally alien to its vicinity, and those dwelling in 
it rarely have contact with the residents of the surrounding neighbourhood, which 
contrasts starkly with the historically integrated neighbourhood focus of Japanese 
residential development.
Developers used to build housing targeting the nuclear family as the ‘standard 
household’. Associated with the diversifi cation of household types, however, 
conventional nuclear families have decreased and small households such as 
single-person and couple-only households have increased. It has, therefore, 
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2.8 Completions and projected completions of tower condominiums, Tokyo
Source: Real Estate Economic Institute Co. Ltd.
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but also to stimulate the housing market by providing various households with 
diverse housing types. Developers have begun to provide new types of housing for 
singles and couples. One type, which has been increasing in number, is a compact 
condominium unit with a fl oor space of just 30–50 square metres. Another type is 
a SOHO (Small Offi ce Home Offi ce), which is a combination of a small offi ce and 
a small living space for small households, designed for workers in the information 
sector among others. The tendency of household size to become smaller is more 
noticeable in the central city areas. A survey of 3,743 households who purchased 
a condominium in the Tokyo metropolitan area in 2004 revealed that more single 
people and less nuclear households acquired a condominium in the ward-districts 
than in other areas. The ratios of singles and nuclear households were 22 per cent 
and 34 per cent in the ward-districts, and 9 per cent and 51 per cent in other, less 
central areas, respectively (Recruit, 2005).
One tendency in the housing market in the central areas of large cities is 
that an increasing number of single women are acquiring condominiums. The 
level of home ownership is lower among female-headed households than among 
male-headed households. Among single people aged 40 or older, however, the 
home ownership rate of women is higher than that of men. Matsumoto (1998), 
analysing the geographic distribution of single people who own a house in the 
Tokyo metropolitan area, found that the ratio of female homeowners was high 
in central city areas while that of male homeowners was high in the periphery 
areas, implying an expansion of the home ownership market for single women 
in the city centre. Yui (2004), investigating the condominium market, identifi ed 
the formation of a structure that supported the growing market for single women 
that involved: an increase in income of working women combined with a drop in 
housing prices; the tendency of single women to put importance on convenient 
commuting leading to the growth of a female condominium market in city centres; 
single women, being concerned with providing for their old age, increasingly 
desiring to stabilize their residential situation and acquire an asset in the form 
of a dwelling; and lastly, developers increasingly seeking to expand the housing 
market by targeting single women as a new group of purchasers.
A consequence of the strategies of developers selling tower-type condominiums 
is the differentiation of the housing market not only horizontally but also vertically. 
The higher the fl oor on which a dwelling is located, the higher the price becomes. 
There are relatively low-priced dwellings on lower fl oors, which are for those 
in the moderate and middle-income bracket. Dwellings on the top fl oors are for 
households on high incomes, and on the very top fl oor, extremely expensive, 
luxurious dwellings for the very rich can be found. The vertical differentiation 
of dwellings in a condominium tower is more noticeable in high-class residential 
districts than in ordinary neighbourhoods. In the case of a 34-storey tower-type 
condominium with 314 units built in 2003 in Aoyama, one of the most fashionable 
districts in Tokyo, the differentials of housing size and price are vertically 
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distinguishable (see Figure 2.9). On the ninth fl oor or below, the fl oor area of a 
dwelling is 45–99 square metres and the price of a unit up to ¥130 million, while, 
for most of the dwellings on the twenty-fourth fl oor and above, the fl oor area of 
a unit is 120 square metres or more and the price of a unit is ¥100 million at the 
lowest. A unit on the top fl oor of 240 square metres was sold in 2003 for ¥710 
million (£3.55 million). Figure 2.10 indicates the average price per square metre 
of dwellings by fl oor for 22 condominiums tower blocks built after November 
2002 in Tokyo. The data demonstrate that housing prices are differentiated more 
in ‘the housing market in the sky’ than in ‘the market at the ground level’.
Cold spots have been formed mainly in the suburbs and the outskirts of cities, 
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2.9 Floor area, price per square metre and a price of a unit, Aoyama Park 
Tower
Source: Advertising materials.
2.10 Price per square metre, by fl oor number of condominium units among 
the 22 case-study tower developments in Tokyo
Source: Advertising materials.
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has remained stagnant. It was not only the bursting of the bubble but also the 
formation of the hot spots themselves that produced the cold spots. The ‘urban 
renaissance’ policy stimulated the construction of condominium blocks in the city 
centres, and consequently, the intensifi cation of the ‘back to the city’ movements, 
which led to an inevitable decline in demand for housing in the suburbs and the 
urban peripheries. In this sense, the appearances of hot and cold spots in the urban 
home ownership market are linked to each other, and the new housing market 
boom in the hot spots has been created at the expense of the cold spots.
Households who purchased a condominium in the bubble period have 
suffered the sharp devaluation of residential property. There are two kinds of 
‘bubble condominiums’: ‘super-luxury condominiums’ and ‘suburban bubble 
condominiums’ (Hirayama, 2005). Super-luxury condominiums were built in 
city centres and high-class residential districts in the latter half of the 1980s and 
purchased by the rich. Their extremely high price dropped drastically when the 
bubble burst. Although the quantity of super-luxury condominiums is relatively 
low, that of suburban bubble condominiums is high. Households that move to 
the suburbs generally desire single-family houses. During the bubble period, 
however, families with moderate and middle incomes bought condominiums in 
the suburbs, as housing prices had risen so dramatically. The marketability of a 
condominium unit of this type nose-dived in the post-bubble period. Households 
who bought a suburban condominium are now repaying massive amounts on the 
loans for their housing, which is rapidly declining in value. Moreover, the fl oor 
area of a condominium is generally smaller than that of a single-family house. As 
Matsumoto (2002) pointed out, the difference in fl oor area between a condominium 
and a single-family home is greater in the suburbs than in the city centres, which 
further pulls down the marketability of a condominium in the suburbs.
Some single-family housing estates in the suburbs, if not all, are expected 
to experience further decline (Kadono, 2000). As the movement of ‘back to 
the city’ progresses, the suburbs inevitably compete with each other and a drop 
in the marketability of residential estates, which were developed in unpopular 
places, is unavoidable. It has been assumed that Japanese people, historically and 
culturally, prefer single-family detached housing to multi-family housing. There 
is a new tendency, however, for younger generation households not necessarily to 
prefer living in single-family housing, which potentially reduces the demand for 
suburban houses. According to a survey on housing preferences carried out by the 
government in 2004, the ratios of respondents who prefer single-family housing 
were 85.5 per cent for those aged 60 or more and 60.8 per cent for those aged 20–9 
(Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2005). During the bubble period, 
development of so-called ‘ultra-distant suburbs’ occurred, since the provision 
of owner-occupied housing, affordable for moderate-income households, was 
possible only in places which were extraordinarily distant from city centres. 
In the post-bubble period, many houses in the ‘ultra-distant suburbs’ remained 
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unsold and the prices of such properties dropped sharply. A suburban niwatsuki 
ikkodate jutaku used to be a mai homu located at the top of the ‘housing ladder’, 
and represented inclusion in mainstream society. Many people who tried to climb 
up the ladder towards single-family housing in the bubble period were forced 
to move to the ‘ultra-distant suburbs’. A house they are living in now no longer 
represents the top of the ladder.
De-socializing the housing system
The reorientation of housing policy by the government as well as socio-economic 
reorganization have refl ected and accelerated the transformation of the housing 
system. This last section addresses the changing role of the government in managing 
the production and consumption of housing. The government took the initiative in 
structuring the post-war housing system. The basic course of housing policy has 
been laid out by Five-Year Housing Construction Plans, which the government 
has drawn up periodically since 1966 based on the Housing Construction Plan 
Act. Since the middle of the 1990s, however, the government has explicitly shifted 
its housing policy towards emphasizing the role of market mechanisms. The 
traditional ‘three pillars’ of housing policy have been dissolved and the policy 
principle of expanding the market-based provision of housing and mortgages has 
clearly been announced. The 1995 report by the Housing and Land Committee, 
which set out the basic orientation of housing policy, declared, ‘Housing services 
should be consumed privately. In principle it should be left to the individual 
to determine what standard of housing should be enjoyed and what amount of 
expenditure should be spent for housing’, stressing the necessity of ‘utilizing the 
free market more widely’ (Housing and Land Committee, 1995). In a subsequent 
report in 2000, the committee emphasized a ‘market-driven direction’ for housing 
based on the ‘principle that housing and land should be acquired and utilized 
by individuals’ own efforts’ (Housing and Land Committee, 2000). The Housing 
Construction Plan Act was discontinued in 2006 and instead a new basic act for 
a new housing system was legislated. The new legislative framework of housing 
policy made the market its principal agent even more explicitly (Housing Bureau 
of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2004; Sectional Committee 
on Housing and Land of the Panel on Infrastructure Development, 2003, 2004).
De-socialization of the housing system has begun to progress, associated 
with the weakening of the government’s control over the processes of housing 
provision. The global diffusion of so-called neo-liberal ideology clearly affected 
the reorientation of housing policy in Japan. The government has, in order to 
rationalize the downsizing of its housing policy, often referred to the tendency 
of governments in other countries, particularly Anglo-Saxon societies such as 
the US and Britain, to liberalize the economy. On the other hand, however, it 
is also important to look at the indigenous housing context in understanding 
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shifts in Japanese housing policy. In the era of housing shortage, ‘housing 
poverty’ was regarded as a social problem and was prioritized as a political 
issue. Housing policy was given the clear purpose of facilitating the large-scale 
production of dwellings. In relation to the Five-Year Housing Construction 
Plan, a luminous and pressing goal was posted every fi ve years – the goal set 
in 1966 was that ‘one dwelling for every household’ was to be ensured; the one 
set in 1971 was that ‘one room for everyone’ was to be secured; and the one set 
in 1976 was that ‘the elimination of substandard housing’ was to be achieved. 
Households having housing diffi culties were defi ned as those who lived in non-
residential buildings such as factories and warehouses, in other people’s houses, 
in dilapidated housing or in overcrowded conditions where, for example, four or 
more members lived in a space of less than 20 square metres. Such defi nitions, 
which refl ected the severe condition of ‘housing poverty’, were used until the 
middle of the 1970s. The necessity of government intervention in the housing 
system was never doubted in the period when dwellings were desperately 
needed. Since the 1980s, however, with an expansion of a housing surplus and in 
context of increasing vacancies, the goal of housing policy has become less clear 
and its ground has been increasingly unstable. In the late 1980s the proportion 
of households living in substandard housing fell to less than 10 per cent, and 
therefore, it became diffi cult to stress the necessity of large-scale housing 
policy as a means to resolve this problem. Although ‘housing poverty’ has been 
persistent, its magnitude as a social and political issue has been lessened. The 
housing surplus played a role in undermining the traditional basis on which the 
government interferes in housing issues.
People’s need for housing has become more diversifi ed, which has also 
promoted the retreat of the government from housing policy. Household 
formation and life-courses have been de-standardized and housing pathways have 
become increasingly differentiated. People’s housing conditions are fragmenting 
and relentlessly shifting, depending on various factors such as the stability of 
income and employment, household type, the timing of housing acquisition and 
the balance of asset and debt. A change in the housing sphere can be good news 
for certain groups and simultaneously bad news for others. A drop in housing 
prices works in favour of tenants who wish to purchase a home while it means 
the devaluation of housing assets for those who have already purchased a house. 
The economic condition of home ownership has progressively differed between 
‘hot spots’ and ‘cold spots’, between those who purchased a dwelling before the 
bubble occurred and those who purchased a dwelling at the peak of the bubble, 
and between the outright owners of a house and owner-occupiers of a mortgaged 
house. The government once formed housing policy measures in order to address 
homogeneous and serious mass problems. When the housing conditions diversifi ed 
and fragmented, however, the extent to which the government controlled the 
housing system began to decrease. ‘Free choice’ and ‘individual consumption’ 
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have become key phrases in policy documents concerned with the reorganization of 
housing policy. Housing issues, which used to be located in the social sphere, have 
now been relocated into the private sphere and the government has increasingly 
entrusted housing to the choices of individual households.
As regards low-income housing, the government has launched a policy to 
provide a safety net for people with housing diffi culties. The public housing system 
is expected to play a role as the core of the safety net policy. In circumstances 
where the provision of housing by market mechanisms is considered a principle, 
however, the formation of the safety net is defi ned as a residual measure and its 
target becomes as narrow as possible. New starts of public housing have stopped 
almost completely and only a small number of places can be provided for low-
income households.
The government used to take level of income as the main criterion to defi ne 
qualifi cation for entry into public housing. However, the target of the new safety 
net policy is defi ned not only by income level, but also by a set of ‘welfare 
categories’. There has been an increasing tendency in the low-income housing 
system to screen people who qualify for public housing by using welfare categories 
such as ‘the elderly’, ‘single mother households’ and ‘those with disabilities’. 
In addition to these ‘traditional categories’, ‘new categories’ such as ‘homeless 
people’, ‘victims of domestic violence’, ‘crime victims’ and ‘households with 
infants’ have been introduced to redefi ne the target of the safety net. Emphasizing 
such categories in the defi nition of potential public housing tenants implies that it 
has become diffi cult for those who are ‘merely low-income’ to move into public 
housing, which leads to greater justifi cation for decreasing the provision of public 
housing. The policy to expand market housing and the safety net policy based 
on welfare categories are two sides of the same coin. Only a limited number of 
households who fi t into the welfare categories are allowed to receive assistance 
from the government while others are in principle expected to secure their housing 
through the market.
The introduction of the welfare categories into the safety net system 
encourages the de-socialization of housing problems even more, as housing issues 
are technically analysed according to categories and special measures for each 
category are divisively defi ned. There are various issues such as housing renovation 
for people with disabilities, housing provision for the homeless, the supply of 
mortgages for the elderly and ensuring shelter for victims of domestic violence. 
However, these segmented housing issues are not regarded as social or political 
priorities but as residual and technical matters. Although the government admits 
the need to address problems for people with housing diffi culties, the construction 




In this chapter I have explored the process of transformation in the housing system 
in order to demonstrate how pivotal home ownership has been as a catalyst in socio-
economic change. The housing system in post-war Japan, by expanding middle-
class home ownership, generated a clear orientation for both households and 
society. The aggregation of people’s moves up the ‘housing ladder’ towards home 
ownership dynamically formulated a ‘social fl ow’, which enlarged and maintained 
a middle-class society. Home ownership played a central role in determining 
life-courses and forming the mainstream of society. From the last decade of 
the twentieth century to the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, however, the 
conditions of home ownership have been transformed by the increased instability 
of housing property as an asset; the differentiation of housing pathways; and the 
spatial fragmentation of the urban housing market. The government has begun to 
focus on the functioning of a more deregulated market in providing and fi nancing 
housing. Indeed, the home ownership based housing system has functioned as an 
instrument to shape and reshape the socio-economic order in post-war Japan.
Over the past two decades the housing system has increasingly been embedded 
in the wider economy and social structure, and the interaction of home ownership 
and socio-economic transformations deepened further. This interaction produced 
a cycle in which social and economic changes and the home ownership system 
destabilized each other. Economic volatility has affected the price and asset value 
of housing, and the expansion of the mortgage market has had a profound effect 
on the condition of the broader fi nancial market. The housing market has been 
fragmented into various sub-markets due to the diversifi cation of household 
formation and life-courses, and the composition of the sub-markets is continuously 
shifting. Instability of income and employment has further undermined the housing 
trajectories of households.
The era when the economy was considered relatively predictable along with 
a clear social orientation has come to an end, and a new era of risk has become 
increasingly apparent (Tachibanaki, 2004). The extent to which the government 
and the ‘company society’ can protect the middle class in a planned way has 
been decreasing while the sphere encompassed by market forces has been 
expanding. The government has begun to emphasize ‘free choice’ and ‘individual 
consumption’ in reshaping the housing system. The increase of ‘free choice’ in 
‘individual consumption’ of housing, however, means an increase in risks for 
individuals and potential for growing debt. When a household chooses a variable 
rate mortgage, there is the possibility that the interest rate will rise. If the asset 
value of a home purchased by an individual drops, the purchaser is accountable 
and liable for losses. As the housing system is de-socialized, individuals are 
increasingly expected to form their own housing path using their own resources 
within the market and to individually deal with various risks related to housing. 
The movements of individuals up individualized housing ladders will not lead to 
Reshaping the housing system
43
the construction of a social fl ow. The transitional conditions of the housing system 
and home ownership refl ect and reinforce each other in complex ways, and the 
emerging landscape is of an unstable economy and a progressively fragmented 
society. The future of Japan is becoming uncertain. What is certain, however, is 
that housing and home ownership will play a more signifi cant part in provoking 
socio-economic changes.
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3 Transformations in 




Construction is a major engine in the development of the housing market, and 
Japan’s housing market in particular has been characterized by substantial 
continuous and sustained housing construction. In Western European countries, 
housing construction peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and subsequently 
began to decline (Ball and Harloe, 1998). In contrast, Japan maintained a high 
level of housing construction, averaging more than 1.4 million units a year 
from the mid-1970s, despite the infl uence of cyclical fl uctuations in production 
conditions. International comparison of construction volume by population 
reveals considerable differences in the Japanese case. The number of houses 
newly constructed per thousand people ranged between three and six units during 
the 1980s and 1990s in Britain, Germany, France and the USA. Japan, in contrast, 
maintained a level of between ten and fourteen units, even though this fell to nine 
units in the late 1990s (JSS, 2004).
However, housing construction in Japan decreased signifi cantly during 1997 and 
1998, and has remained at a level of less than 1.2 million units per year. This long-
lasting depression in the housing market can be explained by the following macro-
economic factors: fi rst, falling land prices and bad debt problems, and secondly, 
economic depression and increasing unemployment rates under conditions of 
increasingly globalized competition. Retrospectively, the Japanese economy and 
urban development in the 1980s were quite spectacular and featured massive 
exporting power in terms of products and capital, centralization of international 
money-fl ows around Tokyo’s market and the promulgation of the myth that land 
prices went up in perpetuity. However, in the 1990s the Japanese miracle turned 
sour. Although most economists tend to argue that the defl ationary crisis in the 
Japanese economy ended in 2003, the outlook for housing construction is still 
gloomy. Indeed, the housing construction system has been faced not only with a 
temporary down-phase in the economic cycle but also with the inauguration of a 
new phase of structural change which will strongly affect the housing market.
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Japan’s housing market growth has been led by mass housing construction 
and fuelled by expanding provision of housing loans that promoted the rapid 
growth of mass home ownership. However, the housing market has faced a critical 
turning point since the 1990s. This is the context underlying the restructuring 
of government housing policy. A central purpose of this chapter is to attempt to 
expose the dynamics of transitions in the housing market and housing policy, 
focusing on, fi rst, the changes in the housing loan market under conditions of 
fi nancial deregulation and privatization; secondly, competition and concentration 
among house-builders under changing market conditions; and thirdly, the 
government’s new policy approach to recovery in the housing market. It is 
important to note the conduct of major industrial associations concerned, as the 
roles they play as pressure groups strongly affect government policy-making 
processes. This chapter thus offers a comprehensive analysis of transformations 
in housing construction and fi nance, and their real world implications.
The social and economic context of transformation
There are a number of other factors that infl uence the housing market and 
construction sector in Japan which provide a framework for understanding the 
dynamics of transformations in housing fi nance, construction and provision. 
First, there is evidence that economic and social polarization is growing. Job 
security has been substantially eroded for many classes of working people. The 
drastic changes in the labour market are resulting in an increasing polarization 
of incomes and living conditions and greater uncertainty and insecurity. These 
changes are not just impacting lower income groups but also the middle classes 
as well. Secondly, Japan faces the serious problem of a shrinking population and 
the prospect of an ageing society. These demographic and social changes are the 
direct result of lower birth-rates. Japan has presently one of the lowest birth-rates 
in the world (the total fertility rate in Japan was as low as 1.29 in 2004). This 
low rate is, in the long term, conducive to a signifi cant decrease in the size of 
population and increase in the proportion of older people. While the population 
of Japan in 2000 was approximately 127 million, it is expected to decline to less 
than 118 million by 2030, representing a decrease of 7.4 per cent over just three 
decades. Over the same period, the proportion of people aged 65 years and more 
is expected to increase from 17 per cent to 30 per cent (CSI, 2003). This trend will 
certainly create a long-term decrease in housing demand.
Thirdly, the above changes are uneven across regional economies and local 
housing markets. While the property market in central Tokyo is showing signs 
of full recovery, most other big cities and regional centres remain in a state of 
economic depression. The polarization of housing markets is thus effectively 
ongoing. Consequently, it is evident that housing construction is in a state of 
distress as the market faces the unfavourable prospect of continuous decline in 
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terms of effective demand for houses. Increased uncertainty and risk are pre-
eminent in perceptions of the housing market.
The long-lasting depression has also affected the housing fi nance market. 
Despite extraordinarily lower interest rates, the balance of housing loans is at a 
standstill with an aggregate of over ¥183 trillion (£915 billion; ¥200 = £1) from 
2000. The privatization of housing fi nance, which has been an important part 
of the restructuring of the post-war housing system, has provided banks with a 
growing lending market. Although an increase in the provision of housing loans 
from banks has been observed, it has only replaced decreased provision of housing 
loans from the public sector.
The marketization of housing provision
In this critical context, the drastic restructuring of housing policy has been ongoing. 
In post-war Japan, public policy promoting housing provision was served mainly 
by the three institutions established in the 1950s: the Government Housing Loan 
Corporation (GHLC) fi nancing middle-class private home purchase, the Public 
Housing System providing the lower income groups with rented houses, and the 
Japan Housing Corporation providing residents of large cities with houses for rent 
and sale (the latter was afterward merged into the Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation, HUDC). These institutions have played important roles in the mass 
housing system whereby acute housing shortage caused by rapid urbanization 
was to be solved (see Hirayama, in this volume). However, since the latter half of 
1990s the government has engaged in drastic restructuring of these institutions, 
and has been seeking to further marketize the housing provision system.
With the revision of the Public Housing Law in 1996, the upper income limit 
for tenants of public housing was lowered, while the government simultaneously 
curtailed its subsidies for public housing construction. These measures led to 
increasing residualization in the provision of public housing. In 1999, HUDC was 
abolished and replaced with the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), which 
began to withdraw from housing provision. Subsequently, the UDC was abolished 
in 2004 and replaced with the Urban Renaissance Agency in order to provide 
further support for private urban redevelopment businesses. The government is 
also seeking to abolish the GHLC by 2007 and replace it with a new corporation, 
the Housing Finance Agency, dealing exclusively in securitization of bank housing 
loans. Overall, this ongoing restructuring is in accordance with the principle 
that housing policy has to be limited to supplement the operation of the market 
(Honma, 2004). This essentially follows a neo-liberalist doctrine that supports 
both privatization and deregulation in Japan’s housing system.
Viewed in a historical light, the transitions in Japan’s housing policy can be 
characterized by three stages. First, the interventionist state in early post-war 
Japan was strongly growth-oriented, and established housing policies subordinate 
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to this aim. In the next stage, this developmentalist strategy was strengthened by 
the introduction of privatization and deregulation policies during the 1980s when 
the form of neo-liberalism represented by Thatcherism and Reaganism expanded 
its infl uence more internationally. In this context, housing policy encouraged 
home ownership and strongly promoted the growth of the housing market. In the 
present stage, starting from the 1990s, privatization and deregulation have been 
escalated across all industries and all regions. This neo-liberalist approach aims 
to prop up markets troubled by the macro-economic conditions and increasingly 
globalized competition. The restructuring of housing policy has been carried out 
following the neo-liberal principles of the new strategy in Japanese economic 
governance.
Housing fi nance under deregulation and privatization
Whereas the GHLC had been exclusively providing the middle classes with 
housing loans during the 1950s and 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that the 
housing loan market started to demonstrate more comprehensive growth. Annual 
GHLC loans increased in value from just over ¥1 trillion (£5 billion) in 1973 
to ¥3 trillion (£15 billion) by 1979, and to a total ¥5.8 trillion (£29 billion) by 
1989. This considerable increase was critically supported by the government’s 
business-cycle policy. When an economic recession occurred during 1970 and 
1971, the government increased the public funds to be distributed by the GHLC 
in order to stimulate the economy. Since then, the government has utilized GHLC 
loans following principles of Keynesian fi scal policy. From the government’s 
perspective, the expansion of GHLC loan provision was an effective and relatively 
inexpensive policy tool, because it immediately led to the expansion of housing 
construction with strong ripple effects into related industries (see Honma, 1987; 
GHLC, 2000).
The growth of bank housing loans
Nevertheless it was notable that, despite the rapid growth in GHLC loans, housing 
loans by private banking institutions grew faster than those of the GHLC from 
the 1970s. Housing fi nance became an important, relatively safe and profi table 
business for banks as high economic growth ended and corporate fi nance began 
to shift away from intermediated fi nance to equity fi nance. Bank housing loans 
reached ¥5.5 trillion (£27.5 billion) in 1980 and increased to a peak, in 1989, of 
over ¥21 trillion (£105 billion).
The growth of the housing loan market reached a problematic climax in the 
period of the bubble economy from 1985 to 1990 (Oizumi, 1994; Itoh, 2002). 
After the collapse of the bubble, there was a turning point. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
how the housing loan market has adapted a new pattern since the 1990s. In the 


















3.1 Newly advanced housing loans 1989–2004
Source: Government Housing Loan Corporation.
Note: Banks include other private fi nancial institutions.
early 1990s bank housing loans decreased substantially because the bubble had 
burst, while GHLC kept lending as a means to counter market recession. Bank 
loans expanded again in 1995, and subsequently maintained a high level, while 
the level of GHLC loans began to decrease. These contrasting trends have become 
more obvious and advanced since 2001.
The reasons for these changes can be explained by both fi nancial deregulation 
and the extraordinary easing of monetary policy, which were introduced in the 
latter half of 1990s. Japan’s ‘fi nancial Big-Bang’ policy, announced in 1996, 
set out rapid, comprehensive deregulatory reforms for Japan’s fi nancial system 
(between 1999 and 2001), generated a drastic wave of mergers among large 
commercial banks and had a severe impact on regional banking institutions which 
began to disappear (JSRI, 2000; Oizumi, 2005). These trends were exacerbated by 
the increasing pressure of bad debt problems. To mitigate the hardship in banking, 
the Bank of Japan gradually reduced its basic interest-rate from 0.5 per cent in 
September 1995 to 0.1 per cent in September 2001, and, through open market 
operations, supplied a vast amount of money in order to augment the reserve-funds 
private banks hold. This extraordinary monetary policy has caused a rapid decline 
in short-term and long-term market interest-rates (signifi cantly, the interest-rate 
on call money has fallen to 0 per cent).
The wave of banking mergers created four mega-banking groups covering 
both lending and securities businesses. These are Mitsubishi-Tokyo, Mizuho, 
Sumitomo-Mitsui and UFJ (the UFJ banking corporation is due to be merged with 
Mitsubishi-Tokyo in 2006). Despite the overwhelming concentration of funds 
in these mega-banks, there are some serious weaknesses in the mega-banking 
sector. These include underdeveloped skills in fi nancial asset management and 
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reduced profi tability caused by the vast backlog of bad loans. The mega-banks 
are, therefore, faced with the double necessity of making forays into securities 
markets, and developing profi table money-lending markets. Thus, the mega-banks 
are eagerly launching into consumer fi nance business and expanding further into 
the housing loan sector. At the same time, regional banking institutions, which 
have specialized as fi nancial intermediates for medium-sized and small fi rms, 
also expanded into housing loans in order to compensate for increased risk in 
lending to fi rms. Hence, under the strong competitive pressure caused by fi nancial 
deregulation, housing fi nance markets have become an arena where major banks 
as well as local banks compete to expand their lending.
Under these market conditions the GHLC has been an impediment to banks 
expanding their housing loans services. Indeed, supported by the government 
policy aimed at stimulating the economy, GHLC loans continued to expand. 
The Japanese Bankers Association (JBA), the largest advocacy organization of 
banking business circles, has strongly asserted that the GHLC has been crowding 
out the private bank housing loan sector and has in fact restricted expansion.
The GHLC facing risks and extinction
GHLC lending in the post-bubble era has encountered serious problems. Increased 
credit risk has been caused by over-lending without regard for borrowers’ 
weakened ability to pay in the conditions of the deeply depressed economy. 
To offer easier access to borrowing the GHLC escalated special measures that 
kept repayments artifi cially low for the fi rst fi ve years. Such measures had been 
introduced since the 1980s. This repayment system presupposed that borrower’s 
incomes would continue to increase steadily, with the rate of repayment therefore 
adjusted to surge from the sixth year. Consequently, many users of this repayment 
system have been unfortunate and have fallen into a double bind of abrupt upturn 
in their outgoings and a negative equity problem due to the depression both in 
the economy and the housing market. The result has been a remarkable increase 
in repayment arrears and bankruptcies. In 2003, arrears and bankruptcies in the 
repayment of GHLC loans amounted to ¥811 billion (£4.1 billion), and in only 
eleven months, from April 2002 to February 2003, 22,000 households lost their 
homes due to repossession (Shimamoto, 2005). 
In addition, relaxed monetary policy and lower interest-rates caused further 
problems for the GHLC. Money markets had provided an extraordinarily 
easy system of fi nance since the late 1990s. Under such conditions banks had 
increased lending for housing loans. As a result, the interest-rates on housing 
loans declined drastically. Since GHLC loans were fi xed at a higher rate, GHLC 
borrowers rushed to convert their debts to banks. The GHLC suffered quite a loss 
from increased prepayment risks. Although new lending continued to expand, an 
increasing proportion of public funds distributed to the GHLC remained unused. 
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While borrowers continued to make prepayments to the GHLC, the GHLC could 
not carry these prepayments back to the government. Prepayment by borrowers 
amounted to ¥9.9 trillion (£49.5 billion) in 1995 and then averaged ¥6.3 trillion 
(£31.5 billion) between 1996 and 2001. The GHLC suffered substantial losses 
and hence government subsidy was swelled, averaging ¥518 billion (£2.6 billion) 
between 1996 and 2001. This situation reinforced claims that the operation of the 
GHLC was highly ineffi cient.
In short, both the over-lending to counter the market depression and easy monetary 
policy, to rescue banks in hardship resulted in increases in costs and risks at the 
GHLC. From the neo-liberalist perspective of government and banking circles this 
situation offered a justifi cation for the abolishment of the GHLC. In December 2001 
the government adopted a programme to privatize public corporations, including 
the abolition of GHLC. The programme set out how to replace the GHLC with a 
new corporation, dealing exclusively in securitization of bank housing loans, within 
fi ve years. Accordingly, the GHLC began to gradually curtail its loan services 
from 2002, while the government, in principle, reduced the provision of subsidy. 
In February 2003 the JBA published a statement that approved the government’s 
programme and asserted the need for the GHLC to speed up its withdrawal from 
primary lending as well as the necessity to replace the corporation (forcing it to 
withdraw altogether from lending). 
The government and JBA anticipated that the abolition of the GHLC would 
widen the market wherein corporate bank housing loans could expand further and 
the disposal of GHLC loans through securitization would offer private fi nancial 
institutions opportunities to obtain low-risk, high-profi t fi nancial assets. The new 
corporation dealing with the securitization business and a growing secondary 
market of housing loans was conceived to follow the institutional model set out 
in the USA of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).
These circumstances have fundamentally shaped changes in the housing loan 
market. The GHLC, preceding the inauguration of a new corporation, has begun 
the securitization of housing loans, while phasing out lending. The growth in bank 
housing loans from 1995 has been partly facilitated by the shift of borrowing 
away from the GHLC, and partly through the sale of new types of loans to be 
securitized by GHLC. The four mega-banks have attempted to take full advantage 
of this opportunity. Their share of the housing loan market amounted to ¥28 trillion 
(£140 billion) in 2003, representing 23 per cent of total aggregate bank housing 
loans. This increased to ¥32 trillion (£160 billion) over the following two years.
Potential consequences in housing fi nance
Despite problems generated by the prioritization of economic policy, the GHLC 
has played an important role in developing housing provision. The GHLC provided 
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many working-class people with easier access to home ownership through the 
facilitation of long-term lending conditions with low, fi xed interest-rates. At the 
same time it contributed substantially to the improvement of dwelling quality, 
through the special building standards applied to its lending. In abolishing the 
GHLC, the government is undermining many necessary and effective elements 
in housing policy. Essentially, it will generate many new problems in the housing 
fi nance market.
It seems questionable whether banks will provide an adequate substitute for the 
GHLC in providing stably employed people with easy access to home ownership. 
A recent GHLC report indicated that 90 per cent of bank housing loans consist of 
lending with both an adjustable interest-rate and a fi xed interest-rate applicable 
for only fi ve years or less, whereas the GHLC has provided long-term, fi xed-
interest lending for between 25 and 35 years. While GHLC long-term and fi xed 
interest-rates have been supported by public funds, bank lending is funded through 
deposits and bonds with changing market interest-rates. Consequently banks fi nd 
it impossible to supply long-term housing loans with fi xed interest-rates because 
it is diffi cult for them to manage the risks that changing interest-rates incur.
Although the securitizing of bank loans would make it possible for banks to 
sell long-term housing loans with fi xed interest-rates, there are various other risks 
including credit risk, prepayment risk and liquidity risk on mortgage-backed 
securities. Under fi nancial deregulation, bank lending policies are increasingly 
volatile. The housing fi nance market is likely to suffer more and more from the 
fi ckle and changing conditions of fi nancial markets. Securitization of housing loans 
cannot cover such fi nancial risks completely and the development of a secondary 
market may cause some serious troubles for local housing loan markets, as the 
USA experience demonstrates.
The examination by Dymski and Isenberg (1997) of US housing fi nance 
market deregulation revealed the following problems. First, the integration 
of housing fi nance into the main fi nancial market, through the development 
of a secondary mortgage market, destabilized the housing fi nance market. 
In particular, an increase in interest-rates frequently created a lock-in effect 
against housing loans. Secondly, because of deregulation, money-fl ows in 
housing mortgages increased volatility. Thirdly, the standardization of housing 
mortgages, which is requisite for issuing mortgage-backed securities, furthered 
‘redlining’ (discrimination in mortgage lending). Fourthly, adjustable mortgage 
interest-rates, which were introduced, made the risks of changing interest-rates 
transferable to borrowers. Lastly, in stagnant local areas, where the spill-over 
effects of increasing property values could not be anticipated, the entire local 
lending market declined. Overall, Dymski and Isenberg (1997) noted that US 
housing fi nance did not become less pro-cyclical because of the widespread 
adoption of securitization in the 1980s, and also that the wider channel for 
‘standard’ loans on ‘standard’ houses threatened to reduce the availability of 
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fi nancing for ‘non-standard’ housing loans, restricting the type of neighbourhood 
and the income/wealth criteria of borrowers.
In the case of Japan GHLC reports indicate that GHLC borrowers are 
concentrated in the lower middle and middle income classes with annual incomes 
ranging between ¥4 and ¥6 million (£20,000 and £30,000) while those who 
borrow from banks alone are concentrated in the upper middle and upper income 
classes with incomes of over ¥8 to ¥13 million (£40,000 to £65,000). While the 
abolition of the GHLC and the withdrawal of government lending will enable 
banks to expand lending to the lower middle and middle income classes, banks 
will face the increasing necessity of managing credit risk. Bank lending policy 
is normally discriminatory against ‘risky’ classes, including the self-employed, 
part-time employees and females living alone. In fact, the GHLC has asserted 
that its continued existence is necessitated by the need to support housing fi nance 
for lower income groups which the private banking sector is incapable of dealing 
with. The fi nancing of lower income and ‘risky’ groups by banks and private 
lenders will be an increasingly serious concern due to the ongoing polarization 
of the economy.
So far, as the recovery of the economy has been sluggish, extraordinarily low 
interest-rates have continued. This condition is, nevertheless, unsustainable. Once 
monetary policies are tightened, bank housing loans will be more selectively or 
discriminatively distributed and interest-rates will increase. This will, arguably, 
lead to a greater propensity for risks to be transferred to borrowers where banks 
introduce preferable adjustable interest-rates on housing loans. Furthermore, 
most households are vulnerable to such acute risk. The changes in the housing 
loan market, therefore, will increasingly lead to greater problems of housing 
affordability. With the securitization of bank housing loans, some risks will 
inevitably be borne by the government as the securitization programme is supported 
by GHLC guarantees (and consequently its successor’s guarantee) against debts, 
repayment failures and mortgage-backed securities. Therefore increasing costs 
generated by market risk will largely necessitate growing government subsidy for 
guarantor institutions.
It is also questionable whether banks will accept outright public regulation 
on the building standards applied to their lending. GHLC loans have required 
special building standards stricter than regulations in the standard Building 
Code. For instance, there are regulations on the structure and size of detached 
houses, and common facilities provided in apartment buildings, when obtaining 
a GHLC loan, while no such regulations exist in the Building Code (Honma, 
1987). Alternatively, bank lending has been frequently extended to houses clearly 
breaking the Building Code. Despite the need to expand this kind of regulation 
to housing development, any role for housing fi nance in improving the quality 
of dwellings and their environments will remain limited, especially in context of 
ongoing fi nancial deregulation.
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There is substantial evidence to support apprehension. When the GHLC started 
securitization activities in 2003, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
(MLIT), which supervises the GHLC, stated that bank housing loans were to be 
securitized on condition that lending was made available to fund housing fulfi lling 
the special building standards of the GHLC. Nevertheless, in the following year, 
this condition was relaxed by the MLIT to facilitate the diffusion of new types of 
loans among banks. It is evident that the government’s housing fi nance policy is 
not oriented towards public interests but to the interests of banking circles.
Transformations in the housing fi nance system will result in an increase in 
market volatility and risk, fi nancial discrimination against, and exclusion of, lower 
income and ‘risky’ categories of household. As long as the housing market and 
housing construction keep growing, banks will be able to expand their housing 
loans. However, the changing conditions of the housing market make predictions 
unreliable and banks may have to deal with unexpected economic conditions.
House-builders in changing market conditions
We now consider the potential volatility generated by changes in the structure of the 
housing system and economy in terms of house-builders and the housing market. 
Japan’s growing housing market has been led by successive large-scale housing 
construction. Figure 3.2 illustrates this trajectory. Although housing shortages 
were satisfi ed by the early 1970s, when housing stocks exceeded the number of 
households in each part of the country, housing construction maintained average 
levels as high as, or more than, 1.4 million units a year. High levels of construction 
















3.2 Housing construction starts 1968–2004
Source: MLIT Construction Statistics.
Note: Owner-occupied housing includes houses built-for-sale. Rented housing includes 
those built by the public sector and company-owned houses and dormitories.
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Housing construction and the ‘Scrap and Build’ spiral
The results reported in Table 3.1 help to explain the pattern of successive housing 
construction over the years. Although increases in the stock of existing houses, 
from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, were lower than from the 1960s to the early 
1970s, housing construction has remained at a high level. It is possible to estimate 
the number of demolished houses by subtracting the increase in existing houses 
from the number of newly constructed houses. The ratio of demolished houses to 
newly constructed houses, representing the ‘scrap and build’ ratio, was above 40 
per cent in the 1960s and early 1970s, but it exceeded 50 per cent from the mid-
1970s. In contrast, the ratio in Britain over the same period did not exceed 5 per 
cent (Yamada, 2000).
The growth of the housing market is, therefore, characterized by active housing 
construction sustained mainly by the demolition of existing houses, leading to a 
‘scrap and build’ spiral (for a consideration on the demand-side factors pertaining 
to the ‘scrap and build’ of housing, see Oizumi and Oi, 2005). We now consider 
the important aspects of housing construction in both owner-occupied housing 
market and the rented market sectors.
Under accelerating urbanization, from the mid-1970s, expanding demand for 
home ownership was satisfi ed by constructing both detached houses in suburbs and 
high-rise apartment houses in built-up areas. On the fringe and in built-up areas 
of big cities detached housing construction frequently took the form of ‘mini-
housing developments’. These developments were made up of small detached 
houses on plots of less than 100 square metres, due to the pressure of rising land 
prices. The construction of rented housing, alternatively, decreased remarkably in 





















1963–68 4,501 7,764 3,263 42
1968–73 5,468 9,940 4,472 45
1973–78 4,392 7,770 3,378 44
1978–83 3,156 6,435 3,279 51
1983–88 3,401 7,433 4,032 54
1988–93 3,872 7,666 3,794 50
1993–98 4,367 7,360 2,993 41
1998–2003 3,620 5,927 2,307 39
Source: MLIT Construction Statistics.
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the latter half of 1970s, as shown in Figure 3.2. Rental housing construction began 
to increase again in the fi rst half of 1980s and, during the period of the bubble 
economy, constituted over 60 per cent of the housing construction in Japan’s three 
major metropolitan areas. However, development was based on the speculative 
construction of small studio fl ats with fl oor space of less than 20 square metres. 
This kind of rented housing satisfi ed the expanding demand by unmarried young 
people in large cities.
The ‘scrap and build’ spiral caused a thorough transformation of the urban 
landscape. A sprawl of housing development emerged in suburbs, while high-
rise apartments, ‘pencil buildings’ and ‘mini-housing developments’ were wedged 
into built-up areas by developers. At the same time, in big cities, many densely 
crowded districts with old wooden housing remained. Although successive housing 
construction has improved the quality of owner-occupied housing stock, averaging 
125 square metres in fl oor space per unit in 2003, their improvement has advanced 
unevenly between metropolitan and regional cities. Regression is marked in much 
privately rented housing stock, which averaged 48 square metres of fl oor space 
per unit in 2003, because rental housing construction has focused largely on 
small-size apartments while older stock has deteriorated (for a consideration of 
disparities in housing stock, see Sumita, 2003). Housing construction in Japan 
thus has a very peculiar character which can only be understood in context of the 
house-building industry led by ‘scrap and build’ activities.
Growth of major house-building companies
Broadly defi ned as the business element of housing provision, the house-building 
industry is characterized by the three functional aspects of housing development: 
residential land development, housing production and house marketing and sales 
(Ball, 2003). With reference to this functional defi nition, the main players in 
Japanese house-building industry can be identifi ed as follows: 1) house-builders 
constructing mostly detached houses and low-rise fl ats, 2) general contractors 
constructing multi-storey buildings, 3) developers projecting real-estate 
development and dealing in the sales and management of real estate and 4) real-
estate agents dealing in the circulation of real estate. My concern here is mainly 
with house-builders and general contractors.
The Japanese house-builder system is composed of a dual-pyramidal structure. 
On the top layer, there are eight major companies sharing nationwide markets. On 
the bottom layer, there are a large number of small house-builders running several 
small-scale projects in local markets. The number of small house-builders in the 
country amounted to 180,000 at their peak in the latter half of 1970s, when they 
shared over 60 per cent of the housing construction sector. Since then, however, 
their number and share have been decreasing. A survey by the MLIT in 2001 
indicated that, among the 136,000-strong group of small house-building fi rms, 92 
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per cent use the conventional wooden framework method of construction, and 50 
per cent construct annually less than four units. Their business is supplemented 
by repairing an annual average of less than ten units of existing houses (KSK, 
2003).
The major companies are large prefabricating house-builders: Sekisui 
House, Daiwa House Industry, Misawa Homes, Pana Home, Sekisui Chemical 
(Housing division), Asahi Kasei Homes and Mitsui Home. Sumitomo Forestry 
(Housing division) is rather exceptional in its use of more conventional methods 
of construction. As shown in Table 3.2, the business of the major companies is 
remarkably high. Annual sales of Sekisui House and Daiwa House amount to 
57,000 and 40,000 units respectively, while the other four companies each 
sell around 10,000 units or more. Through subcontracting relationships, these 
companies also keep a large number of small house-builders at their disposal. 
Hence, the infl uence of these major companies on the housing construction and 
market conditions, particularly in large cities, is very signifi cant.
However, despite the dominance of large house-builders, the market share of 
small house-builders has not signifi cantly diminished. The market conditions have 
allowed for the coexistence of large and small house-builders. This coexistence 
can be partly explained by the low substitutability of land and property, and low 
economies of scale in house-building. But it is, above all, the sustainable growth 
of the housing market though active housing construction that has provided the 
platform for this coexistence.
Starting from the latter half of the 1960s, an oligopoly of major companies 
established a market of prefabricated housing. At that time, during conditions of 
high economic growth and rapid urbanization, prefabricated housing production 
was promoted, not just as an innovative way of developing a ‘modern housing 
industry’, but as a new leading industry. The major prefabricating house-builders 
have been competing and leading the development of new house models. 
In pursuing differential advantages through marketing strategies, they have 
developed and introduced their products to consumers as upmarket commodities. 
They have erected their own nationwide logistics systems and sales networks, 
and established mass production and mass sales systems whereby houses can be 
provided to customers very rapidly.
Tempted by the success of large prefabricating house-builders, big business 
fi rms in other industries such as steel, car manufacturing and chemical industries, 
as well as large general contractors and real-estate agents, made forays into house-
building. However, apart from a few successful cases such as Sumitomo Forestry, 
most newcomers failed to break through the entry barriers or claim signifi cant 
market share. The remaining alternatives for expansion into the sector included 
the option of specializing in land development, multi-storey building construction 
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The growth of prefabricating large house-builders has exerted great infl uence 
upon housing construction as well as the housing market. In response to the 
technological innovations brought about by prefabrication methods, small house-
builders, using conventional methods, have also pursued the rationalization 
of the construction process by introducing pre-cut materials. The ceaseless 
development of new house models and their marketing by large house-builders 
constituted a major thrust which promoted and normalized the ‘scrap and build’ 
of housing.
It is since the latter half of 1970s that the construction of high-rise fl ats has 
advanced in competition with the construction of detached houses. The demand 
for home ownership, which signifi cantly increased from the 1970s, was satisfi ed 
by providing both detached houses in suburbs and high-rise apartments in urban 
areas. High-rise apartments constitute a form of intensive land use that refl ects the 
house-building industry’s response to an increase in urban land prices. Indeed, 
the promotion of high-rise housing development was meant to offer some relief 
from household diffi culties in purchasing houses, deriving from the infl ationary 
pressures in the land market. The construction of high-rise housing contributed to 
the absorption of the large increase in demand for property ownership at affordable 
prices.
These conditions promoted the construction of high-rise fl ats by general 
contractors. The most successful case is Haseko Corporation, which has advanced 
its construction business though its property agency division. The strategy 
adopted by Haseko involves the development and planning of suitable sites in 
advance, and the subsequent promotion of construction projects to developers. 
Typically, general contractors only undertake construction work and hence the 
initiative in housing development is normally taken by developers or real-estate 
agents. But Haseko does not just contract to build high-rise apartments, as it also 
engages in sales and management jointly with developers. This joint-venture 
business approach peculiar to Haseko raised the company up into the top group 
of companies constructing high-rise apartments. Haseko has presently a market 
share of 14 to 15 per cent, while the share of most general contractors does not 
exceed 5 per cent each.
Whereas the post-war housing shortage was largely satisfi ed by the early 
1970s, housing construction has kept growing, led by ‘scrap and build’ spiral. It is 
against this background of housing market conditions that the prosperity of most 
house-builders and general contractors should be measured. Moreover, the growth 
of the housing market has been fuelled by the increasing volume of housing loans 
facilitated by government and private fi nancial institutions. At the height of the 
property boom in 1990, the total market price of the 1.6 million units of newly 
built dwellings amounted to ¥76.8 trillion (£384 billion), which represented about 
18 per cent of GDP. This amount exceeded the total sales in the automobile market 
in the country. Thus, the housing market had an important role in the economy, 
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despite the fact that its size also refl ected the extraordinarily high level of land 
prices (Itoh, 2002).
Competition and concentration among house-builders
As shown by Figure 3.2, housing construction decreased signifi cantly in 1998 
and has remained at a low level. Housing provision is faced with a crisis posed by 
the increasing uncertainty in the housing market. Given the fact that most houses 
are provided through the market, the improvement of urban dwelling conditions 
is conditional on stable growth in the ability of households to pay rents or house-
purchasing costs. The stability of households and household economies has, 
however, come under considerable strain in the post-bubble environment. The 
housing market faces unfavourable prospects due to the trend towards continuous 
decline in the effective demand for houses.
In order to understand the dynamics of the housing market, it is important to 
examine aspects of competition among house-builders and general contractors. 
Given the unfavourable market conditions, there has been a strong tendency for 
housing construction to be concentrated within big cities. The bulk of housing 
construction has taken place in the three main metropolitan areas: Tokyo (Greater 
Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba prefectures), Nagoya (Aichi, Shizuoka, 
Gifu and Mie prefectures) and Osaka (Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Nara, Shiga and 
Wakayama prefectures). These metropolitan areas account for 63.8 per cent of the 
total 1,193,000 housing units developed in 2004, while the Tokyo metropolitan 
area alone accounts for 37.7 per cent. In Greater Tokyo, where successions of 
population infl ows have been observed since 1996, the infl ow amounted to 66,000 
people during the period from 2002 to 2003. This compares to 24,000 people in 
Kanagawa and 11,000 in Chiba prefectures. By contrast, most of the remaining 
prefectures have experienced a series of population outfl ows.
Judging from the statistics reported in Table 3.3, the composition of housing 
construction demonstrates signifi cant differences across the metropolitan and 
regional areas. A large share, 24.1 per cent (33.7 per cent in terms of fl oor space), 
of housing construction in the metropolitan areas is accounted for by high-rise 
apartments. Within rental housing construction, accounting for 34.1 per cent, a 
great majority is made up of high-rise apartments. The evidence also suggests that 
the construction of high-rise housing has been intensely concentrated in big cities. 
In particular, the share of Tokyo metropolitan area represents more than half of the 
total units of high-rise housing since 1998 and it further increased to 60 per cent in 
2003. In this area, the construction of super high-rise housing with more than 20 
storeys increased in 2000 to 2.4 times that of the preceding year.
The largest regional market in housing construction is that of the Tokyo 
metropolitan area, which has more recently been led by the construction of high-
rise apartments. In this, the major prefabricating house-builders seem to be at a 
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disadvantage compared to large general contractors and developers. In Greater 
Tokyo and Osaka prefecture, prefabricated housing is limited to 9 per cent and 
7.2 per cent, respectively, of the housing construction in each area. The top three 
regions for prefabricated housing are Okayama (with 28.2 per cent prefabricated 
housing), Yamaguchi (27.6 per cent) and Fukui prefecture (24.0 per cent), which 
are located more rurally. The total volume of prefabricated housing construction 
decreased from a peak of 340,000 units in 1996 to 243,000 units in 2003. Under 
these pressing conditions of intense competition, the power gap is widening 
between the strongest two construction companies, Sekisui House and Daiwa 
House, and other competitors.
Facing reduced market opportunities, business diversifi cation is an increasingly 
important strategy for major house-builders. Sekisui House now has 96 affi liated 
companies engaging in diverse businesses including real-estate transactions and 
management, land development, landscape gardening, fi nance and cable television. 
Daiwa House has more than 50 companies under its umbrella extending over real-
estate trading and management, home centres, tourism and hotels. Furthermore, 
in order to contain the impact of general contractors and developers, Daiwa House 
and, more belatedly, Sekisui House have advanced into the construction of high-
rise apartments. Evidence of diversifi cation can be found not just with respect to 
major house-builders, but also among major developers and real-estate agents. 
However, the business diversifi cation approach to hedging market risks can bring 
about additional risks of its own. The failure of Daikyo, a major developer, and 
Misawa Home provide clear examples.
Table 3.3 Differences in the composition of housing construction between 
the three metropolitan areas and the other local areas in 2004
Total 
areas













Owner-occupied 367 24.4 20.5 41.9 60.6
Built-for-sale 349 40.2 50.8 15.3 16.4
 apartment 207 24.1 33.7  9.8  9.9
 detached 139 15.9 17.1  5.3  6.3




1,193 761 432 
Source: MLIT Construction Statistics.
Note: % indicates composition of houses built in each area.
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Large house-builders are increasingly competing in the expansion of production 
and sales of their products. Competitive efforts are being made to produce a 
variety of articles on the one hand, and to curtail their production costs on the 
other. However, although these joint efforts of differentiated production and cost-
reduction are necessary, they may also confl ict. Consequently, there appear to 
have been efforts made among large house-builders to push out or try to exclude 
small homebuilders from the market.
The practice of eliminating small house-builders is gaining momentum. The 
depression in the housing market has undermined the coexistence between large 
and small house-builders. Table 3.4 illustrates the impact of market trends on 
small house-builder fi rms and smaller carpenter fi rms. The number of small house-
builder fi rms decreased from 97,000 in 1981 to 92,000 in 1991, but it began to 
recover thereafter, reaching 98,000 by 1996, and 95,000 by 2001. The number of 
the employees in this sector increased from 431,000 in 1981 to 504,000 in 1991, 
but it fell signifi cantly to 470,000 in 2001. Over the 1981–2001 period, the number 
of smaller carpenter fi rms, which peaked at 104,000 in 1972, decreased by 28,000, 
while the number of employees fell by 44,000. These statistics indicate that the 
trend toward collapse among small carpenter fi rms in the sector of smaller house-
builders is signifi cant, but there is also evidence that the degree of concentration 
among small house-builders has advanced remarkably since the 1990s.
The economic depression and intensifi ed competition in the housing markets 
are strengthening the process of elimination among small house-builders. Some 
researchers predict the extinction of as much as a third of small house-builders 
as well as the reduction of another third to the status of subcontractors of large 
house-builders in the near future (KSK, 2003). In fact, the construction work 
subcontracted from large house-builders to smaller house-builders located in 
large cities has become essential to the survival of the latter. Furthermore, the 
business of small house-builders has traditionally depended on repair work, but 
Table 3.4 Elimination and concentration of small house-builders
1981 1991 2001
Number of small fi rms
Building-fi rms  96,589  92,489  95,391
Carpenter-fi rms  67,924  62,026  40,380
Number of employees
Building-fi rms 431,302 503,632 469,942
Carpenter-fi rms 164,612 177,624 120,579
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Establishment and Enterprise 
Census.
Note: ‘Building-fi rms’ indicates wooden house-building contractors.
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there is now stronger competition from large house-builders in this business as 
well. Indeed, the major house-builders have conceived business strategies centred 
on reorienting small house-builders toward subcontracting activities and adding 
local markets for housing construction and reform work to their own portfolios. 
However, it is also noticeable that some franchise-groups organized by local 
house-builders have been growing since the mid-1980s. This process may result 
in strengthening their marketing capabilities.
New housing policy: one last ‘scrap and build’?
Given the diffi culties posed by the stagnating housing market, major house-
builders acting as a pressure group exert substantial infl uence on government 
housing policy-making. This section offers an assessment of recent urban and 
housing policies in terms of their novel objectives and their implications for the 
house-building industry.
Government ‘urban renaissance’ policy
Japanese urban policy is presently determined by the government’s ‘urban 
renaissance’ policy of 2001. The measures taken by the government to implement 
this policy may be viewed as merely an acceleration of the deregulation and 
privatization processes in urban redevelopment which started in the 1980s. The 
urban policy was associated at that time with the objectives of resolving the dual 
problem of international trade friction and low economic growth (Oizumi, 1994, 
2002a), whereas they are now more concerned with the defl ationary crisis and bad 
debt problems.
The ‘urban renaissance’ policy has been increasingly oriented around the 
redevelopment of big cities. This policy is associated with the use of sites and 
properties as collateral for bad debts, and the promotion of intensive land-use 
projects in city centres. The government designated a selection of sites within the 
centres of big cities as Emergency Redevelopment Zones (ERZs), following the 
model of British Enterprise Zones. Among the 34 ERZs, covering 4,749 hectares 
in the large cites, in central Tokyo there are 7 sites amounting to 2,375 hectares, 
and in Osaka City 12 sites covering 1,072 hectares. The ERZ concept represents 
the culmination of the deregulation process in urban planning. Normal regulations 
concerning land-use and building are not applicable to these exceptional zones. 
Developers are allowed to propose their own urban planning schemes without 
restriction, and development is subsidized fi nancially by public funds. While the 
British Enterprise Zone policy aimed at the redevelopment of declining inner-city 
areas, the ERZ policy intends solely to further the recovery of the property market 
in big cities. Stimulated by the government’s urban redevelopment policy, the 
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construction of high-rise offi ce buildings and condominiums has subsequently 
boomed in central Tokyo (Hirayama, 2005a, 2005b).
These urban policy measures have signifi cant implications for large developers, 
general contractors, real-estate agents and commercial banks. In fact, the latter 
have benefi ted immensely from the booming property markets led by high-rise 
construction in central Tokyo, and, more belatedly, in Osaka. There has been a 
signifi cant increase in bank lending for property development purposes over recent 
years. Indeed, whereas the total amount of newly advanced bank loans in 2004 
decreased by 2.9 per cent compared to the previous year, there was a signifi cant 
increase in bank lending for property development purposes. The latter amounted 
to ¥8.2 trillion (£41 billion) in 2004, which represented a yearly increase of 15.3 
per cent. Real-estate loans represented 19.9 per cent of total bank loans, even 
exceeding their share over the period of bubble economy. The rush of major banks 
to advance non-recourse loans to the property market is a risky business approach, 
but appears to be building in velocity.
It is also notable that, from the standpoint of major house-builders, the 
promotion of housing markets driven by high-rise building construction works 
puts them at a disadvantage, as they are peripheral in this sector. There are growing 
expectations that the government will supplement ‘urban renaissance’ policy with 
new measures aimed at promoting the participation of major house-builders in 
these construction activities.
Housing policy advocated by pressure groups
The emerging dynamics of the housing market offer industry pressure groups 
renewed opportunities to exert infl uence over government policies, where they 
seek to press for new legislation and new policy measures which will strengthen 
the process of housing redevelopment. A housing policy proposal titled For the 
Innovation of Housing and the Environment was published in 2002 by the Japan 
Federation of Housing Organizations (JFHO), which is an industrial association 
of large house-builders including the eight major companies. Building on this 
initiative, another proposal was introduced in 2003 by the Japan Business 
Federation (JBF), an important association of large companies from various 
industries (Sakaniwa, 2004). The most important aspects of these new policy 
proposals and recommendations can be described as follows.
First, a shift in the aims and objectives of housing policy is recommended. 
Housing policy, it is argued, should not be oriented towards the promotion 
of housing markets driven by mass construction. It should, rather, be geared 
towards mature markets characterized by active transactions involving existing 
stock. Housing markets with a high circulation of existing stock have grown in 
Western European countries and the USA, while in Japan the market of used 
housing is still largely underdeveloped. This policy-shift can be achieved, it 
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is paradoxically suggested, through large-scale renewal investment in existing 
housing stock.
This reorientation of market resources brings into focus the second 
recommendation, which addresses the limitations and fl aws in existing housing 
stock. There is an urgent need to provide stronger incentives for large-scale renewal 
investment aimed at creating earthquake-resistant housing stock. Out of the total 
housing stock, which exceeds 50 million units, there are 21 million dwelling units 
built before the enforcement of building standards for earthquake-resistant houses 
in 1981. The numbers of housing units which fail to meet safety standards are 
estimated by the MLIT to amount to as many as 14 million units.
Thirdly, there is a need for housing policy to provide stronger incentives 
for the development of rental housing markets. The MLIT estimates that there 
is a signifi cant shortage (2.5 million units) of rental houses suitable for family 
households in the metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and Fukuoka. 
This shortage, it is argued, should be solved through further private investment 
in housing construction for rent and the conversion of disused owner-occupied 
houses into rented houses. It should also be addressed through the deregulation 
of the Housing Lease Law by relaxing the restrictions on fi xed-term tenancy 
introduced in 2000. Incidentally, the introduction of the fi xed-term tenancy was 
justifi ed by the highly controversial argument that the protection of tenants’ rights 
had impeded the supply of rental housing.
Fourthly, it is recommended that housing in areas characterized by high-density 
building in big cities should be redeveloped. According to the ‘urban renaissance’ 
policy, the government plans to redevelop areas in danger of natural disasters and 
fi re (8,000 hectares) within ten years. Half of these densely constructed but high-
risk areas, covering 4,000 hectares, are located in central Tokyo and Osaka City. 
Thus, housing policy considers housing areas with an abundance of old and small 
wooden dwellings in big cities as targets for ‘scrap and build’ activities.
Finally, the proposals insist on the necessity of adopting the ‘Basic Housing 
Act’ as the foundation for new housing policy. The Housing Construction Plan 
Act of 1966, which provided the legal basis for governmental housing policies, is 
to be abolished and replaced with a new housing law. The new legal foundations 
should provide the government with strong guiding principles for the design and 
implementation of long-term action plans for the renewal of housing stock.
Thus, these proposals advocate a fi nal ‘scrap and build’ to construct more 
durable, safe and quality-enhanced housing stock. While, the proposed measures 
aim to create a mature housing market with higher stock circulation, they will 
certainly create more business opportunities for the parties which stand to benefi t 
most from these market transformations. In particular, ‘scrap and build’ schemes 
are focused on residential areas with densely concentrated building in big cities. 
Thus, the governmental measures together with JBF and JFHO recommendations 
are likely to strengthen the ‘scrap and build’ process in big cities on a selective 
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basis. It is, inevitably, hard to resist the view that the ultimate objective of this 
‘growth coalition’ is merely to implement a rescue package serving the interests 
of major house-builders, general contractors and developers.
Nevertheless, this ‘growth coalition’ includes members with differing interests. 
With respect to housing development in cities for instance, there are confl icting 
interests between house-builders and the group of general contractors and 
developers. It is in this context that the recommendations made by top executives 
of major house-building companies, not just for the improvement of the housing 
stock but for the creation of an amenity-rich environment and an attractive 
landscape, should be understood. They so far remain strong opponents of the 
mega-development projects by general contractors and developers.
Implications: new problems for the housing market
Despite inherently confl icting interests, this ‘growth coalition’ has shared needs 
for an expansion of the housing market. Consequently, the government’s housing 
policy of stimulating housing construction through deregulation and privatization 
provides the kind of solution that serves the interests of all parties. However, this 
supply-side policy is likely to result in more serious problems for both urban 
residents and house-builders in the short as well as the long run.
Indeed, the proposals above insist that the renewal of the existing 14 million 
houses should be presented as a national project to create a housing stock that is 
disaster resistant. Conceivably, the success of this project relies on comprehensive 
housing policies including some housing provisions in the public sector, housing 
subsidies for residents, and appropriate regulation and induction. However, 
ongoing privatization, or more precisely marketization and deregulation, of the 
housing provision system make the introduction of these very subsidies and 
comprehensive housing policies diffi cult. The housing market, as I identifi ed, 
is undergoing structural changes caused by economic and societal polarization, 
declining fertility and population and an increasingly ageing society. These 
demographic and social transitions are bound to increase uncertainty and risk 
in the housing market. With signs of polarization or segregation across housing 
stocks increasingly obvious, the renewal of the housing stock will only advance 
on an unpredictable basis.
It is also important to consider housing affordability in light of improvements in 
housing stock. Issues in the rented housing market have been discussed elsewhere 
(Horita, 2005). It should be noted that the MLIT estimate of a shortage of 2.5 
million rental houses suitable for family households in the four metropolitan areas 
is based on a defi nition of such houses as ones with fl oor space of more than 50 
square metres. With reference to this defi nition, in terms of the current market 
price of rented houses, the monthly rent for a newly built apartment house with 
fl oor space of 50 square metres can be estimated to be around ¥180,000 (£900) in 
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the Tokyo metropolitan area in 2003. On the other hand, government investigations 
show that a monthly net income of working households living in privately rented 
houses in those areas averaged ¥462,000 (£2,310) in 2002. Hence the ratio of rent 
to income reaches 39 per cent, greatly exceeding the standard 25 or 30 per cent 
generally accepted in defi ning housing affordability. This evidence suggests that 
the objective of the ‘growth coalition’ of ensuring an appropriate home for every 
household through rental housing construction is not likely to be accomplished, 
unless public policy measures to provide affordable houses are developed.
Seemingly, this policy targets the redevelopment of densely built-up housing 
areas in big cities. However, because of household affordability problems and the 
uncertainties inherent to the housing market, the ‘scrap and build’ process will be 
implemented on a selective, uneven and thus discriminatory basis. It is likely to 
result in the dispossession and social exclusion of mostly lower income classes in 
areas selectively designated in big cities.
Moreover, there is strong likelihood that the polarization and increasing 
instability of housing markets will generate problems for house-builders. First, 
assuming the policies being promoted by this ‘growth coalition’ are fully 
implemented, the competition among large house-builders, general contractors 
and developers will only grow in intensity. Indeed, they are still exposed to 
business risks associated with market instability and may incur high fi nancial 
risks as many companies have not yet fully recovered from bad debt problems. 
In particular, large general contractors and developers are faced with the looming 
risk of over-supply in the market for high-rise housing.
Furthermore, the major house-builders which dominate the market for detached 
houses are being strongly challenged by the emerging franchise-groups organized 
by local house-builders. Finally, many small house-builders are faced with 
increasing competition and the prospect of extinction. This crisis largely stems 
from the long-lasting depression in local economies. Small house-builders are 
enduring strong pressure and may only survive by accepting subcontractor status, 
submitting to large house-builders or partnering up with organized cooperatives.
Deregulation and privatization in Japan’s housing system thus constitutes a 
gamble on the policy of housing market stimulation through ‘scrap and build’ at 
the expense of the established housing provision system. The ‘scrap and build’ 
spiral may well escalate further, or cause more serious problems in the increasingly 
polarized and destabilized economy. It is possible that the policy-shift toward a 
mature housing market involving the improvement of housing stock may help 
generate an amenity-rich, landscaped environment. However, the bias in favour 
of the interests of suppliers suggests that such an outcome is unlikely. Housing 
development will be strongly restricted by market volatility.
The experience of increased volatility in the owner-occupied housing market, 
dominated by transactions by existing home-owners, is well documented in 
Britain and the USA, where, in the late 1990s, sales of existing houses amounted 
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to 7.4 times and 3.1 times that of newly built houses, respectively. Martens (1988) 
identifi es the role of the existing stock in the British owner-occupied housing 
market as well as related pitfalls. As activities in the market became dominated by 
transactions by existing home-owners, chains of sales became common, with more 
purchase and sales needing to be matched. Martens indicates that this delicate 
balance between purchase and sales cannot be kept without house price infl ation 
that encourages existing home owners to trade up, and market volatility further 
increases as the level of new building comes to depend on house price infl ation 
(Martens, 1988: 109–10).
Dymski (2002) analyses the ‘knife-edge’ balance problem of housing accumu-
lation in the USA housing market:
Imbalances between new home values, existing home values, and household 
income and debt levels can slow or reverse the pace of housing accumulation 
… The longer any period of successful new-home construction and sales 
continues, the more likely are imbalances between new and existing 
home-values, and between household wealth, income, and debt levels. In 
consequence, housing is a boom–bust industry whose downturns can undercut 
macroeconomic growth.
(Dymski, 2002: 70)
Instability in these mature housing markets stems not just from the market structure 
dominated by the behaviour of homeowners, but also from the market conditions 
where fi nancial volatility, disparity of income distribution and uneven growth 
among cities increase. It therefore appears that the same structures of market 
instability will operate in Japan’s housing market also, where owner-occupied 
houses constitute 61.2 per cent in the total stock (in 2003), compared to 67.2 per 
cent in Britain (in 1997) and 66.9 per cent in the USA (in 1999). Indeed, ‘scrap 
and build’ projects have to be executed under highly complex and problematic 
market conditions.
Conclusions
The transformations in housing construction and fi nance thus create new problems 
in the owner-occupied and rented markets, such as increases in market volatility 
and risk, fi nancial discrimination and exclusion, differentiation and segregation 
of housing stock, and affordability problems. Privatization and deregulation 
policy to promote recovery in the housing market do not constitute a solution, 
but rather signify the start of a new set of problems. Against the background of 
neo-liberalization, a balanced approach in housing policy is needed, including the 
redefi nition of; the government’s and local authorities’ roles, community-based 
housing policies following residents’ initiatives, and greater partnership among 
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interested parties involving small house-builders and regional banks (Oizumi, 
2002b, 2005; Shiozaki, 2006).
In the context of excessive competition, further problems are emerging in the 
house-building industry. It has recently been exposed that a number of high-rise 
apartments and hotels (at least 82 structures, including 13 under construction) have 
been built using falsifi ed structural-integrity data in order to reduce construction 
costs. At least three developers, three general contractors, a management-
consultancy company, some licensed architects, a design-engineering company and 
two construction-inspection companies are involved in this scandal. In addition, 
while the demand for house repair grows, there has been a lot of trouble caused 
by ‘slipshod’ repair works and over-charging, and homeowners’ suspicions have 
been heightened. In the worst cases there have been injuries caused by shoddy 
building work, which, furthermore, have been concentrated in the households 
of aged people. Behind the booming development of high-rise buildings there 
is strong competition to reduce construction costs, which has arguably led to the 
undermining of safety and the trust of urban residents. Indeed, the house-building 
industry is facing not just market uncertainty but a crisis of confi dence.
References
Ball, M. (2003) Markets and the structure of the house-building industry: an international 
perspective, Urban Studies, 40(5/6): 897–916.
Ball, M. and Harloe, M. (1998) Uncertainty in European housing markets, in M. Kleinman, 
W. Matznetter and M. Stephens (eds) European Integration and Housing Policy, London 
and New York: Routledge, pp. 59–76.
CSI (Council for Social Infrastructure) (2003) Toshi Saisei Bijon (The Report of the Vision 
for Urban Renaissance), Tokyo: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.
Dymski, G. (2002) U.S. housing as capital accumulation: the transformation of American 
housing fi nance, households, and communities, in G. Dymski and D. Isenberg (eds) 
Seeking Shelter on the Pacifi c Rim: Financial Globalization, Social Change, and the 
Housing Market, New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 63–96.
Dymski, G. and Isenburg, D. (1997) Social effi ciency and fi nancial revolution in USA 
housing fi nance (trans. into Japanese), in H. Shibuya, S. Imura and T. Nakahama (eds) 
Nichi-Bei no Fukushi Kokka Shisutemu (The Welfare State Systems in Japan and the 
USA), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, pp. 171–205.
GHLC (Government Housing Loan Corporation) (2000) Jutaku Kin-yu Koko 50 Nen-shi 
(The 50 year history of the GHLC), Tokyo: Jutaku Kin-yu Fukyu Kyokai.
Hirayama, Y. (2005a) Running hot and cold in the urban home ownership market: the 
experience of Japan’s major cities, Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 
20(1): 1–20.
Hirayama, Y. (2005b) The new dynamics of housing and urban fragmentation: feeling the 
effects of globalization in Japan, Paper presented to Asia-Pacifi c Network for Housing 
Research 2005 Conference, Kobe, 6–8 September.
Honma, Y. (1987) Jutaku (Housing), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha.
Eiji Oizumi
72
Honma, Y. (2004) Sengo Jutaku Seisaku no Kensho (Examining Housing Policy in Post-
War Japan), Tokyo: Shinzansha.
Horita, Y. (2005) Contradictions in the current housing policy of Japan: with particular 
reference to local authority housing, Paper presented to Asia-Pacifi c Network for 
Housing Research 2005 Conference, Kobe, 6–8 September.
Itoh, M. (2002) Housing fi nance in Japanese fi nancial instability, in G. Dymski and D. 
Isenberg (eds) Seeking Shelter on the Pacifi c Rim: Financial Globalization, Social 
Change, and the Housing Market, New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 150–68.
JSRI (Japan Securities Research Institute) (2000) Securities Market in Japan 2001, Tokyo: 
JSRI.
JSS (Jutaku Sangyo Shinbunsha) (2004) Jutaku Keizai Deta-shu 2004 (Data Book of 
Japanese Housing Economy), Tokyo: JSS.
KSK (Kensetsu Seisaku Kenkyusho) (2003) 21 Seiki wo ikinuku korekara no Chiiki 
Komuten (Report on the Situation and Future of Local House-Builders), Tokyo: KSK.
Martens, M. (1988) Owner-occupied housing: a tenure in transition, in M. Ball, M. Harloe 
and M. Martens, Housing and Social Change in Europe and the USA, London and New 
York: Routledge, pp. 87–129.
Oizumi, E. (1994) Property fi nance in Japan: expansion and collapse of the bubble economy, 
Environment and Planning A, 26(2): 199–213.
Oizumi, E. (2002a) Housing provision and marketization in 1980s and 1990s Japan: a new 
stage of the affordability problem?, in G. Dymski and D. Isenberg (eds) Seeking Shelter 
on the Pacifi c Rim: Financial Globalization, Social Change, and the Housing Market, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 169–86.
Oizumi, E. (2002b) Restructuring of Japan’s housing fi nance policy: should the Government 
Housing Loan Corporation be abolished?, Paper presented to European Network for 
Housing Research 2002 Conference, Vienna, 1–5 July.
Oizumi, E. (2005) Financial deregulation and the privatization of housing fi nance policy 
in Japan: an argument against abolishing the Government Housing Loan Corporation, 
Annals of the Economic Society Wakayama University, 9: 29–47.
Oizumi, E. and Oi, T. (2005) Japanese housing industry in transition: competition among 
house-builders in changing market context, Paper presented to Asia-Pacifi c Network for 
Housing Research 2005 Conference, Kobe, 6–8 September.
Sakaniwa, K. (2004) Zaikai ni yoru Jutaku Seisaku no Shihai no Kozu (Housing policy 
controlled by big business), Keizai (Journal of Political Economy), 106: 72–89.
Shimamoto, Y. (2005) Jutaku Soshitsu (Losing a Home), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.
Shiozaki, Y. (ed.) (2006) Jutaku Seisaku no Saisei (Toward a New Housing Policy), Tokyo: 
Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha.
Sumita, S. (2003) Maruchi-Haujingu Ron (Considerations on Multi-Housing), Kyoto: 
Minerva Shobo.
Yamada, Y. (2000) Jutaku Mondai to Shijo, Seisaku (Housing problems, market and 
policy in Japan), in M. Adachi, E. Oizumi, T. Hashimoto and Y. Yamada (eds) Jutaku 
Mondai to Shijo, Seisaku (Housing Problems, Market and Policy), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai 
Hyoronsha, pp. 1–21.
73
4 Welfare regime theories 




This chapter analyses Japan’s housing system in relation to welfare regime and 
comparative housing system theories. Esping-Andersen has classifi ed welfare 
regimes into three types: liberal, conservative and social democratic (1990, 
1996, 1999). The welfare situation in Japan, however, is known to be diffi cult 
to classify in terms of this typology. In the fi eld of comparative housing system 
theory, Kemeny, focusing on the place of social renting in the housing market, 
identifi es two types of housing systems: the dualist rental system and the unitary 
rental market (Kemeny, 1995, 2001). Here again, however, the Japanese situation 
presents an anomalous case, essentially showing the features of the dualist system 
but not fully consistent with it.
The purpose of the present chapter is to identify the causes of Japan’s resistance 
to these welfare regime and housing system typologies in connection with the 
post-war Japanese housing system. In doing so, I will take particular note of the 
scale of the role played by corporate housing welfare. It has been pointed out 
that Japan’s overall system of social security and welfare services was designed 
to include the corporate sector as an integral subsystem, beginning in the high 
economic growth period of the late 1950s to 1960s (Osawa, 1994, 2005a, 2005b). 
In parallel to that, the corporate sector became a crucial subsystem within the 
post-war Japanese housing system as well.
However, the feature characteristics of the Japanese housing system have begun 
to falter amid the upheavals in Japan’s socio-economic system since the 1990s. As 
Japan’s economy entered a prolonged period of recession, Japanese corporations 
sought to enhance their business effi ciency by implementing large-scale personnel 
cutbacks (‘restructuring’) and major reductions in welfare, including company 
housing. The destabilization of employment and the withdrawal of corporations 
from housing welfare are diminishing the corporate sector’s role as a key subsystem 
within the housing system. Furthermore, since the latter half of the 1990s the 
national government has been vigorously advancing a campaign of neo-liberal, 
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market-oriented reform politics across a broad swath of the Japanese socio-economic 
system, the impact of which is being felt in housing policies as well.
In this chapter I present the features of the post-war Japanese housing system as 
outlined and describe the transformation it has undergone in recent years. I begin 
by briefl y describing where Japan falls in terms of welfare regime and housing 
system theories and confi rming that the focus of the Japanese case is on housing 
welfare provided by the corporate sector. I then discuss the circumstances under 
which the corporate sector became an important subsystem within the post-war 
Japanese housing system, and elucidate the functions and dysfunctions of that 
subsystem. Further, I analyse the transformation of Japan’s housing system since 
the latter half of the 1990s and the background to those changes. The key trends 
running through that transformation have been the withdrawal of corporations 
from the housing welfare arena and the development of market-oriented housing 
policies. Finally, I consider the issues surrounding the market-oriented housing 
system that is currently taking shape.
Theoretical overview
Welfare regime typology and the Japanese case
Although Esping-Andersen’s three-type classifi cation of welfare regimes made 
a tremendous contribution to the development of comparative welfare studies, 
further debate since then has brought to light a number of important problems 
associated with his typology. Two such problems are important in connection with 
Japan’s housing system, the focus of the present chapter. One is that some cases 
do not fi t neatly into any of the three categories of welfare regime that Esping-
Andersen identifi ed (i.e. liberal, conservative and social democratic). The other is 
that this typology overlooks the importance of housing in welfare states.
In the context of the present chapter, the fi rst problem that arises is the question 
of how to classify Japan and other East Asian countries in terms of welfare 
regimes. Some have attempted to resolve the question by placing East Asian 
countries, including Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Taiwan, into 
a new category called ‘Confucian welfare states’ (Jones, 1993) or ‘East Asian 
welfare regimes’ (Goodman and Peng, 1986; Goodman et al., 1998). However, 
given the political, economic and social diversity among East Asian countries, the 
validity of such attempts to classify them into a single category requires further 
verifi cation. While there are several perspectives on the construction of an East 
Asia housing model (see Ronald and Hirayama, in this volume), the view taken in 
the present chapter is that for the time being it is necessary to continue building up 
separate observations and analyses of the welfare regimes in these countries.
Esping-Andersen suggests that Japan’s case is a hybrid of the liberal regime 
and conservative regime types (1997, 1990). In Japan, the social insurance system 
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is divided up on the basis of occupational fi elds, and differences in benefi ts 
and other conditions are comparatively clear. Japan also ranks highly on social 
stratifi cation indices. These points indicate the conservative features of Japan’s 
regime. The strongly familistic nature of the Japanese case is another aspect of its 
conservative nature. On the other hand, Japan also shows features of the liberal 
type in that the market and private sector play a large role and there is minimal 
social welfare expenditure (see also Miyamoto et al., 2003).
As a crossing point of the liberal and conservative aspects of the Japanese 
regime, Esping-Andersen focuses on the provision of social benefi ts through the 
corporate sector (1997, 1990). This highlighting of corporate-based provision of 
welfare makes a valid point. It should be noted that Japanese corporations have 
distinctive organizational principles different from those of corporations in the 
West. The Japanese company is not a nexus of contracts among stockholders, 
managers, workers and other stakeholders; rather, it has the character of a ‘welfare 
community’ sustained by the concerted achievements of management and labour. 
Furthermore, as we will see again later, post-war Japanese society has made this 
communal bond within the company the core of its social integration (Goto, 2001). 
The role of this specifi c kind of corporation apparently has given Japan’s welfare 
regime its distinctive features, and the aim of the present chapter is to analyse 
those features in connection with Japan’s housing system.
Housing system typology and the Japanese case
Although housing is, along with social security, health and education, one of the 
four main pillars of the welfare state, it has long been neglected in comparative 
welfare research (Kemeny, 1995, 2001). According to Kemeny, the extent to 
which housing is a pillar of the welfare state depends to a considerable degree 
on how the provision of housing is organized. Kemeny notes that two opposing 
political ‘strategies’ or ‘philosophies’ have developed in regard to the state’s role 
in the provision of housing (1995, 2001).
In one approach, the state takes upon itself the direct responsibility of 
providing rental housing for households in need. To this end, non-profi t (social) 
rental housing is organized in the form of a state or local government monopoly. 
As far as possible, the social renting sector is prevented from competing with 
private profi t-seeking housing companies by hiving it off from the market into 
a command-economy social rental housing sector. Access is in terms of ‘need’. 
The result is a dualist rental system in which two distinct types of rental tenure 
are created, corresponding to a ‘public’ command-economy sector and a ‘private’, 
and largely unregulated, rental market.
In the other approach, the state is not a major provider of housing itself or, if it 
is, access to such housing is not limited to households in need. Instead, non-profi t 
rental housing is encouraged to compete with for-profi t rental housing on the open 
Iwao Sato
76
market for tenants. Social rental housing can thereby set standards, ensure that all 
households have security of tenancy and competitively hold rents down. The result 
is that the legal distinction between for-profi t and non-profi t (social) housing is 
minimized and a unitary rental market is encouraged to emerge.
While noting certain variations from one country to the other, Kemeny fi nds 
the dualist housing system typifi ed in Anglo-Saxon countries, and also includes in 
the dualist category most Southern European countries as well as a few Northern 
European countries (Norway, Finland and Iceland). Countries exemplifying the 
unitary rental market, meanwhile, include Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. Kemeny points out that whether a country has a unitary rental market 
or a dualist rental system may be explained in terms of corporatist versus two-
party political systems. Dualist systems tend to be found in societies with two-
party systems while unitary markets tend to be found in societies with corporatist 
political structures.
Furthermore, Kemeny notes that countries with command-type public rental 
sectors (dualist) tend to have a higher proportion of owner occupation than 
countries with integrated (unitary) rental markets because alternatives to owner 
occupation are effectively precluded from the available range of choices. If open 
access to public renting is denied as a realistic alternative to middle-income 
households, while the profi t-dominated rental market only offers either high-
quality housing with high rents and insecurity of tenancy or low-rent housing with 
security of tenancy but at low quality, then the only alternative remaining is owner 
occupation. As a result, countries with a dualist rental system have high rates of 
owner occupation (see Table 4.1).
In many respects Japan shows features of a dualist system. Social rental 
housing is provided in the form of government-managed housing (public housing) 
for needy households; the social rental housing sector is separated from the rental 
housing market; and, since rental housing is not a realistic option for middle-
income households seeking good-quality and affordable housing, the rate of 
home ownership is very high (see Table 4.1). On the other hand, however, closer 
examination shows that Japan’s housing system has unique features in relation 
to Kemeny’s typology. Specifi cally, company housing, or housing that private 
corporations provide to their employees, accounts for a signifi cant share of overall 
housing in Japan, and the corporate sector thus constitutes an important subsystem 
within the Japanese housing system.
The magnitude of the role played by the corporate sector in post-war Japanese 
society makes Japan an awkward case for both the welfare regime and housing 
system typologies. How did this system of company-based housing welfare take 
shape in the context of post-war Japan’s housing system? What functions and 




Japan’s post-war housing system and corporate housing 
welfare
Basic features of Japan’s post-war housing system
Housing in Japan was devastated during the Second World War, by the end 
of which (August 1945), according to government estimates, the nation had a 
shortage of some 4.2 million homes. How to fi ll that gap was the most pressing 
challenge facing housing policy in post-war Japan. To meet the challenge, a 
number of systems were instituted one after another in the early 1950s, notably 
a system for local governments to acquire national government subsidies for 
construction of public housing (kouei jutaku) (launched in 1951); a system under 
which the Japan Housing Corporation (Nihon Jutaku Koudan) carried out broad-
based and large-scale housing construction projects (1955); and a system whereby 
the Government Housing Loan Corporation (Jutaku Kinyu Kouko) provided 
long-term, low-interest loans for private housing construction (1950). These three 
systems became the three main pillars of Japan’s post-war housing policy through 
a class-based division of roles: local government public housing supplied low-cost 
rental housing to the low-income class; the Japan Housing Corporation supplied 
rental and tract housing to the middle class; and the Government Housing Loan 
Corporation provided public funding mainly for the construction of privately 
owned homes for the more affl uent middle class.












England 66.0  7.0 27.0 –
Ireland 78.0  9.0 14.0 –
USA 70.0 25.0  5.0 –
Japan (1993) 59.8 26.4  7.1 5.0
Japan (2003) 61.2 26.9  6.6 3.1
2 Unitary 
housing systems
Germany 37.0 38.0 25.0 –
Denmark 32.0 25.0 18.0 –
Sweden 40.0 20.0 23.0 –
Source: Kemeny, 2001; fi gures for Japan provided by author.
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This post-war Japanese housing policy shows a number of features (Watanabe, 
1962; Harada, 1985; Sato, 1999; Hirayama, 2003a). First, a basic premise of 
the policy was the principle of ‘self-help’, that is, that the private sector would 
construct housing on its own initiative and strength.
Second, and as a corollary of the fi rst feature, the scope of the government’s 
role in housing welfare was kept to the minimum necessary. This feature was 
most prominent in the way public housing was understood in post-war Japan: as 
a Ministry of Construction offi cial in charge of establishing the public housing 
system put it at one Diet meeting, public housing was regarded as purely a stopgap 
measure until private housing construction was fi rmly back on the recovery 
track (cited in Watanabe, 1962); and on that basis the number of public housing 
construction projects was kept to the minimum necessary. Table 4.2 shows a 
comparison of the shares accounted for by social rental housing construction in 
overall new housing construction in England and Wales, Germany (former West 
Germany) and Japan after the Second World War. The comparison shows that 
in the 1950s, when the housing situation in all of these countries was in serious 
crisis, whereas public housing in England and Wales and social housing (sozialer 
Wohnungsbau) in Germany made up 64.0 per cent and 45.8 per cent, respectively, 
in Japan public housing (i.e. local government or public corporation-managed 
housing) accounted for only 18.4 per cent.
Third, Japan’s rent allowance system leaves much to be desired. There is a 
system for rent reduction or exemption under special circumstances in public 
housing, and a housing allowance as part of the livelihood protection measures 
provided under the system of public aid (seikatsu hogo). But these systems apply 
only to limited areas, and Japan has no general rent assistance like Britain’s 
housing benefi ts or Germany’s Wohngeld programmes. Given the scarcity of 
government-supplied social rental housing, many people had little choice but to 
Table 4.2 Share of construction of social rental housing to 









housing owned by 
local authority and 
public corporations)
1945–49 76.8 –  7.4
1950–59 64.0 45.8 18.4
1960–69 43.2 28.8  9.1
1970–79 18.0 19.5  7.2
1980–89  3.5 11.6  4.3
Source: Sato, 1999: 304.
Note: a Former West Germany.
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rely on private rental housing, but in the absence of a general programme of rent 
assistance, a dilemma arose: good-quality private rental housing meant heavy rent 
burdens, but lowering construction costs to meet tenants’ limited rent-payment 
capacities meant private rental housing of poor quality. The latter option became 
the prevailing trend, with the result that most private rental dwellings were small 
and shoddy.
A fourth feature of Japan’s post-war housing policy is that, within the context 
just outlined, the government’s only concentrated infusion of public funds 
for housing was its assistance for home ownership. From the 1950s on, the 
government pursued a vigorous policy of helping the middle class to acquire their 
own homes. The principal measures adopted to that end were long-term, low-
interest loans provided by the Government Housing Loan Corporation and tract 
housing supplied by the Japan Housing Corporation. The government’s proactive 
policy for home ownership was aimed at cultivating and stabilizing the middle 
class as the focus of Japan’s post-war economic recovery and social reconstruction 
(Hirayama, 2003b). Assistance for home ownership has remained a corner stone 
of the government’s housing policy to this day. Given the scarcity of social rental 
housing and the poor quality of private rental housing, the government’s vigorous 
support for home ownership has led to a high rate of home ownership in Japan, at 
around 60 per cent (see Table 4.1).
Because social rental housing has been provided mainly in the form of public 
housing (some through the Japan Housing Corporation), the social rental housing 
sector has been clearly differentiated from the private rental housing market. At 
the same time, the scarcity of social rental housing and the poor quality of private 
rental housing have had the effect of boosting home ownership among the middle 
class and thus raising Japan’s overall home ownership rate. In these respects, 
among others, Japan’s post-war housing policy has given Japan’s housing system 
the features of what Kemeny calls the dualist system. Within that context, another 
key feature of Japan’s post-war housing system is that, with companies actively 
providing housing welfare for their employees, the corporate sector has become 
an important subsystem within the overall housing system.
Corporate housing welfare as a subsystem of the housing 
system
Generally speaking, the corporate sector has played a crucial role in improving 
employee welfare in Japan (company welfare) (Fujita and Shionoya, 1997; 
Tachibanaki, 2001, 2005), and company-provided housing welfare has been one 
of the most important elements of that trend. Japanese corporations have typically 
provided their employees with low-cost rental housing (company housing, kyuyo 
jutaku or shataku) as well as fi nancial assistance towards owning their own homes 
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(Kaneko, 1991; Fujita and Kojima, 1997; Shinkai, 1997; Tachibanaki, 2001, 
2005).
Company housing fi rst appeared in Japan with the emergence of the textiles 
and mining industries during the burgeoning of modern industry in the late 
nineteenth century. Companies in those industries provided their employees with 
housing (dormitory-style ryo) near their places of work. Generally speaking, 
however, until the Second World War most workers lived in regular private rental 
accommodation (Ariizumi, 1956).
The catalyst for the dramatic expansion and improvement of corporate housing 
welfare came during the Second World War, when, to ease the strain on worker 
housing in urban heavy industry zones (the centres of the war industry), many 
companies began providing housing for their employees. After the war, corporate 
housing programmes were further expanded and popularized to fi ll what was by 
then a serious housing shortage. In 1948, company housing accounted for 5.8 per 
cent of total housing stock, and that share subsequently rose even higher, to 6.7 
per cent in 1958 and 7.0 per cent in 1963 (Housing Survey of Japan). From the late 
1960s on, Japanese corporations also began actively helping employees to acquire 
their own homes by providing them with low-interest loans, interest subsidies 
and other assistance towards home ownership. In this way, the corporate sector 
became an important subsystem of Japan’s post-war housing system (Kaneko, 
1991; Fujita and Kojima, 1997; Shinkai, 1997; Tachibanaki, 2001, 2005).
The expansion of corporate housing welfare in Japan can be seen in terms of 
each of the main protagonists behind it, namely, the government, the corporate 
sector and labour unions. 
In terms of its policy of promoting housing construction through self-help-
type construction activity by the private sector, the government was happy to see 
corporations building as many homes as possible with private funding (Watanabe, 
1962; Harada, 1985). In 1953 the government opened the way to Government 
Housing Loan Corporation fi nancing for company housing construction, and 
throughout the economic boom period of the late 1950s and 1960s a lot of company 
housing was built with such loans. Moreover, corporate support for employee 
home acquisition also meshed well with the government’s policy of nurturing 
and stabilizing the middle class through home ownership. For this reason, the 
government instituted generous tax breaks related to the low-interest loans and 
interest subsidies that companies provided for home acquisition (Kaneko, 1991; 
Shinkai, 1997).
In the corporate sector, meanwhile, the limited number of public housing 
projects being constructed despite the serious post-war housing shortage meant 
that companies needed to implement their own housing policies for their 
employees (Ariizumi, 1956). Whereas Europe around the same time saw vigorous 
construction of social rental housing, with governments playing a leading part in 
the recovery of the housing system, in Japan the corporate sector came to assume 
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that role in the government’s stead. Even after the serious housing shortage of 
the immediate post-war years had been signifi cantly alleviated, Japan’s corporate 
sector continued and even enhanced its provision of housing welfare to employees. 
This was because doing so brought benefi ts to corporations themselves, including 
the securing of a quality labour force, the improved productivity that came from 
giving employees a good work environment, employee loyalty to the company and 
good labour–management relations (Shinkai, 1997; Tachibanaki, 2001, 2005).
Another factor that must not be overlooked is that labour unions were also 
actively involved in corporate efforts to provide housing welfare. Because labour 
unions in Japan were organized separately on an individual company basis, union 
demands regarding housing were made at the level of labour negotiations within 
each company and were aimed at improving the housing welfare provided by 
the company. The provision of company housing was thus in fact also a union 
demand; furthermore, when in the late 1960s corporations began actively helping 
employees to become homeowners, labour unions eagerly embraced that trend as 
well.
This stance of the labour unions had an important impact on the formation of 
the Japanese post-war housing system, beyond simply that the unions and other 
labour powers embraced corporate housing welfare. In post-war Europe, the 
elements that called on the government to spearhead housing policies, such as 
for mass construction of social rental housing, were nationally organized labour 
movements led by industry-wide labour unions, together with the social democratic 
political parties they backed. In Japan, by contrast, labour unions did not infl uence 
the government’s housing policy through such macro-strategies at the level of 
national, general housing policy. Ohmoto (1991) relates the retrospective account 
given by a key fi gure in a national association of labour unions:
Given that most labour unions were based within individual corporations, 
housing issues were resolved to some extent by the fact that corporations 
– mainly large, stable corporations – provided company housing or provided 
home loans using company reserve funds. In other words, labour unions 
could get things done without orchestrating unifi ed demands through national 
centres. This was why, on the one hand, labour unions did not infl uence the 
government’s housing policy at the national level, and also why, on the other, 
individual labour unions took a positive stance toward the housing welfare 
that companies provided.
(Cited in Ohmoto, 1991: 806)
A distinctive feature of Japanese corporations is the cooperative relationship 
maintained between management and labour at the individual company level. 
Goto (2001) characterizes social integration in post-war Japan as corporate-
centred integration, in contrast to the welfare state integration seen in Europe. This 
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Japanese form of social integration is based on voluntary acceptance of a logic 
whereby workers enlarge the overall pie by striving to improve the performance 
of their company, secure for themselves a larger share of that pie by prevailing in 
competition with other workers to contribute to the company, and so improve their 
own livelihoods. With workers thus regarding the company as a performance/
welfare community, confl icts of interest between labour and management receded 
into the background (Watanabe, 1990; Osawa, 1994; Goto, 2001). Shinkawa 
(1993) points out that, given these features of labour relations and labour unions 
within companies, there was little likelihood of workers in post-war Japan uniting 
as a distinct class and driving the development of a social-democratic welfare 
state.
Corporate housing welfare compensated for the meagreness of social rental 
housing supplied by the government. However, the scarcity of government-
supplied social rental housing was itself a result of Japan’s corporate-centred 
social integration, which fostered labour’s demands for housing at the micro-level 
of individual companies but meant that effective infl uence was not exerted on the 
government at the macro-level of overall housing policy.
Dysfunction of corporate housing welfare
While there is no doubt that corporate housing welfare has played a crucial role 
as a subsystem of housing security, at the same time it has also brought with it a 
number of problems.
One is the welfare gap between corporations of different sizes. Generally 
speaking, large corporations offer generous welfare packages while small and 
medium-size companies provide only meagre ones, and housing welfare is one 
area in which this gap is particularly noticeable. Larger corporations tend to 
own more housing and in more desirable locations and to be more generous in 
their assistance towards employees buying their own homes. Figure 4.1 shows 
a comparison of monthly housing-related welfare expenditure per employee 
among corporations of different sizes. We see a marked trend of higher per-head 
expenditure the bigger the corporation. Larger corporations generally provide 
higher salaries, and on top of that their employees generally enjoy more favourable 
housing welfare (Shinkai, 1997; Tachibanaki, 2005).
Another problem is the gap in welfare between regular and non-regular 
employees. Japan’s labour force includes many part-time, temporary and other 
non-regular workers. Particularly amid the prolonged recession that began in 
the 1990s, many companies have shifted towards downsizing their regular staff 
(restructuring) and replacing them with non-regular employees. As a result, non-
regular employees now account for some 30 per cent of the total workforce and 
around half of all working women. Meanwhile, a marked gap exists between 
regular and non-regular employees in terms of corporate welfare. In many cases, 
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only regular employees qualify for company housing or for company assistance 
toward home ownership. Corporate housing welfare has thus led to considerable 
inequality between regular and non-regular employees (Tachibanaki, 2005).
A third problem is that the system of corporate housing welfare gives priority 
to male householders. In many cases, being the head of one’s household is one 
of the conditions of eligibility for company housing. Given that most household 
heads are men, the company housing system has thus an inherent gender bias. 
In 2002 a Cabinet Offi ce investigative committee conducted a survey in which it 
analysed links between company housing systems and the proportions accounted 
for by women among corporate employees and managerial staff. The survey 
found that implementation of company housing systems was more prevalent the 
smaller the ratios of female employees and female managers, and interpreted this 
as indicating that company housing is being provided primarily to men who are 
heads of their households (Cabinet Offi ce, 2002). Furthermore, given that most 
non-regular employees are women, the aforementioned inequality between regular 
and non-regular employees in terms of eligibility for corporate housing welfare 
overlaps with the gender disparity. Viewed from standpoint of gender, corporate 
housing welfare is thus heavily marked by the ‘male breadwinner’ paradigm 












Size of company: number of employees
4.1 Company provision costs related to housing (monthly amount per 
employee)




Transformation of the Japanese housing system since the 
1990s
Withdrawal of the corporate sector from housing welfare
The Japanese housing system described above has been undergoing a marked 
transformation since the 1990s. One major change is that private corporations, 
which previously constituted an important subsystem of the housing system, 
are withdrawing from the housing welfare fi eld. Another is that the thrust of the 
government’s housing policy has turned sharply towards the formation of a more 
market-oriented housing system.
In the 1990s, the Japanese economy entered a period of prolonged recession. As 
economic growth slowed considerably, many corporations, struggling now for their 
very survival, carried out large-scale personnel restructuring and downsizing. This 
extensive restructuring, together with corporations’ declining capacity to absorb 
new entrants to the labour force, pushed unemployment to over 5 per cent and led 
to a net decline in the total labour force population for the fi rst time in the 40 years 
since the high economic growth period of the 1960s. At the same time, the trend 
of cutting back on regular staff and replacing them with part-time, temporary, and 
other non-regular employees is becoming increasingly pronounced. The share of 
corporate employees made up by non-regular employees rose from 20.2 per cent 
(males: 8.8 per cent; females: 38.1 per cent) in 1990 to 30.4 per cent (males: 15.6 
per cent; females: 50.6 per cent) in 2003 (Nakamura, 2005). Japanese companies 
of the post-war era established a distinctive standard of providing employees with 
long-term, stable employment, but these recent changes have rocked the post-war 
employment system (Nitta, 2003). They have also impacted in important ways on 
corporate housing welfare.
One of the effects is that the scope of corporate housing welfare coverage is 
shrinking. People typically eligible to enjoy the benefi ts of corporate housing are 
those employed by companies as regular, full-time employees; but as a result of 
management rationalization measures in the form of drastic personnel cutbacks 
and the shift from regular to non-regular employees, the benefi ciaries of corporate 
housing welfare are steadily decreasing in number. Moreover, when employees 
who have been living in company housing are retrenched, this means they lose 
their homes at the same time that they lose their jobs. Because it is intertwined 
with the Japanese employment system, the system of corporate housing welfare 
thus leads to loss of housing along with loss of employment (income). This harsh 
aspect of the system became increasingly apparent in the 1990s.
Another effect of the changes is the growing trend of corporate withdrawal 
from the fi eld of housing welfare itself. According to a survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare in 2002, of all the surveyed corporations 
that had been providing employees with company housing or assistance towards 
home ownership in 1997, the ratios of those that reduced such measures in the 
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fi ve years from 1997 to 2002 was 20.9 per cent for company housing and 12.8 
per cent for home ownership assistance. Particularly notable is that the trend of 
curtailing company housing and assistance for home ownership is prominent even 
among large corporations, which in the past had been generous in providing their 
employees with housing welfare (see Figure 4.2). The circumstances behind this 
trend include demands on corporations to rationalize their business operations, 
the selling off of corporate-owned housing and land as real-estate assets to reduce 
debts, and major revisions of the employment system. As a result, the share of 
total housing stock accounted for by company housing has dropped sharply since 
the 1990s, down to 3.1 per cent by 2003 (Housing and Land Survey of Japan).
Though previously an important subsystem within Japan’s post-war housing 
system, corporate housing welfare is thus steadily retreating into a narrower and 
narrower functional range.
The state’s role gets even smaller: market-oriented housing 
policy
As already mentioned, the role played by the state in housing welfare in Japan has 
long been a minor one, but a signifi cant feature of housing welfare developments 
in the decade and a half since 1990 is that the state’s role has diminished even 
further. Specifi cally, the system previously sustained by public housing, the Japan 
Housing Corporation, and the Government Housing Loan Corporation – the three 



















4.2 Ratio of number of companies that reduced housing services 1997–2002












Looking fi rst at public housing, we fi nd that the number of new construction 
projects has dropped sharply in recent years. The number of public housing 
construction projects was 51,030 in 1995 but by 2004 had dropped to 21,278 (see 
Figure 4.3). The stock of public housing was far from adequate in the fi rst place, 
and with little prospect of new construction the government in recent years has 
increasingly emphasized the need for ‘fairness’ and ‘effi ciency’ in the management 
of existing public housing. Specifi cally, this means ‘tightening up the management 
of public housing so that it is provided appropriately to people in genuinely critical 
need of housing’ (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, 2003). The 
categories mentioned as ‘people in genuinely critical need of housing’ include 
the elderly, the disabled, victims of domestic violence, the homeless, single-
parent households, and foreign nationals. Meanwhile, for people who do not fall 
into any of these special categories, the income levels determining eligibility for 
public housing are gradually being lowered, resulting in a marked shrinking of 
the socio-economic class to which public housing is available. At the same time, 
there has been a strengthening of measures concerning people whose incomes rise 
above the eligibility ceiling after they have already entered public housing, such 
as charging them additional rent or requiring them to move out. Public housing in 
Japan already had a residual quality in that the stock of such housing has always 
been too small to cover a broad class spectrum of the population; but with the 
developments of the 1990s – the lowering of the income threshold for eligibility 
for public housing (i.e. shrinking the proportion of the population covered) and 
the increasing specifi cation of categories of eligible people – public housing has 
become even more residualized (Hirayama, 2002, 2003a).
The second pillar of housing welfare policy is the Japan Housing Corporation. 












4.3 Construction of public housing 1995–2004












Corporation (Jutaku Toshi Seibi Koudan), tasked with developing new, large-scale 
housing projects in addition to providing housing. In 1999 it was renamed the 
Urban Development Corporation (Toshi Kiban Seibi Koudan), and in 2004 further 
reforms greatly reduced its functions and it was reborn as the Urban Renaissance 
Agency (Toshi Saisei Kikou). Instead of undertaking urban development itself, the 
agency’s role was now limited to supporting redevelopment projects carried out 
by the private sector. In the area of housing provision, the agency has withdrawn 
from tract housing projects, has stopped construction of new rental housing, is 
selling as much of its existing housing stock as possible to the private sector, and 
wherever possible is outsourcing the management of the remaining buildings to 
private companies.
Furthermore, as part of its efforts to promote a market-based home loan 
system, the government has decided to abolish the Government Housing Loan 
Corporation, a key player in home fi nancing in post-war Japan, at the end of 
March 2007 (see Oizumi, in this volume). Although part of the organization will 
continue in the form of a new body called the Housing Loan Support Agency 
(Jutaku Kinyu Shien Kikou), the functions of the latter will be greatly reduced. 
Instead of providing housing loans directly, it will focus on providing support for 
the securitization of real estate (i.e. measures to facilitate fi nancing through the 
securitization of home loans by private fi nancial institutions).
In these ways, public housing is taking on a more residual character and the 
role of the public sector in providing housing and home loans is diminishing 
considerably. Underlying this housing policy of the present government is its 
current programme of neo-liberal reform politics. Since the latter half of the 1990s, 
the government, led by the Liberal Democratic Party, has forged ahead with a 
series of reforms, including deregulation, privatization and administrative reforms 
(reduction and streamlining of government functions), over a broad spectrum of 
policy areas. This reform campaign has gathered particular momentum under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi, who assumed the prime 
ministership in 2001 (Tokyo University, Institute of Social Science, 2006; Noble, 
2006). The waning of the state’s role in the housing system and the increased 
emphasis on the role of the market are among the main effects these reforms have 
had in the area of housing policy.
The key question here is whether or not these modifi cations to the housing 
system help to improve housing welfare for the society at large. While we must 
avoid jumping to any hasty conclusions in this regard, it is important to bear the 
following points in mind. First, corporate housing welfare, which, as we have 
seen, was a crucial mechanism compensating for the meagreness of the state’s 
role in Japan’s post-war housing system, no longer performs as effectively as it 
previously did. If corporate housing welfare previously made up for the scantiness 
of state-supplied public housing, then what is needed now that the corporate sector 
is pulling out of the housing welfare fi eld should be an expansion of the state’s 
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role. Instead, what actually emerged in the 1990s was a situation in which the 
corporate withdrawal and the shrinking of the state’s role both proceeded at the 
same time.
Second, further residualization of public housing and the decline of company 
housing are serving to increase the roles played by home ownership and private 
rental housing. Let us consider home ownership fi rst. Amid the economic slump 
Japan has been in since the 1990s, the risk factors involved in buying a home 
have increased. The number of households unable to repay housing loans due 
to recession-related job loss or stagnant wage growth, among other reasons, has 
risen sharply. From 1995 to 2002, the number of Government Housing Loan 
Corporation loans with repayments in arrears by six months or more jumped from 
14,205 to 42,333. Furthermore, one result of the fall in housing prices is that 
home ownership increasingly fi gures as a major capital loss in household budgets 
(i.e. the remaining debt of the home loan is far greater than the asset value of the 
home). Whereas in post-war Japan the government strove to nurture and stabilize 
the middle class by promoting home ownership, in the 1990s home ownership 
itself became a destabilizing factor in the lives of the middle class (Hirayama, 
2003b).
The third point concerns the role of private rental housing. While reducing 
its own role in the housing system, the government is hoping to invigorate that 
of the private rental market. Here too, however, we fi nd a situation of increasing 
destabilization of rental tenancy due to the easing of regulations on rental housing. 
In 1921, legislation was passed in Japan that regulated rental contracts so as to protect 
tenants (the Rent Act of 1921), and in 1941 such regulations were strengthened. 
Under these regulations, in order to terminate rental contracts landlords must have 
‘justifi able grounds’ for doing so, such as reallocating a dwelling for their own or 
their family’s use, and rent increases are limited to standards of ‘reasonable rent’ 
(not rent control, but rent regulation). The courts determine whether or not rent is 
reasonable and whether or not the landlord has justifi able grounds for terminating 
a rental contract. Through strict application of the regulations, the courts have 
played a crucial role in safeguarding tenant occupancy. The stable persistence of 
rental contract regulation has been an important feature of Japanese housing law, 
and such regulation has constituted the most effective safety net for tenants (Sato, 
1999).
In December 1999, however, a government initiative led to the enactment of 
the Law on Special Measures to Promote the Supply of Quality Rental Housing 
(Ryoshitsu na Chintai Jutaku tou no Kyoukyu no Sokushin ni Kansuru Tokubetsu 
Sochi Hou), which provided for major exceptions to traditional rental regulations. 
The new law allows for rental contracts in which the landlord and tenant agree, 
under certain conditions, to eliminate security of tenancy on the understanding that 
the rental contract will automatically terminate at the end of the rental period. The 
government’s intention in introducing this law was to increase supply of quality 
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rental housing by easing regulations on rental contracts, but it has attracted fi erce 
criticism from people who point out that, given the inequality in bargaining power 
between landlords and tenants, in practice the new system works solely in favour 
of landlords and could result in destabilization of tenant occupancy (Harada, 2000; 
Morimoto, 2000). This law is typical of the neo-liberal, market-oriented housing 
policy the government has been pursuing since the latter half of the 1990s.
Conclusion
Since the 1990s, the corporate sector has been withdrawing from the housing 
welfare arena in Japan, and the government’s role in housing welfare has also 
been diminishing as a consequence of its market-oriented housing policy. Against 
this backdrop I would like to consider two questions: Is the corporate withdrawal 
from housing welfare only a temporary phenomenon? In what direction is Japan’s 
housing system likely to evolve from now on?
The slowdown of the Japanese economy has certainly been a major factor 
behind the corporate sector’s withdrawal from housing welfare. If, then, the 
Japanese economy picks up again, as it is now fi nally showing signs of doing, 
does that mean Japanese corporations will return to the housing welfare arena 
and that the corporate sector will once again become a key subsystem within 
the housing system? In my view, this is unlikely. The context in which Japanese 
corporations previously took on such a major role in the housing welfare arena 
included the Japanese-style employment system, characterized by career-long 
employment and promotion by seniority. But that employment system has been 
deteriorating over the past 15 years and will not easily be restored to its former 
prominence. Considering the changes that have taken place in the employment 
system, as well as the pressure of international competition, which is expected 
to become even more intense in the coming years, the waning of the corporate 
sector’s role in housing welfare would seem to be irreversible.
We must also bear in mind that the post-war Japanese housing system in which 
the corporate sector played such an important part was itself problematic in that it 
entailed a number of disparities and inequalities, such as between large and small 
companies, between regular and non-regular employees, and between male and 
female employees due to the bias towards male householders.
So how is Japan’s housing system likely to develop from now on? One 
option that deserves careful consideration is that of an expansion of the role of 
state in housing welfare. Specifi cally, various lessons can be drawn from the 
past experience and underlying philosophy of countries with unitary housing 
systems, whereby the stock of quality rental housing builds up as the state 
assumes responsibility for expanding and popularizing the non-profi t (social) 
rental housing sector and integrating it with for-profi t rental housing. A crucial 
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element in such an approach would be the introduction of the kind of universal 
rent assistance programmes common among European countries. But reorienting 
Japan’s housing system in this way would require more than simply expanding the 
state’s role so as to offset the decline in housing welfare provided by a corporate 
sector that previously fulfi lled that role in the government’s stead. Rather, a more 
positive and meaningful approach would be to acknowledge that the provision of 
housing welfare by private corporations entails serious dysfunctions, and to create 
instead a system for adequate housing welfare without relying on the corporate 
sector.
This is not, however, the thrust of current government policy. Instead, the 
government is moving towards creating a more market-oriented housing system 
while paring down its own responsibility for housing welfare to a scale even 
smaller than in the past. The current situation is one of increasing deregulation/
liberalization of the rental system and increasing residualization of public housing 
on the basis of the clear-cut separation of social rental housing (public housing) 
from private rental housing. In these respects, Japan’s housing system appears to 
be evolving in the direction of a pure dualist type.
Under this present system, people have little choice but to procure housing on 
the commercial housing market. However, there is no government assistance for 
them in that market, as no rental assistance of the kind seen in Europe is available, 
and the measures for security of tenancy that until recently constituted the most 
important safety net for tenants are being weakened. Meanwhile, it remains 
uncertain whether or not the supply of quality commercial rental housing that the 
government hopes to generate through rent deregulation will in fact materialize. 
The ‘social divide’, or widening gap between the haves and have-nots, is arousing 
considerable debate in Japan today (see e.g. Tachibanaki, 1998; Sato, 2000; 
Otake, 2005; Shirahase, 2006). It is doubtful whether the market-oriented housing 
system that the government is working to create will be able to provide quality, 
affordable housing to a broad cross-section of the Japanese people in the age of 
inequalities.
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5 Turning stock into cash 
fl ow




This chapter considers demographic change, addressing ageing of the population 
in particular, as part of social transition and examines its impact on housing. It 
challenges the popular debate in many industrial societies including Japan in recent 
years, concerning the transformation of housing assets into an income stream to 
help older people provide more fi nancial security in their later life. In Japan this 
discourse was born largely out of the facts that a signifi cant proportion of fi nancial 
and material assets were held by older people nationally, and that politicians, 
policy-makers and economists alike are looking for a means to revitalize the 
nation’s stagnating economy. This chapter seeks to contribute to the debate on an 
asset-based approach in public policy, drawing upon literature from post-industrial 
economies, and highlights the impact of the recent shift from family reciprocity 
to the wider socialization of care on individual asset accumulation. The chapter 
concludes by exploring the various options and accompanying issues surrounding 
liquidizing housing assets in old age. The fundamental misconception of such 
institutional mechanisms is also examined.
The post-war baby-boomers (called dankai no sedai in Japan) are fast 
approaching their retirement age and some commentators have identifi ed 
signifi cant implications this may have in the coming decade regarding societal 
ageing. Partly due to the exceptional size of the cohort (the population born 
between 1947 and 1950 was 27 per cent and 21 per cent larger than the previous 
and subsequent cohort, respectively) the baby-boomers have been a key driving 
force in creating new social trends in the post-war period. In the mid-1970s, 
for example, when they were in their late 20s, the ‘new family’ as opposed to 
traditional (three-generational, co-resident) families became a focus of discourse. 
And when they were reaching ‘house-buying age’ of their 40s, the timing could 
not have been worse. The baby-boomer households entering the housing ladder, 
which typically takes place in people’s late 30s and early 40s in Japan, coincided 
with the emergence of the bubble economy in the 1980s. As Hirayama explains 
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in chapter 2, the cohort following the baby-boomers was hit the hardest by the 
‘housing bubble’. The sudden increase in housing demands by the baby-boomer 
households helped accelerate price increases in urban areas. In fact, between 1984 
and 1996, the number of newly built houses was exceptionally high, reaching an 
average of 1.5 million units per annum, although this trend is now in decline. Now 
fast approaching their retirement age, is this cohort likely to set another trend in 
ageing Japanese society? The future of Japanese society is strongly bound up with 
what will happen to this generation, especially those who are well equipped with 
fi nancial and housing assets, and my examination will focus on this group within 
the current social, economic and demographic context.
One of the characteristics of home ownership in Japan is that a plot of land and 
dwelling are often considered separately, and thus valued separately. ‘Housing’ 
is often used as a generic term to describe a dwelling with or without a plot of 
land in the academic literature. In Japan, however, there is a clear differentiation 
between land and house (the building on top of the land), especially when we 
discuss the values of properties. In this context, plots of land hold their value 
higher and longer than houses due to the short life span of Japanese houses. 
National climate, materials used and the cultural practice of ‘scrap and build’ 
supported by the construction industry are some of the main reasons given for 
rapid cycle of housing reconstruction and accelerated decline in stock value (see 
Oizumi, in this volume). In this chapter, the term ‘housing assets’ implies, as in 
western home ownership systems, combined assets of land and dwelling, unless 
specifi cally stated, in order to make arguments accessible.
Asset-based public policy
The debate on asset-based approaches in public policy originated in the US and 
has been transported to many post-industrial economies in the West including the 
UK, Sweden and Australia. This approach views inequalities in the ownership 
of assets as problematic and tries to alleviate such inequalities by helping those 
on low incomes to accumulate assets through policy measures such as individual 
development account schemes (Regan and Paxton, 2001). Sherraden also 
emphasizes the importance of assets for low-income individuals and households 
as ‘income only maintains consumption, but assets change the way people interact 
with the world. With assets, people begin to think for the long term and pursue 
long-term goals. In other words, while income feeds people’s stomachs, assets 
change their minds’ (1991: 13). In his more recent work, Sherraden (2003) points 
out changes in welfare policy in some developed economies as a shift away from a 
welfare state to a social investment state, where the overarching role of government 
is to build up people’s capacity. In the UK, where an asset-based approach is 
relatively new, the neoliberal approach of selling council housing since the 1980s 
can be interpreted as asset-based welfare assistance for low-income households 
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through supported entry into the home ownership sector. More recent initiatives 
include the Saving Gateway and the Child Trust Fund, which are designed to 
strengthen fi nancial education and to promote positive attitudes towards saving 
among low-income households. The latter is aimed at providing young people 
with more equal conditions (despite their family wealth) at the start of their adult 
lives through a stock of fi nancial assets. In relation to housing, a proposal on an 
equity share scheme (the idea of granting social-renting tenants part ownership 
in terms of the value of their homes) has been identifi ed as a means to assist low-
income household saving (Chapman and Sinclair, 2003).
The important role that assets play in contemporary society is to allow 
individuals or households access security, independence and opportunities on top 
of the mere ownership of fi nancial and material assets. In other words, the lack 
of access to asset accumulation not only hinders the development of fi nancial 
and physical (housing) capital but also precludes people from building human 
and social capital (Latham, 2001). Such interconnectedness of different types of 
assets is illustrated in the rationale behind developing Individual Development 
Accounts:
… an individual could save into an account (thereby accumulating fi nancial 
capital), then invest in education (building human capital) or buy a home 
(accessing physical capital), whilst taking part in fi nancial training (again 
building human capital) and being supported by and connecting with a 
community-based organisation (contribution to social capital). 
(Regan and Paxton, 2001: 3)
In many capitalist societies, accumulation of individual assets occurs largely 
through institutionalized mechanisms, primarily via home ownership and pension 
schemes that are clearly defi ned and heavily subsidized within public policy 
(Regan and Paxton, 2001). Therefore, as Paxton (2003) puts it, asset-building 
policies were primarily geared towards the affl uent: what was described as the 
fi scal welfare state by Titmuss (1958). Throughout the post-war economic growth 
period, the Japanese government encouraged the majority of households to become 
homeowners and thus to accumulate their own housing wealth through heavily 
subsidized, low-interest loans from the Government Housing Loan Corporation. 
Such self-reliance in accessing quality housing was also made possible through the 
unique system of occupational welfare – the ‘productivist’ notion of the welfare 
state linking welfare provision with the labour market performance and individual 
employment status (Holliday, 2000). As many welfare state analysts point out, 
however, the system has inevitably created social inequalities between households 
according to their position in the labour market. Under the system, access to home 
ownership has been restricted for low-income households, those in unstable or 
irregular employment, and single and female-headed households.
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In addition, traditionally, welfare policy tends to have anti-asset elements 
signifi ed in means-testing. Means-tested public assistance is a form of institutional 
disincentive for individuals to accumulate assets through the setting of an ‘asset 
limit’. For example, it is very diffi cult for Japanese owner-occupiers (especially 
with mortgages) to access public assistance once they lose regular income or 
experience a substantial salary cut, which are increasingly likely under the current 
shift towards more fl exible employment practices in Japan’s troubled economy. 
Public assistance is not designed to cover mortgage repayments (Seikatsu Hogo 
Hoki Kenkyukai, 2003), and this can be understood to signify the policy stance 
that public money is not for investing in individual asset accumulation.
In terms of ageing societies, the different ways in which states perceive and 
treat individual asset accumulation regarding long-term care are indeed, manifest 
in fundamental differences across societies (Izuhara, 2005). For example, who is 
responsible for the cost of long-term care is a well-debated issue in many industrial 
societies. In England, for example, the necessity to sell a home – accumulated 
asset – in order to move into residential or nursing homes has been the source 
of public outcry (Askham et al., 1999; Royal Commission on Long Term Care, 
1999). In this scenario, policy-makers consider the housing assets of individuals 
as a source of income in old age. Moreover, people with capital or savings of more 
than £18,500 are expected to meet the full cost of their long-term care fees. Japan, 
on the other hand, has recently taken an alternative strategy to funding increasing 
care needs in an ageing society. Under the new social insurance scheme (Koteki 
Kaigo Hoken) introduced in 2000, both personal and nursing care provision is no 
longer means-tested, and thus everyone has an entitlement to receive long-term 
care according to criteria of the extent of physical and mental disability. This 
system allows individuals (and their families) to retain their wealth, including 
residential property, while receiving public services under the scheme. I will 
return to discuss this in detail later in the chapter.
The rationale behind recent developments in asset-based approaches in public 
policy is to help achieve a more equal and inclusive society, giving the opportunity 
to those on low incomes to accumulate assets. The approaches in the West thus 
specifi cally target low-income households to assist their entry into a pathway of 
asset accumulation. In addition, many other existing, mainstream policies, such as 
the promotion of home ownership and state-assisted pension schemes, can also be 
interpreted as asset-based welfare. Nevertheless, such neoliberal approaches have 
exacerbated social inequality. While the intergenerational transfer of assets has 
played a part in widening the wealth gap between haves and have-nots, the later 
stage as well as the starting point of asset accumulation in people’s life-course is 
also critical and requires scrutiny.
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Assets, housing market and demography
‘Asset-rich, cash-poor’: the fi nancial status of older people
The total wealth of households is made up with their income and assets. Income 
includes earnings from both economic activity and other sources such as rent 
from properties and profi ts from investments, while assets can be categorized as 
fi nancial assets (e.g. savings and investments) and material assets (e.g. ownership 
of real estate, automobiles and, in Japan’s case, membership of a golf club!). 
Overall assets of individuals or households also consist of the sum of both positive 
and negative assets (debts).
The tendency is to regard older people as being ‘asset-rich, income-poor’, 
refl ecting their labour market status as ‘retired’. When people reach their retirement 
age, they tend to rely on a limited income (i.e. pensions), which reinforces the 
social construction of old age. According to the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Labour in 2000, for example, the average income of older households was made 
up of 62 per cent of pensions, alongside 28 per cent earned from economic activity. 
The income of older people has in fact grown over the post-war period, keeping 
pace with the general growth of that of the working population, thanks to the 
increased benefi t of pension insurance (which is closely linked to people’s labour 
market performance in Japan). Compared with general households, however, the 
income of older households tends to be much more concentrated in the bottom 
few income bands. In 2000, some 13 per cent of older households received annual 
income below 1 million yen (£5,000; ¥200 = £1) and another 30 per cent received 
that of ¥1–2 million (£5,000–£10,000).
The pattern of ownership of assets, however, paints a different picture of old 
age. The amounts of assets households have increases as people age, refl ecting 
the characteristics of Japanese saving patterns (Table 5.1; Figure 5.1). Despite 
the real, if sometimes romanticized inter-generational family values in Japan, the 
‘life-cycle model’ as opposed to the ‘dynasty’ and ‘altruism’ model dominates 
household saving behaviour, in which people save primarily for retirement and 
other events in their own life-course (Horioka et al., 2000). The majority do not 
save simply to pass assets on to the future generations or strategically to exchange 
for family support. It is puzzling, however, that many people continue to save well 
into their old age, instead of eating away their savings after retirement.
According to the Survey conducted by the Ministry of Post and Telecom-
munication on household economy in 1996, a signifi cantly high proportion of 
those in their 60s (64 per cent) and 70s and over (58.9 per cent) were still saving 
for their own old age, while the younger generations (over 50 per cent of those 
who were in their 30s and 40s) were more likely to be saving for their children’s 
education. It is surprising to fi nd that, despite the notorious ‘0 per cent interest’ 
in the Japanese banking sector and stagnated income growth in the post-bubble 
economy, household savings grew while the value of real estate assets has fallen. 
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At the turn of the century, however, the impact of the prolonged recession has 
started being more visible, with increased rates of households without savings. 
Economic uncertainty and precarious employment conditions are the factors 
contributing to such household behaviour.
While the aggregated data conceals the level of wealth inequalities within old 
age, the cohort of older people appears to hold more than a half of the nation’s 
fi nancial assets. According to the 2000 survey on attitudes towards savings, 53 per 
cent of fi nancial assets, and 69 per cent if debts are excluded, were owned by those 
aged 60 and over. This is also the case when we look at housing assets. Older 
households are indeed more likely to own greater (un-mortgaged) housing equity, 
Table 5.1 Estimated value of assets per household by age group of household 
head (in thousand yen)
Average < 30 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 > 70
Total 
assets





8,727 946 283 3,114 10,112 17,869 17,105
Real 
estate
28,346 4,633 15,911 26,917 32,858 37,569 41,809





















40–49 50–59 60–69 70–8030–39
5.1 Value of assets per household by age group of household
Source: Arakawa, 2003b.
Note: Survey conducted by the Daiichi Life Insurance Research Centre in 2002 among 







refl ecting the timing of house purchase and duration of owner-occupation (Figure 
5.1). The rate of home ownership is as high as 80 per cent among those aged 60 
years and over. Furthermore, approximately 20 per cent of real-estate assets of 
older people were properties other than their owner-occupied housing.
Finally, the fact that the nation’s wealth is largely held by the older generation 
has now provoked a debate on ‘making older people spend their fortunes’ as part 
of revitalizing the nation’s stagnated economy and also to help tackle swelling 
welfare expenditure. Indeed, the high level of fi nancial and housing assets means 
that considerable numbers of people own accumulated assets which could be 
turned into income streams. The diffi culty in realizing this proposal is, however, 
that assets are largely tied into owner-occupied housing, which, unlike savings, is 
diffi cult to liquidize.
Volatility in the housing market
It had been a common belief that, partly due to the lack of land in urban areas, 
housing prices would consistently rise and home ownership was inescapably 
accompanied by capital gains – that is, until the economic bubble burst in the early 
1990s. Under earlier circumstances, people aspired to become homeowners and 
expected to accumulate assets through housing price infl ation. This discourse is 
now in crisis, as the housing market has remained depressed for some 15 years.
The prolonged recession eroded people’s confi dence and their ability to invest 
in housing, which is particularly evident among the younger generations. Entry to 
home ownership has been delayed over the last two decades. The home ownership 
rates of the age groups 25–9 and 30–4 declined from 25 per cent and 46 per cent 
in 1983, 13 per cent and 32 per cent in 1993, to 8 per cent and 21 per cent in 2003, 
respectively. Some scholars may argue that deliberate delaying of entry is driven 
by the expectation of the younger generations of inheriting parents’ property, but 
there is no clear evidence to support the argument. In comparison with the steady 
growth of fi nancial assets, poor performance of real-estate assets has been evident 
in recent years. According to the National Consumption Survey in 1999, the total 
wealth of average household has declined 18.4 per cent compared with the 1994 
data, with the devaluation of real-estate assets as the major contributing factor. 
Land and housing assets fell 26.4 per cent and 5.9 per cent respectively, while the 
level of fi nancial assets rose 5.7 per cent in the fi ve-year period.
An over-supply of housing may have also contributed to housing price defl ation. 
The contemporary pattern of urban (housing) developments being, in nature, high 
density, together with the predictable decline of the number of households in a low 
fertility society, has meant that housing shortages have become a thing of the past. 
In a similar vein, the White Paper on Land in 2004 anticipated the negative impact 
that a growing number of vacant houses would have on many neighbourhoods 
– for example, fear of crime and anti-social behaviour.
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The expected life-span of Japanese houses being ‘culturally’ short is highly 
problematic if housing is considered as a tradable commodity later in people’s 
life-course. A single-family home, if the purchasers were in their 40s, would 
require substantial renovation or even total rebuilding later in their life-course. 
The owners of condominiums, an increasingly popular and common option for 
urban households, will also face substantial related problems because of their 
lack of durability and their even more dramatic price defl ation. The condition and 
values of housing are of primary importance when older people try to utilize their 
housing assets to raise funds in old age.
The impact of demographic change
Low fertility is one of the key driving forces leading to societal ageing, and 
its causes and consequences are well debated in contemporary Japan (see e.g. 
Kawamoto, 2001). The fertility rate dropped to a record low of 1.29 in 2004. The 
factors infl uencing this demographic change are multifaceted and include both 
the social and economic. Most notable are women’s increased social participation 
and declining willingness to start a family due to associated opportunity costs; 
people delaying marriage or not marrying at all (babies born to unmarried mothers 
are still uncommon in Japan); and even married couples being less confi dent in 
having a second and subsequent children or delaying having them due to the 
prolonged recession and accompanying precariousness in employment (Iwasawa, 
2001; Ogawa, 2001).
The Japanese pattern of fertility is unlike that of Italy, where many couples 
tend to have one child only (Bettoni, 2006). If we look at the fertility rate among 
Japanese ‘married’ couples, it has been stable at around 2.2 (enough to maintain 
the nation’s population) for the last three decades (Iwasawa, 2001). This suggests 
that some families are having two or three children, while an increasing number 
are having none.
What is signifi cant for understanding social changes in Japan is that individuals 
and couples are increasingly choosing not to have children, which affects their 
asset accumulation and disposal where there may be diminished incentives to 
accumulate and protect assets for future generations. Under current economic 
conditions, those without children may opt for rental accommodation, given 
the likely fi nancial burden of a long-term mortgage. And in the case of owner-
occupiers, housing assets may be viewed as more disposable with fewer and 
fewer households looking to trans-generational accumulation and more and more 
households having greater incentive to use their assets more effectively in old 
age.
Increased longevity, the other side of the same coin of societal ageing, tends 
to delay intergenerational asset transfer, which also has signifi cant implications 
for asset accumulation and disposal. Increased longevity means two or more 
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adult generations are likely to exist as separate households for longer. Unless 
older people strategically transfer assets early to help younger generations, adult 
children are likely to have an established household with an (un-mortgaged) owner-
occupied house by the time they inherit. Inheritance skipping a generation is one 
predictable outcome. However, given the accidental nature of bequests under the 
life-cycle model, wealth tends to fl ow from the old-olds to the young-olds and 
thus remains stubbornly in the older age group and subsequently under-used (or 
unused) (Arakawa, 2003a). Inheritance received later in people’s life-course has 
little impact on their consumption or investment patterns. A survey conducted 
by the Daiichi Life Insurance Research Centre in 2002 confi rmed that for 81.4 
per cent of those who had inherited assets, there was no signifi cant effect in their 
consumption and investment pattern after inheritance (Arakawa, 2003b). Arakawa 
(2003a) therefore suggests that breaking the cycle of such unused or under-used 
assets among older people, by encouraging them to spend more or transfer wealth 
earlier to younger generations, can be one way of stimulating the economy.
Despite the cultural understanding of housing as ‘family assets’, which were 
accumulated and passed on over the generations, housing has been increasingly 
‘commodifi ed’ in Japan (Izuhara, 2005). The decline of co-residency suggests that 
the clear line and obligation of household succession within the family are also 
diminishing. Do all the above factors work to the advantage of older people in 
turning their housing stock into a cash fl ow?
From family reciprocity to socialization of care: the paradox 
of institutional mechanisms and wealth accumulation
Family obligations and asset transfer have in the past been explicitly connected in 
the Japanese social and legal systems. Until the traditional form of the ie (family) 
system was abolished by constitutional reform immediately after the Second 
World War, eldest-son succession was the norm, refl ecting the patrilineal stem-
family system (see Ronald, in this volume). The successor child looked after his 
parents through co-residency and, in return, inherited the family wealth intact 
(although practical care was often provided by the daughter-in-law). Co-residency 
certainly provided a perfect structural context for such an exchange to take place. 
In a society where the family had the central responsibility to care for their older 
members, and where high rates of home ownership exist, this exchange has 
continued to thrive until recently (Izuhara, 2002).
Japanese society has recently witnessed gradual changes in family structure 
and function, however, and the link between care provision and inheritance has 
been increasingly divorced through, in part, independent living that has gained 
in popularity among older people (Izuhara, 2005). The introduction of a new 
social insurance scheme for long-term care in 2000 was indeed one of the major 
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turning points for shifting care responsibility from the family to the state. Whether 
such socialization of care would further accelerate family disengagement from 
traditional duties is another debate, but the rationale behind it not only refl ected 
demographic changes and economic downturn, but also that the family was on 
the verge of collapsing under the heavy burden of care (particularly for women), 
and the declining capacity of the family to care, partly due to the increased 
geographic distances between the generations and increased female labour market 
participation (Peng, 2002).
This section examines a paradox in the new institutional mechanism on 
social care delivery. Unlike the means-tested approach applied in many western 
industrialized societies, Japan has opted for a social insurance approach. The 
system of funding care and the criteria for service provision are both distinctive 
features of the social contract between individuals and the state. Social insurance 
differs from tax-based systems in terms of the mechanism of funding, its coverage, 
eligibility and entitlement (Ikegami and Campbell, 2002). What are relevant here 
are the eligibility criteria. One of the advantages of social insurance rests on 
making long-term care an explicit and uniform entitlement for everyone, with 
eligibility decided according to ‘objective based criteria on the extent of physical 
and mental disability’ (Ikegami and Campbell, 2002). Other individual conditions 
such as income, assets and the availability of family care are irrelevant in the 
assessment process in Japan. In other words, as long as people pay a monthly 
premium (which is deducted from their pensions), they can receive services with 
10 per cent co-payment once the need arises. It is inevitable that this scheme 
creates social inequality among older households (Izuhara, 2003). The winners are 
primarily the middle to higher income households who used to meet the full cost 
of care entirely from their own pocket and who can now access public services 
while retaining their assets. On the other hand, low-income households lose out 
because of the double burden of compulsory contribution and user fees. Many 
have to keep contributing to the funds without any prospect of using services due 
to the affordability issue over co-payment.
The separation between care provision and asset transfer is evident here, and 
the current system encourages the further accumulation of trans-generational 
wealth. Some scholars therefore argue that, as inheritance has been traditionally 
viewed as a reward for caring for older members within the family, the current 
system presents a distortion of such a generational contract. Long-term care has 
now been ‘socialized’ in order to maintain or strengthen the social security system, 
which the better-off with assets are currently benefi ting most from. A debate has 
emerged concerning the means to reimburse society from individual assets, instead 
of protecting assets for children (Atusmi, 2001). The need to shift the boundary of 
the micro-level ‘generational contract’ regarding care and inheritance to a macro-
level social contract has become an increasingly salient argument in discussions 
of welfare in Japan.
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If the provision of social care is not means-tested, Atsumi (2001) argues that 
inheritance tax may help redistribute individual wealth back to society. Under the 
current inheritance tax system, only 10 per cent of those aged 45 and older were 
subject to taxation after their death. Despite the nine-stage progressive taxation, 
which taxes higher asset owners much more, the bottom line of eligibility is set 
very high (¥90 million (£450,000) for the family of a spouse and two children), 
leaving only 10 per cent of asset transfers currently taxable (Ministry of Finance, 
2001).
If the primary motivation for saving behaviour had been a response to potential 
health and fi nancial risks in old age, the Long Term Care Insurance has reduced 
the individual risk by shouldering a potentially large burden of care costs. A survey 
conducted by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication in 2004 revealed that 
the reason people were decreasingly intending to leave an inheritance for children 
was not because ‘they wanted to spend their assets themselves’ (14 per cent) but 
that ‘they did not feel they could afford to do so’ (80 per cent). Nevertheless if 
people still continue to save, such cultural behaviour may come from people’s 
varying perception on risks (Tachibanaki, 2004). Parsons points out the complexity 
of defi ning problems in the application of policies or solutions since ‘values, 
beliefs, ideologies, interests and bias all shape perceptions of reality. Problems 
involve perceptions and perceptions involve constructions’ (1995: 88). He goes 
on to explain that, ‘although problems are ill-structured, government is highly 
structured and this means that all problems have an organisational or governmental 
context which has a major infl uence on the way in which problems come to be 
structured’ (p. 89). Since institutions are major players in problem defi nition 
and policy-making processes, public policy may also be able to manipulate 
people’s perceptions, and infl uence their attitudes towards asset accumulation and 
consumption. In this context, potential strategies for transforming or liquidizing 
the assets of older people depend on whether it is possible to change people’s 
perceptions of risk.
From housing stock to cash fl ow
Policy-makers and some academic commentators increasingly view turning 
existing assets of individuals into an income stream as a necessary strategy in the 
revitalization of the nation’s economy. This is also debated in the context of current 
recession, labour market restructuring, and demographic change, which combine 
to produce uncertainty in future pension funds and return from investments. To 
secure and supplement their income and to meet the changing needs of housing in 
old age, there are indeed various options that older people could deploy to release 
part or all of their equity tied to housing. This section explores the pros and cons 
of such options, focusing largely on the experiences of older homeowners.
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Reverse mortgages
There are various ways to utilize housing assets to generate income for old age. 
For ‘asset-rich, income-poor’ homeowners, reverse mortgage schemes are, in 
theory, very attractive options for those who have limited income and would like 
to release some of their equity tied to an owner-occupied house while remaining 
independent in their own home. This is particularly a good option for people who 
are reluctant to move in old age for various social and fi nancial reasons. It also 
meets a recent policy emphasis, not only in Japan but also in many developed 
economies, upon older people ‘staying put’ or ‘ageing in place’. Although often 
driven by fi nancial concerns relating to the cost of institutionalization, this policy 
logic has also been supported by the aspirations and preferences of older people 
themselves for independence and autonomy. This policy focus of shifting away 
from social hospitalization to supporting people in need in their own home was 
central to the development of new social insurance for long-term care in Japan.
Reverse mortgage schemes are currently operated by both private fi nancial 
institutions and local authorities (most in association with fi nancial institutions) 
in Japan, but the take-up rates are still insignifi cant. For example, there were only 
18 users in 1998 in Musashino City, Tokyo, the pioneer local authority with the 
longest established scheme in operation since 1981. Like Britain, the evident 
failure of such schemes to attract many older homeowners, however, suggest that 
there are various barriers to take-up and a degree of resistance to their use (Okuda, 
1999; Davey, 1996; Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1998). The increasing volatility 
and uncertainty of housing and fi nancial markets is one factor. Homeowners and 
fi nancial institutions alike may be less confi dent about future property values and 
the rise of interest rates than before. Many restrictions therefore apply to older 
homeowners, such as low borrowing limits and, for most, purpose-specifi c monthly 
payment limits apply. For example, given the likely devaluation of property, 
70 per cent of the market values is often available for owners of single-family 
homes, but the available rate drops to a maximum of 50 per cent for condominium 
owners. Some institutions even exclude condominium owners from applying for 
the schemes. Prolonged longevity and accompanying uncertainty in how long 
people are going to live also add further complications to setting a loan period. 
Some people may exhaust their funds long before they pass away but it has proven 
diffi cult for local authorities and fi nancial institutions to force older homeowners 
to repay, which defeats the initial purpose of the mortgage. Older people may also 
lack adequate information or reliable advice to take up this option.
In addition, it is likely that cultural values and pride still play a signifi cant role. 
As UK research found, older people ‘do not want to be in debt’ or ‘do want to pass 
something to the next generation’ (Davey, 1996). In the case of Musashino City, the 
majority of remortgagers do not have children. At their death, their benefi ciaries 
are more likely to pay off the mortgage debts from their own savings or loans, 
rather than by raising funds from the sale of the inherited property. The continued 
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importance of Japanese cultural practices of family wealth accumulation and 
inter-generational asset transfer is indicated by the fact that a guarantor, often an 
adult child, is a prerequisite for an older homeowner in joining a scheme. Such 
institutional constraints help families to maintain the customary generational 
contract, and thus to protect housing assets for the future generations.
Renting out additional properties 
The recent deregulation of the Leasehold Act opened doors to this option for non-
professional property owners and investors. Short-term leasehold gives property 
owners the right to refuse an extension of a contract without any reason. Under the 
previous regime, many individual, non-professional owners were reluctant to let 
their houses due to the risk and uncertainty of tenants occupying their house for 
an unspecifi ed period of time. It is believed among a specifi c group of neoliberal 
scholars and businesses that such deregulation will encourage an expansion of 
rental stocks (especially, large-size housing), decrease rents and ease the existing 
burden on property owners who make up the shortfall of public sector rental 
(Abe et al., 1997; Hatta, 1998). It may also stimulate the economy through urban 
redevelopment. However, the social needs and protection of tenants are largely 
ignored in this shift. Stability in the rental sector has been inevitably reduced, and 
the cost of such a shift tends to fall on low-income tenants – many of whom are 
elderly.
As a consequence, an increasing number of people who have additional 
properties besides their owner-occupied house are renting out their spare housing, 
many of them to their relatives. The proportion of those who own additional 
properties is higher among elderly households (see also Hirayama, in this volume). 
This is indeed one way of boosting their income in old age although the option 
is only available for a fortunate few who have invested in or inherited properties 
in the past. Increased inheritance prospects in a low fertility society may expand 
the benefi ciaries of this option but the location, age and type of housing stock will 
dictate the rentability and thus the level of rents achieved.
If inheriting and letting out property is a passive route into landlordism, a 
more proactive route can be facilitated by purchasing a buy-to-let property to 
supplement income in old age (following the popular discourse in the UK) or 
as a component of longer term investment planning. Whether this works so well 
in Japan is, however, questionable. The modest revival in the private rented 
sector in the UK has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the number and 
proportion of individual landlords backed by deregulation, the greater availability 
of mortgages and, in some cases, by the effect of negative equity (Heron and 
Stevens, 1999). Those non-professional investors were attracted partly by strong 
capital gains in the past, but the future of the market will depend primarily on the 
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demand for private rented property which is supported by demographic factors, 
changing labour and lifestyle patterns, as well as government policy (Pannell and 
Heron, 2001). As the number of vacant properties is already becoming an issue in 
contemporary Japan, winners and losers may be divided by how their additional 
properties meet the demands of the changing rental market.
Trading down
Trading down involves both inter- and intra-tenure downward movements in terms 
of size and value of property. Older people can move to purchase a smaller, more 
manageable and less expensive property (e.g. a small condominium unit instead 
of two-storey, single-family home) to release some equity from current housing. 
The benefi ts of trading down are not only releasing some of the equity tied into a 
large owner-occupied house but also achieving greater manageability in terms of 
living space and environment while retaining independent living. Compared with 
some western societies where moving houses according to people’s life-cycle 
need is more popular, the Japanese tend not to move once they acquire a single-
family home. The housing market, however, highly dictates the destinations of 
older movers.
An inter-tenure movement from owner-occupation to tenancy can be 
attractive for some who view owning a house in old age as a liability in terms of 
maintenance and property tax. Given the fact that 80 per cent of older households 
are owner-occupiers and that the average size (fl oor space) of an owner-occupied 
house is almost three times larger than rented accommodation (Management 
and Coordination Agency, 1998), the potential impact of liquidizing housing 
assets of older people upon the rental market would be signifi cant. By trading 
down, the current likely mismatch of household size and their living space, 
considering different stages of the life-course, could be rectifi ed. A large demand 
by younger families with growing children for good-quality, larger size housing 
in the private rented sector could be met by properties strategically released by 
older homeowners who are likely to be empty nesters. The Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport views such redistribution of housing stock as a vital 
and effective way of meeting the needs of households in different stages in their 
life-course, and is promoting new initiatives such as the establishment of support 
centres for movers and a sub-lease insurance system (Gekkan Fudosan Ryutsu 
(July 2003), 84–6).
Moreover, trading down could be the only means for older people who are 
willing to move from a depressed housing area to a popular, up-coming urban 
area. For example, the only way for older parents who want to relocate closer to 
their only child in the Tokyo metropolitan area may be by selling their 40-year-
old detached house in a suburb of a small city and to rent a unit in the public or 
private rented sector. It is inevitable, however, that the capital from the sale of the 
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property will be gradually eaten away, which may threaten children’s inheritance. 
Condominium owners who face the necessity of redevelopment (due to the short 
life-span of residential buildings) in their old age may, although reluctantly, need 
to take up this option, given their limited income and considerably reduced housing 
equity. The future of shared ownership in condominiums poses many questions, 
especially since the passing of the new Act – when the cost of demolition is 
subtracted from an already small share of individual equity from a plot of land, 
it is almost impossible to buy back a unit in a newly built building on the same 
site.
Furthermore, if people rely on the ‘risk-averse’ rented housing market, problems 
begin to appear when they reach a certain age. Age discrimination largely exists in 
the private rented sector, thus entry into private renting in old age appears almost 
impossible in Japan. Becoming a tenant or trying to look for alternative rented 
accommodation in old age poses a great challenge, especially for lone (female) 
tenants, due to limited public provision, costly alternatives in the market and 
discrimination against older tenants who may be viewed as a potential problem 
(e.g. causing fi res, dying in the property) by landlords and estate agents (Izuhara, 
2000). Approximately 40 per cent of private management agencies refuse older 
tenants access to the majority of their rented accommodation. This fact makes older 
homeowners cautious in considering the option. There is however an increasing 
recognition that the effective use of both existing housing stock and private 
market initiatives is the key to promoting good-quality housing for older people 
in an ageing society. Tackling the issue regarding the refusal of older tenants by 
landlords and managing agencies was one of the aims of the new Act (ensuring 
housing stability among older people) in 2001. Under the Act, the proposal was to 
set up a voluntary registration scheme for landlords and managing agencies that are 
willing to take in elderly-headed households and strengthen the communication 
channels to spread information regarding elderly-friendly landlords. Some public 
funds attached to this initiative (in the form of rent guarantees) provide landlords 
and management agencies with an incentive to achieve a more inclusive, un-age-
biased private rented sector.
Moving to purpose-built housing for older people
The move into supported housing has only been an option for a minority in 
Japan, refl ecting the under-development of the housing sector and the current 
condition of the housing in the private market. In response to new and growing 
demands for independent living by older people, there have been both publicly 
funded and privately developed supportive housing projects operating in Japan 
since the late 1970s. Private housing complexes offer a wide range of independent 
services for their residents, including a dining room for group meals in addition 
to individual kitchenettes, a communal bath, an emergency alarm system, 24-hour 
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front services, communal facilities such as lounges, library and activity space, 
and organized social clubs and activities. Indeed, supportive housing assists older 
people in maintaining a (semi)-independent lifestyle and prevents unnecessary 
institutionalization as they grow older. Linking housing with social services has 
now become an issue in Japanese housing policy and practice for older people. 
This type of housing is therefore a practical solution when independent living 
or living with other (extended) family members is undesirable or impossible for 
physical, emotional or fi nancial reasons. However, this costly option has lower 
priority within the limited resources of many local authorities, especially under 
the more recent policy emphasis on home care.
The private projects serve only relatively affl uent older people since they usually 
require an initial large lump sum to purchase the ‘life-estate’, and a monthly fee 
for management and operation. Life-estate is the right to occupy a property for the 
period of one’s natural life, which reverts to the project owner thereafter. In this 
scenario, the released housing equity from the sale of their current housing would 
be immediately put back into the housing sector (unless one holds suffi cient savings 
to cover the cost). This option is attractive for some elderly owners because: 1) 
purchasing a life-estate is often cheaper than purchasing the similar unit with full 
ownership; 2) a life-estate is not subject to property tax and maintenance (as long 
as they pay monthly fees); and 3) there is no threat of eviction unless ill health 
requires hospitalization. Such places also attract those without children and thus 
without family obligations or any expectation of inter-generational asset transfer. 
However, research has also found a number of cases where those who had children 
have made a positive decision to move into such housing (Izuhara, 2005). In those 
cases, the decision to break the generational contract involving inter-generational 
transfer came from either the constraint of cultural practices or liberation from 
them. This also highlights a strong gender dimension in family support structure. 
In one case, a widow, who moved to live in private housing for older people, did 
not think it mattered whether she had kept the house or not since her children were 
all married with their own houses and had no intention of coming back to live with 
their widowed mother. In another case of an older female resident, her daughter 
was married to an only son whose mother was also widowed. In her view, it was 
right if his mother lived with them following the traditional patrilineal succession 
system. It was, however, not logical for her to expect to live with the young family. 
Since she had married off her only daughter, the matrilineal mother knew she 
would be on her own when her husband died. In any case, ‘children being well 
established’ was often a condition for older people disposing of their assets early 




If the timing of inheritance matters, transferring assets early to the next generation 
helps the stagnated entry of younger people into the home ownership sector 
signifi cantly and thus may boost the nation’s (housing) economy. This strategy can 
be combined with other options mentioned above but does not necessarily directly 
benefi t older homeowners themselves. Additional allowances for house purchase 
and improvements are more generous in Japan, refl ecting the current government’s 
intention to stimulate the economy by providing families with an incentive to 
redistribute rather than save their assets. In 2003, tax-free cash allowances were 
raised from 1.1 million yen (£5,500) per annum to a total allowance of 25 million 
yen (£125,000). The private sector has also been promoting a new type of extended 
family living. The Japanese housing industry markets a considerable amount of 
‘Two-household housing’, which is detached housing, planned on the presumption 
that older parents co-reside with their adult children, and is often built on land 
owned by the older generation. One of the major reasons for decreasing rates 
of co-residency has been the drawback of such living arrangements. The close 
physical proximity of different generations, each with their own needs, desires, 
lifestyles and preferences, has often led to confl ict within the extended family. 
This problem has been reduced with the new design allowing for the creation of 
two separate households, with separate amenities and facilities, all under one roof. 
This type of housing is often achieved using a cooperative investment by elderly 
parents and their adult children – a loan inheritance scheme over generations – 
forming one type of inter-vivo transfer.
Looking at the saving behaviour of older people, the life-cycle model suggests 
that the majority (for example, 70 per cent of the respondents of the survey 
conducted by the Daiichi Insurance Research Centre) are not living by ‘scrape and 
save’ for future generations but are planning only to leave funds if anything is left 
at the end of their own lives. This implies that older people have limited capacity 
for making inter-vivo transfer or are not willing to do so anyway. According to the 
same survey, older people tend to view ‘fi nancial support for children to obtain 
their housing’ as not part of inheritance but part of their parental obligation of 
bringing up children. However, only a limited group of older people in fact help 
their offspring with house purchases in any signifi cant way. This may therefore 
not be the most effective way to turn assets into a cash fl ow.
Conclusion
This chapter has identifi ed that a large proportion of the nation’s wealth is held 
by older people, and, despite the transfer of assets over the generations, wealth 
tends to remain in the owner-occupied properties of this particular age group due 
to increased longevity as well as people’s perception of risk in Japan’s troubled 
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economy. The chapter also highlighted a paradox of the welfare state mechanism 
in relation to the new social insurance on long-term care, which has shifted the 
responsibility of care away from the family to society, while family wealth (which 
used to be considered as a reward for care giving) remains within the family. 
Protecting assets of older people may require, however, the protection of assets 
for future generations, which in a way works against the principle of the asset-
based approach. The current system indeed encourages trans-generational asset 
accumulation rather than alleviating social inequality among households by 
redistribution of household wealth.
Various options for turning housing assets into cash fl ow were presented in 
terms of both pros and cons of each approach. The low take-up rate, however, 
suggests the government’s intention of liquidizing older people’s assets has 
been slow to materialize under the current housing and fi nancial regime. One 
important factor is the recognition of people’s preference for ‘ageing in place’, 
which is also supported by the current policy priority of promoting home care. 
The reluctance of older people to take up some of the options is because their 
assets are largely tied to their owner-occupied homes. The negative impact of a 
move often outweighs the benefi ts for older homeowners. Displacement from the 
familiar neighbourhood, the cost of moving and insecurity and affordability issues 
in the rental sector are some of the reasons. Despite the importance of inheritance 
and cultural bound meanings of family wealth accumulation, they do not appear 
to be the primary obstacle to the disposing of housing assets in old age. This 
suggests the uniqueness of inter-generational exchange and family obligations 
have been gradually diminished in Japan.
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The housing system in Japan which formed after the Second World War was 
based on a modern family norm that led to the overwhelming provision of housing 
for ‘standard families’, consisting of an employed husband, a homemaker wife 
and two children. This system transformed the Japanese housing landscape to a 
great extent, though assumptions about ‘standard families’ have not necessarily 
corresponded to the actual residential practices of the Japanese. Current socio-
demographic changes demonstrate a rise in non-conventional households 
together with an increasing diversity of lifestyles, which contradicts concepts of 
homogeneity and standardization, and may confl ict with dwelling design as well 
as housing systems developed for ‘standard families’.
This chapter begins by looking at incongruities between household composition 
and housing system norms. It goes on to examine present housing conditions and 
forms of living from the perspective of women. Literature on gender issues in 
relation to the physical environment have been well documented among western 
housing scholars, planners and designers for the last two decades. They have paid 
attention to the diversifi cation of roles for women as well as gaps between the 
physical environment and the needs of women (Hayden, 1981, 1984; Van Vliet, 
1988; Little, 1994; Ottes et al., 1995; OECD, 1995). These studies have revealed 
that women have played not only passive roles as consumers, but also active roles 
in movements seeking change in housing and the environment (Gilroy and Woods, 
1994). Women have generally asserted the need for the physical environment 
to be more secure and for provision of affordable housing and daycare centres 
near residences. These are considered important conditions in the reconciliation 
of domestic affairs with the demands of working life engaged in outside of the 
home.
It seems that there are many common features that women have experienced 
in the built environments of different countries. However, the response of each 
society is varied and has depended on the features of the built environment as well 
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as on the social norms and gender role defi nitions. Social responses and discourse 
concerning the problems that women face within their daily lives refl ect socio-
economic conditions and availability of other sorts of resources peculiar to each 
society. Housing conditions and related services may have a signifi cant effect on 
women’s life chances as well as the quality of everyday life. The examination 
of these issues in terms of empirical realities and a comparative framework may 
contribute to greater understanding of future housing demand and the necessary 
direction of housing policy.
The family norm and modern living
The modernization of Japanese housing seems a unique and complex process. For 
a long time, modernization has been equated with the introduction of ‘western 
styles’, which was linked to the image of being better-off for many Japanese (Ota, 
1969). For the newly emerging middle classes in the pre-war period, the adoption 
of western-style modern living was regarded as a way not only to improve their 
daily lives, but also to express their social success. Western-style modern living 
has thus been regarded as a status symbol among Japanese and for this very reason 
that way of life rapidly expanded in Japan (Matusbara, 2001).
Other factors that promoted the modernization of forms of living were 
massive housing construction after the Second World War and the high economic 
growth period, which enormously transformed the Japanese housing landscape 
and modifi ed the original images of a modern life (see Ronald, in this volume). 
The period immediately after the war was characterized by housing shortages, 
and priority was put on reconstruction projects. The modernization of housing 
production systems was also imperative in order to make up for the housing 
defi cit.
Traditional dwelling plans and interior arrangements, following the pater-
familias principle, were regarded as forms that needed to be modernized at that 
time (Hamaguchi, 1949). The dwelling type denoted ‘n-DK’, which is composed 
of multiple separate bedrooms, their number expressed by ‘n’, with dining kitchen 
(DK), was introduced in the early 1950s as a modern Japanese dwelling form and 
expanded in response to increasing housing demands at the time. The prototype 
in the early days was proposed by housing scholars and technocrats who worked 
for public housing supply bodies. The ‘n-DK’ style dwelling was a solution to 
modern functional dwelling for single families with a minimum of available 
space. Although the infl uence of western-style modern living was already evident 
in the design of some newly built detached houses for single families in the 1920s, 
the introduction of the ‘n-DK’ style dwelling accelerated the transformation of 
Japanese urban housing.
Along with the rise of democracy, the share of a nuclear families fi tting the 
model of ‘standard families’ reached its peak at the end of the period of high 
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economic growth. The newly developed dwelling model had been expected to 
reduce domestic tasks engaged in by women through the introduction of functional 
dining kitchen facilities. The separation of sleeping place from dining room was 
a principle of the ‘n-DK’ dwelling which made residential life more rational too. 
In parallel with the diffusion of western infl uenced living arrangements, living 
practices based on the paterfamilias norm were gradually transformed. Elements 
of urban lifestyles also extended to people living in the countryside with traditional 
living arrangements who were infl uenced accordingly.
The ‘n-LDK’ style dwelling, adding a living room (L) to the ‘n-DK’ model, 
appeared along with the enlargement of the dwelling size. The previous family 
room, called a chano-ma (Japanese-style dining living room), was gradually 
replaced by a western-style living room (Nishikawa, 1998). The ‘n-LDK’ style 
dwelling has comprehensively penetrated the design of newly built houses for 
sale, especially those in the big city suburbs, and represents the ideal home for 
‘standard families’. The modern family norm has played an important role in 
their design. These dwelling models prioritize privacy in family life, which is 
a distinct feature that is divergent from traditional dwelling design. The n-LDK 
style dwelling has been considered functional modern living, fi tting the norm of 
the modern family.
However, the ‘n-LDK’ model did not completely transform the design and 
value system associated with Japanese houses. Among others, local traditions, 
linked to the social life in each region, have played an important role in the design 
of newly built houses. The enlargement of dwelling size has made it easy to realize 
a dwelling containing both modern living and spacious traditional Japanese-style 
rooms used for guests and family events. Since the second half of the 1970s, 
housing scholars have paid much attention to local dwelling designs and how they 
conserve some traditional aspects. Their fi ndings reveal that the modernization 
process in local housing has been different from the ones observed in the big cities 
(Sumita, 1983).
Meanwhile, lifestyles based on the assertion of the modern family norm have 
not prevailed, even in the big cities where ‘n-LDK’ style dwellings have been 
most abundant. It is interesting to note that aspirations for ‘n-LDK’ style housing 
are strongly tied to the desire to secure suffi cient numbers of independent rooms 
for children. Indeed, considerable effort has been made by most families to 
provide independent rooms for children even though the available fl oor area is 
considerably limited by western standards. It has been most imperative to secure 
enough independent rooms for children of school age. The arrangement of living 
space has thus been conducive to the promotion of individualization of living 
units.
It is worth noting that in 1968, during the period of high economic growth 
and when the proportion of standard nuclear families attained its peak, the 
Japanese architect Takashi Kurosawa argued that modern housing linked to the 
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modern family norm was not a sustainable model and would eventually collapse 
(Kurosawa, 1968, 1997). It is doubtful whether he was aware that unsustainability 
derived from the implicit contradiction, from the perspective of gender, in the 
modern family norm. What he thought irrational at that time were the assumptions 
concerning the residential life of couples. Instead of modern living, he proposed 
the compartment group dwelling, composed of an aggregation of independent 
rooms for each individual. In his model, a couple composed of a husband and a 
wife were considered two different individuals who should have a separate room 
each.
Kurosawa provided a keen critique of the ‘n-LDK’ style dwelling in terms of 
contradictions of the modern family norm, but he did not receive broad support at 
the time. His plan anticipated, however, drastic changes in communal life mediated 
and managed by the family. The increasing number of separate rooms has largely 
enabled each individual to secure an independent living space, even for husbands 
and wives. Indeed, it has been observed that Japanese couples were accustomed 
to sleeping separately, even though they did not have separate bedrooms. This 
kind of daily practice has led to a new dwelling style. Since the 1980s, dwelling 
units that facilitate multiple direct accesses from the outside to independent rooms 
within the house has been proposed and in some case already realized (Yamamoto, 
1993; Shinohara et al., 2002; Takada et al., 2005).
The changing processes within Japanese housing have been led by the 
modernization of residential life based on the patriarchal family norm together 
with other traditional forms. Conventional dwellings were replaced by n-LDK 
style dwellings, which were associated with an aspiration towards a modern 
family norm (Yazawa, 1996). The penetration of the modern lifestyle has not 
changed dwelling design associated with the previous family norm completely and 
alternative living models have appeared in parallel with its expansion (Nishikawa, 
2001). The diversity of lifestyle and the individualization of living units have, 
arguably, key relationships with this process.
Individualization of living units
In the 1980s, most western industrialized countries experienced decline in the 
proportion of a nuclear families with dependent children, while, the volume of 
other types of households, such as one-person households and one-parent families 
has expanded rapidly. Accordingly, the growing awareness of the increase of non-
conventional households has led criticism of the lack of housing fi tting contemporary 
needs. Instead of the dwelling model suited to the conventional family household, 
an alternative one has been proposed in response to changes. The relatively high 
housing costs compared with income level among non-conventional households, 
including women-headed ones, have thus been increasingly considered one of the 
most important issues in housing policy.
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Japan, too, has experienced the decline of ‘standard families’ for the past two 
decades and in this process the proportion of one-person households has starkly 
increased. Although their percentage is still low compared to western countries 
(e.g. 36 per cent in Germany, and 31 per cent in the UK and France), the 2000 
Population Census of Japan identifi ed a level of 27.6 per cent. Due not only to 
ageing of the population and greater longevity, but also the diversity of lifestyles 
of all age groups, the size of households continues to diminish. By 2025, the share 
of one-person households among total households is projected to reach nearly 
35 per cent according to the National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research (2003). The reduction of household size together with the decline of 
family households with dependent children will continue and perhaps will be 
accelerated in the near future. Instead, non-conventional households, especially 
one-person households will expand along with the postponement of marriage, 
the decline of the birth-rate and increases in the numbers of those who never 
marry. Such estimates will impact on household formation and, subsequently, will 
strongly infl uence future housing demands.
It seems that lifestyles have been progressing along with the individualization of 
living units. There are not simply independent household units containing singles, 
but many potential types of living alone even in family households. For example, 
young adult children, who live with their parents in a detached house containing 
independent rooms separated from other living spaces, may tend to individualize 
their use of time and space. Japanese modern living which emphasizes privacy 
and individual lifestyle consumption is highly suited to this way of living. The 
diffusion and personalized use of electronics such as a televisions and mobile 
phones has also stimulated self-suffi cient lifestyles. Urban residents, especially 
those who live in the big cities, can easily get necessary services from outside 
of the home. The developing system of goods and services may make it easy to 
live alone. In this regard, it seems that Japanese cities are much more advanced 
compared to those in other industrialized countries.
This trend has generated a new dwelling type. Since the end of the 1970s, one-
room type dwelling units have been provided en masse for single persons living 
alone. Their habitable fl oor area is tiny, but contains all necessary amenities such 
as toilet, bathtub and shower, cooking facilities and independent access from the 
outside. The one-room accommodation looks like a self-suffi cient dwelling unit 
impossible to further sub-divide, which can be described as a dwelling form made 
by compressing a modern apartment unit into its ultimate compact size. Living in 
such a small dwelling without shared communal facilities adds to the increasing 
sensitivity to privacy and the autonomy of individual life among urban residents.
Nevertheless, the individualization of living does not contradict family values to 
the extent that the maintenance of psychological relationships are more important 
to the consolidation of family ties than material reciprocity strengthened through 
practices of living together. Among urban residents, the presumption that home 
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is a place exclusively for communal life has been increasingly losing salience. 
This is particularly true in the Japanese case, where forms of scattered living have 
been widely observed in accordance with the increasing numbers of employed 
married men sent on company transfers during the period of high economic 
growth. The husband-alone transfer has been accepted among ordinary modern 
families in order to maintain a good educational environment for children or/and 
needs to care for the elderly. Recently, not only husbands but also employed wives 
are living alone, apart from their own family, in order to pursue a professional 
career. Although it is diffi cult to count their numbers, such a lifestyle seems to be 
expanding among women with professional careers.
Some housing scholars have called the scattered residential practices of families 
‘network living’ because each family member keeps intimate mutual interrelations 
even though they are living separately (Kim and Omi, 1994). ‘Network living’ 
may be regarded as a solution or reconciliation of values attached to individual 
lifestyles with the dominant family norm of the society. It seems that such lifestyles 
have been spreading even in a society where the values of family ties are strongly 
maintained.
Another aspect that promotes the individualization of living may be the 
increasing number of the ‘never-married’ and divorced. As I will examine further, 
never-married persons have increased among all age groups. Young persons living 
together with their parents, for example, enjoy better living conditions in terms of 
available space per person in comparison with those who belong to the same cohort 
but have started a family. The lack of effective housing policy measures addressed 
to young family households, as well as general social policy certainly affect 
people’s choice of residence and household composition. The number of divorced 
persons is also expanding. Along with the decline of the material reciprocity of 
assistance, it has been observed that family ties might become fragile and broken 
by unexpected events. The social responsibilities of caring for people who need 
looking after increase pressure on families and relationships.
The quality of residential life depends to a great extent on the availability as 
well as affordability of social provision of necessary services. The income level 
of one-person households is generally lower than that of other types of household. 
Unlike other advanced countries, which have been aware of the increase in non-
conventional households and have tried to adjust housing systems in order to 
meet changing needs, public policy in Japan has not paid enough attention to this 
phenomenon. Although the provision of one-room type accommodation has been 
largely a response of the market to demand for privacy and individual living, in 
reality, it also attracts those on low incomes and rent levels have had to adjust to 
people’s ability to pay.
For the market, reducing the quality of dwelling units may be a rational 
response. This solution, however, has brought about new social confl icts and 
tensions. Closed dwelling designs with poor living conditions tend to isolate 
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inhabitants from the local community where the building is located. Some 
neighbourhoods have organized protest campaigns against housing projects which 
intend to provide one-room-type accommodations exclusively and have requested 
that local governments not grant construction permission. For instance, Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government reported increases in neighbourhood objection to the 
building of such dwellings (2004: 40–1). People living in such accommodation 
are often regarded as benefi ting from urban living at least expense to themselves.
The prevalence of one-room-type accommodations raises many questions about 
the design of dwelling as well as community life (Takada, 2002). The support of 
community life is not only crucial for women with caring responsibilities but also 
for children, the elderly and handicapped people who require local networks of 
care and support. The rapid transition of the Japanese housing landscape and the 
problems raised in this process imply that the housing supply system in Japan has 
been fl exible but has produced undesirable effects on community life and the built 
environment in the long run.
Housing conditions and household types
Housing conditions have a great infl uence on the formation of households, and 
the availability of housing as well as its affordability largely determines lifestyles. 
The national housing survey conducted in 2003 shows that the number of 
dwellings nationwide has continued to increase and that they exceed the number 
of households. The rate of 423 dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants is almost the same 
as the level in the Netherlands and the UK. Empty units are increasing not only in 
the countryside but also in big cities such as Tokyo and Osaka, where the vacancy 
rate has reached around 10 to 15 per cent. For the last three decades the housing 
situation has been changed to a great extent in terms of quantity.
Evidently, massive new housing construction over a period of years brought 
about this change. More than 50 per cent of housing stock has been built since 
1981, which contributed to the improvement of housing quality. Housing size, an 
important indicator of quality, has steadily grown and reached almost the same 
levels as in major European countries. In addition, as the number of persons per 
household has decreased, occupation density has improved substantially. As 
a result, households living in dwellings of a standard below minimum housing 
standards set by the Japanese government decreased in 2003 to 4.3 as a percentage 
of total households, compared to 30.4 per cent in 1973.
However, this general picture conceals a considerable disparity in housing 
conditions between different household types. Among other factors, age of 
householders as well as the household size is signifi cant. For instance, young 
householders live in relatively small accommodation compared to the elderly. 
Among elderly households, many live in large dwellings disproportionate to 
relative household size. Such disparities tend to expand in accordance with recent 
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socio-demographical changes as well as in relation to adjustments in housing 
tenure patterns, which I shall consider shortly. The quality of dwelling units that 
one can secure depends largely on the place where one lives. For instance, those 
who are moving or forming a new household in big cities are often confronted 
with the diffi culties of getting a dwelling unit of adequate size and with 
appropriate living conditions. The degree of urbanization measured by variables 
such as population size and urban density remains signifi cant and explains many 
disparities in housing conditions.
Disparities in housing can be seen most clearly between different housing 
tenures. For instance, since 1973, the average unit size of an owner-occupied 
dwelling has been 2.5 times or more of that of the rental dwellings (see Figure 
6.1). Not only in private rental housing, but also in public rental housing there is 
a defi cit in numbers of large dwelling units for family households. Rental housing 
is still orientated towards small-size units and thus cannot satisfy living needs of 
households composed of three or more persons.
Generally, there are trade-offs between the size of dwellings and their location 
and thus those who are living in rental units in the cities lose out in terms of 
dwelling space. In theory, if they are really ‘choosing’ such living conditions, 
they should be satisfi ed with their choice to the same extent as those who live in 
owner-occupied dwellings. According the ‘Housing Demand Survey’ conducted 
periodically by the government, however, those who live in rental units are much 
more discontented with their housing conditions compared to those living in 
owner-occupied dwellings. It suggests that rental dwellers are not freely choosing 
their dwelling form, but rather are constrained in choosing by the lack of options 






















6.1 Average fl oor space per dwelling by housing tenure






Measures of housing conditions by household type also indicate that there is 
wide mismatch between the size of household and the size of the dwelling unit. 
Young households tend to live in small rental units while the elderly live in large 
owner-occupied ones. For the last 25 years, this trend has been reinforced as the 
number, as well as proportion, of young householders moving into the owner-
occupied sector has diminished, while that of the elderly has increased. The huge 
disparity between owner-occupied and rental housing may constrain young people 
who wish to start a family or form a new household, but who cannot afford to buy 
a house immediately.
Statistical evidence also indicates that among about 2 million households who 
cannot fi nd housing that satisfi es the minimum housing standards, as defi ned by 
the Japanese government, 80 per cent are found in rental dwellings and more 
than one-third of such households are one-person households. The minimum 
space applied in these guidelines for one-person households is usually 18 square 
metres (25 in the case of the elderly). This implies that one-person households 
have to accept extremely low housing standards. It is interesting to note the case 
of UK where one-person households living in private rental housing have in 
excess of 50 square metres in average fl oor space, while the comparative fi gure 
is only 32 square metres in Japan. Large family households have diffi culty in 
satisfying minimum living standards if they are accommodated in rental dwelling. 
It is signifi cant that among households living in public rental housing, quite a 
large number of households are composed of four or more people living below 
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6.2 The share of households below minimum housing standard by number 
of household members
Source: Statistics Bureau, 2003 Housing and Land Survey of Japan.
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The housing conditions of urban rental households are in general determined 
by the rent level, which may impede those on low incomes in accessing decent 
dwellings. Therefore, most advanced countries have introduced housing allowance 
or housing benefi t systems, in order to improve their ability to pay, which have 
replaced the social housing supply programme and/or rent control legislation 
applied to private rental dwelling. In the case of Japan, however, the central 
government has never been eager to supply public housing on a large scale, nor to 
introduce a housing allowance system as a universal service for those who cannot 
fi nd adequate housing. As a result, it may be diffi cult for the urban poor to afford 
decent houses with affordable rent. For example, in comparison with the English 
case where low-income households can enjoy signifi cant rent rebate through the 
housing benefi t system, low-income households must bear relatively high housing 
expenses against their income in Japan, where allotments of housing allowance 
are too little and limited only to those who are subject to the Living Standard 
Protection Act.
Women’s life chances and residential patterns
It seems that women have played an important role in current socio-demographic 
changes. The universal validity of the ‘traditional’ life-course for women, based 
on the marriage and mothering norm as well as the assumption of the ‘standard 
families’ model, has come into question with the increasing number of employed 
women as well as a rise in consciousness concerning marriage norms and gender 
relations.
In the case of Japan, the socio-economic changes of the last two decades 
have made it diffi cult for women to stay at home as housewives and/or work 
as neighbourhood volunteers. The rise in the number of employed women is 
signifi cant (Figure 6.3). It indicates, not only for each household but also for 
society, that maintaining the sole male breadwinner model has become diffi cult. 
Both married and ‘never-married’ women have been increasingly expected to work 
outside of the home and to complement the earning of the head of household. The 
rise of education costs for children and the burden of housing loans have also 
stimulated the need for women to work outside the home.
Although the political and legislative efforts to correct unequal treatment 
by gender have been in force since the 1980s, men and women have not able 
to choose their lifestyle equally in most countries. In general, women are less 
integrated into paid work and their wages are lower than those of men. With the 
growing awareness of the discriminatory treatment that women face within paid 
employment, gender related barriers across the labour market have been removed 
steadily, and caring responsibilities have been increasingly redistributed through 
the introduction of social care services available for employed women. In addition, 
in some countries the urban and housing environments, which were formed in 
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accordance with the gender division principle, have been revised and the location 
of employment and housing changed accordingly.
It has been supposed that women’s life chances may not expand without the 
public policy measures mentioned above, and that Japan lags behind in these 
terms compared with the EU countries. For example, urban patterns which compel 
people to commute for long distances constitute a barrier for employed women 
by making a professional career and a home life incompatible. Also, the lack of 
decent and affordable dwellings in cities makes it diffi cult to secure a convenient 
dwelling for women whose living needs are different from those of men.
Indeed, it is signifi cant that there are considerable disparities in women’s 
situations across countries, even though women’s life chances seem to be 
improving in parallel with the promotion of gender equality policies in every 
country. The available statistics indicate that the North European countries are 
moving ahead, while women in Japan remain in a relatively more disadvantaged 
position (Table 6.1). For instance, on average, Japanese employed women get 
only 66.8 per cent, on average, of the wages of employed men (MHLW, 2003). 
The proportion of employed women aged 25 to 54 is more than 77 per cent in 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Alternatively, the share in Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxemburg and Japan is less than 63 per cent. In addition, more than 40 
per cent of Japanese employed women are part-time workers and earn much less 
than full-time workers (OECD, 2004).
The diversity in the types of household that women form correlates highly 
with the rate of employed women. It seems that women may choose their housing 
and household composition among broad and realistic options in countries 
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6.3 Ratios of employment of women between 1975 and 2000 in Japan







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































wages between men and women. For instance, in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
UK, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, more than 10 per cent of women 
aged between 30 and 59 are divorced, while 6.2 per cent are divorced in Japan. 
Furthermore, female one-person households as well as women living together 
with a partner are more represented in the former countries. In Ireland, Spain, 
Italy and Japan, women-headed, one-parent families are few and the birth-rate is 
low (UN, 2005; Gender Statistics Database of UNECE).
Although these statistics indicate that the increasing number of employed women 
together with less disparity in wages by gender may be linked to the emergence of 
new lifestyles, it is not accurate to say that more integration of women into paid work 
will expand their life chances. Without social support for caring responsibilities, 
living with dependent children or with frail elderly parents may become problematic 
for employed women. It also depends on the availability of other resources such as 
informal aid through social networks or kinship. In contrast to the Japanese case, 
in a society providing both equal opportunities in the labour market and necessary 
support in caring for family members, women may be in a better position to 
determine their own lives. High integration of women into paid work is frequently 
concomitant with solid social support and care systems. Countries such as Sweden, 
Denmark and France correspond to this model. The correlations between diversity 
in household compositions and the increase in self-suffi cient women suggest that 
the life chances of women may depend not only on socio-cultural settings but also 
the performance of gender related public policy measures, of which housing policy 
composes an important part. The North European countries and some countries 
with strong social housing traditions enjoy relatively better housing conditions and 
disparities in housing conditions in terms of overcrowding and between different 
income groups are small.
Indeed, the problems that women in Japan face are strongly refl ected in their 
household composition and housing conditions. Women-headed households 
represent only about 20 per cent of all households and single women are the largest 
component among them. The proportion of one-person households is 62.8 per 
cent for female-headed households, compared to 18.7 per cent for male-headed 
households. In real numbers, however, male one-person households account for 
about 7 million households compared to 6 million for female ones (Table 6.2). In 
addition, female one-person households are made up of largely elderly women, 
while, among women aged between 15 and 59 years old, their number is almost 
half of that of male one-person households.
In fact, single women living alone are not in the majority. Unmarried or never-
married women tend to live with their relatives. According to the 2000 Census, 
more than 70 per cent of women aged between 15 and 24 live with their parents 
and even among women aged between 25 and 34, 28 per cent live with their 
parents. In contrast 10 per cent of the latter group live alone as a one-person 
household, while 55 per cent live as a married couple with or without children.
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The choice to live alone is often a heavy fi nancial burden for women, excluding 
those who are already paid-up owner-occupiers. The average housing expenditure 
among one-person households is quite different between men and women. 
According to the National Survey on Living Expenditure in 1999, women-headed 
one-person households aged below 60 years spend more for housing in spite of 
earning less than men. For instance, women under 30 years old spend about 24.4 
per cent of their total outgoings on housing, while men spend about 14.7 per cent. 
Women living alone have been spending more money for housing in total as well 
as in proportion to their income for the last 20 years.
The reason why women living alone spend more money for housing than 
men may relate to their preference in housing location. Women tend to prioritize 
security and convenience and choose to live close to local stations in central areas 
of the city. Their choice also corresponds to their employment status. The majority 
of women living alone in cities are employed in either professional or service 
sectors. For both, the reduction of commuting time is essential. In big cities 
such as Tokyo and Osaka, female one-person households are more concentrated 
in the central areas of the city, compared to male one-person households whose 
location is more diversifi ed (Wakabayashi et al., 2002; Yui et al., 2004). The rent 
in the central part of the city is much higher than that of the periphery. Women in 




One-person household (age 
of householder)
6,978,733 5,932,585 12,911,318
15–39 years old 3,944,677 215,083 4,159,760
40–59 1,987,122 1,078,914 3,066,036
60 and more 1,046,934 2,738,588 3,785,522
One-parent nuclear family 
household
1,008,092 2,569,639 3,577,731
Households with child(ren) 
under 17 years old
112,173 883,549 995,722
Couple only 8,764,944 70,175 8,835,119
Nuclear family household 
with child(ren)
14,856,180 63,005 14,919,185
Other family household 5,589,021 758,230 6,347,251
Other household 137,872 53,907 191,779
Total
37,334,842 9,447,541 46,782,383
Source: 2000 Census of Japan.
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rental dwellings have thus been forced to accept higher housing costs relative to a 
mediocre quality of housing. The discriminatory practices of some landlords have 
also undermined women’s options in living alone.
Under such conditions, the decline of land prices together with increases of 
women with well-paid jobs has stimulated the housing supply in central parts of 
cities for the last decade. Single women are among the major buyers of newly 
built condominiums and there are even customized fi nancial services for women 
looking for loans with affordable interest rates. Although high-rent housing 
conditions have pushed women into buying condominiums, the majority of young 
and middle-aged women living alone are likely to be unsatisfi ed with their present 
living conditions. It has also been pointed out that, compared to women living 
with their parents, young women forming one-person households, on the whole, 
are less satisfi ed with their present living conditions (COGJ, 2003: 104–6).
Another important type of woman-headed household is the one-parent family. 
Compared to the other advanced countries, the share of women-headed one-
parent households in Japan is relatively small, representing about 4 per cent of 
households with children. However, the recent increase in divorce, desertion and 
domestic violence has led gradually to accelerating formation of women-headed 
one-parent households.
For many lone mother families, including those living with relatives or friends, 
it is not easy to secure independent living space. Generally speaking, structural 
disadvantages faced by women, as refl ected in their position in the labour market 






















6.4 Distribution of housing tenure, lone-mother families, 2003
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
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affordable self-suffi cient dwellings. In addition, available public assistance 
and benefi ts available to lone mother families are still limited and tend to be 
concentrated in scope and distribution. Housing has not been examined suffi ciently 
as a possible form of public assistance. Although low-income lone mother families 
constitute a priority group in the allotment of public housing, it does not provide a 
comprehensive solution to the problem. In addition to the scarceness of available 
public housing units, because of their location far from urban centres and/or lack 
of available services for childcare, lone mother families living in public housing 
estates often fi nd it diffi cult to access an appropriate job, even part-time.
Due to the scarcity of available social housing and their disadvantaged location, 
private rental units accommodate a large number of women-headed one-parent 
households. Those who cannot afford to access private rental housing turn to 
institutional support or share dwelling units with relatives or others. At present 
most lone mother families live either in private rental or public rental housing. 
Only 20 per cent of them are found in the owner-occupied sector (Figure 6.4), 
while about 25 per cent of them do not reside in an independent dwelling. Linked 
to the distribution of housing tenure, women-headed one-parent households hold 
less living space compared to conventional family households. Those lone mother 
families who can benefi t from housing allowance fall under the limited umbrella 
of the Living Standard Protection Act. In consequence, the majority of women-
headed one-parent households live in mediocre dwellings with high housing 
expenditure relative to their current income.
Lone mother families and institutional living
The Dormitory for Mothers and Children, is the former name of the Life Support 
Centre for Mothers and Children (LSCMC), and is a rare resource provided for 
lone mother families. It was introduced immediately after the war in order to 
provide lone mothers with accommodation and childcare services. At fi rst, the 
benefi ciaries were mostly war widows and public assistance was justifi ed in terms 
of child welfare needs (Hayashi, 1992). The legal framework of this setup has 
remained unchanged, while the attributes of benefi ciaries have changed more 
radically. Since the second half of 1970s, divorced women with children have 
increasingly constituted the majority of residents. Recently women who have run 
away from domestic violence have been also been increasing in number and the 
LSCMC has provided newcomers with not only shelter but also other necessities 
such as refrigerators, electronic cleaners, tables, chairs and bedclothes along with 
many other kinds of consumable goods.
Presently, there are around 300 LSCMCs which accommodate about 2,000 
families. Considering the increasing needs for shelter among lone mother families, 
the number as well as the capacity of the centres seems modest. Job opportunities 
as well as availability of neighbourhood assistance depend largely on the attributes 
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of the community where the LSCMC is located. Previous studies have pointed 
out that there is a strong correlation between the location of the LSCMC and the 
types of employment that their residents can fi nd (Social Welfare Board of Aichi 
Prefecture, 1984). The advantage of having LSCMCs located in the central areas 
of big cities is enhanced mobility and the reduction of commuting time.
The building of an LSCMC usually consists of entrance hall, living units for 
each household, nursery room, study room for children, meeting room, counselling 
room, staff room, and communal bath or shower room in cases where each living 
unit does not have a private one. Study rooms for children and meeting rooms 
are included following legislative rules. In terms of size, favourable attention is 
paid to the study room, which is often the biggest room in the building after the 
independent day nursery attached to the LSCMC. Children of school age can be 
found playing and studying there until 6 o’clock in the evening on weekdays.
The legal minimum building standards applied to the living unit for each family 
consist of the following two conditions. First is the requirement for more than 3.3 
square metres per person and second is the need for more than one room per 
family. The minimum living conditions applied to each compartment of LSCMCs 
are admittedly much lower than the ones applied for a normal dwelling unit. In 
addition to the lack of living space, a prefi xed fl oor plan following the ‘modern 
living’ principle does not allow for high-quality living. Some shared communal 
rooms are well equipped but used for only several hours on weekdays. The lack of 
private facilities such as bathrooms is regarded in most cases as a major problem. 
It seems that shared communal facilities fail to compensate for the smallness of 
living units and are inadequate as places for enriching communal life.
The objective of the installation of the LSCMC has been to provide children 
with a sound growing environment by assuring that they can live together 
with their mothers. Accordingly, the kinship between mother and children is 
highly respected and this view is refl ected in the support programmes as well 
as the conduct of the staff. Each family is expected to organize their daily life 
by themselves and collaboration with other families is largely frowned upon. 
Residents are responsible for domestic affairs and additional support is not offered 
except daycare for children. Preparing meals, washing clothes, cleaning and so on 
are the responsibility of each family. Mothers are also expected to spend as much 
time as possible with their children. As childcare services are only provided in 
the daytime, mothers working outside the LSCMC must come back early. Such 
conditions may constrain women’s choice of work. Another important point is 
that the benefi ciaries of the LSCMC have to move out to a normal dwelling unit as 
soon as possible, because the LSCMC is considered temporary accommodation.
Inevitably, as the LSCMC is multi-family accommodation with communal 
facilities, residents need to organize their daily lives in collaboration with 
others. They often share responsibility for daily maintenance of the building 
and communal facilities. Residents are requested to collaborate with others for 
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practical reasons on the one hand, but restricted in developing intimate relations, 
at least inside the LSCMC, on the other. Due to such circumstances, life in the 
LSCMC is usually considered unpleasant for residents. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that the on-site services provided by the LSCMC have many advantages that 
cannot be substituted. For instance, the time-saving aspects of on-site services are 
important. Counselling services for childcare and job seeking are available and 
residents can access them whenever they need them. In addition, staff members 
have face-to-face, daily contact with each family, which makes it easy to take 
measures if necessary and immediately in order to prevent problems occurring 
(Hasegawa and Hinokidani, 2002).
In terms of both spatial arrangements and available programmes, life in 
the LSCMC provides children with relatively favourable conditions. The care 
programmes cover not only children under six years old but also children of school 
age. Some institutions even have teaching assistance programmes for high school 
students. These services are available inside the LSCMC building. Facilities for 
children are usually well equipped. The LSCMC also provides various free events 
for children, such as birthday parties, seasonal festivals, day trips and so on.
However, due to poor living conditions and communal facilities, institutional 
living makes it diffi cult to satisfy women’s needs. Furthermore, the present legal 
framework and normative views on the role of the family and mothers restrain 
residents from collaborating with others in trying to make communal life more 
pleasant, despite the relative advantages found in such collaborations.
Women’s needs and alternative living
For women with children, job opportunities depend to a great extent on commuting 
time and the availability of on-site services for children and the elderly. It is 
supposed therefore that if housing provision pays attention to women’s needs it 
will be more effi cient than the current benefi t system in improving conditions. For 
this reason, a suitable living model for working mothers is required and housing 
policy should be conscious of their needs.
It has been widely recognized that many women raising young children are 
heavily dissatisfi ed with their living environment in cities. Cramped housing 
along with high living expenses are often seen as key sources of dissatisfaction 
(Yazawa et al., 2003; COGI, 2005). According to the National Opinion Survey 
on Lifestyle Preferences, in 2005, more than 60 per cent of young married people 
aged between 20 and 49 consider that a good parenting environment is the most 
important criterion in housing choice.
Our questionnaire survey (1995) addressed 252 users of day nurseries located 
in three different areas including the city centre, a deprived inner-city area and a 
newly developed residential area of Osaka. The survey indicated that the causes 
of dissatisfaction with public support schemes differ from place to place, and 
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that preferences were linked to the lifestyles of groups of respondents. The major 
trends are summarized as follows (Fujita et al., 1997; Hinokidani, 1998).
Women living close to city centres often complained about the scarceness of 
caring services and unpleasantness and inappropriateness of the environment 
for childrearing. Respondents had moved to the centre of the city in order to 
reduce commuting time and, in most cases, to get access to the necessary support 
provided by relatives living nearby. Residential location also refl ected status. City 
centre residents are often well-paid full-time professional workers and thus able 
to buy necessary caring services where they are available. The situation of women 
living in deprived inner-city areas was quite different. Most of them, including 
lone mothers, are employed in the service sector and earn little. They are also 
dissatisfi ed with the childcare environment, and wish to improve it. Instead of 
market services, which usually cost too much, support housing policy measures 
were preferred that would enable respondents to live together with their parents 
or near their families’ homes so that their parents or relatives could take care of 
children without remuneration. Most felt they would be better off with a housing 
allowance to facilitate a move to a larger dwelling. Women living in new towns 
located in the suburbs far from the city centre, alternatively, did not expect to 
receive childcare support from relatives living nearby. There were few full-
time workers in these areas and they tended to consider childcare and being a 
housewife more important than making a professional career. The lack of job 
possibilities and informal resources are regarded as given conditions. Many such 
women complained about the inconvenience of their surroundings as well as high 
mobility costs, and supported the development of mutual aid networks in the 
neighbourhood among women with similar lives.
Though this simplifi ed overview has reduced the survey to general characteristic 
features drawn from small samples in a specifi c region, it may illustrate how 
women’s feelings about the questions of daily life and provisional requirements 
are different according to their location and experience and in relation to their 
physical environment. Opinions may have depended to a great extent on the 
situation of each individual. Nevertheless it affi rms the fact that women with 
children have double loads that restrain their life chances, as opposed to the case 
of men. In fact, the social salience of gender roles seems to persist despite the 
increasing number of women working outside of the home. For instance, the 
Government’s 2001 Social Life Survey indicated that married women with a job 
spend 3.6 hours on housework per day on average if they have children and 2.3 
hours if they do not have children, while married men spend only 0.1 hours in both 
cases (COGJ, 2005: 171). Value systems seem to refl ect women’s needs in relation 
to the physical environment, as well as male-dominated forms of residence. Rapid 
socio-demographic changes have thus managed to progress while conserving 
women’s inferior position (Shirahase, 2005). As indicated in the case of women 
living in the city centre, without the informal assistance of relatives, especially 
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grandmothers, women with children struggle to pursue a professional career. It is 
widely recognized, therefore, that the mother/grandmother plays a crucial role in 
the employment of married women (NIPSSR, 2000; COGJ, 2005: 48).
On the other hand, the increasing number of employed women, especially those 
in professional or managerial occupations, implies that the social value system is 
in a process of transition, at least for women who are living self-suffi ciently. It 
is supposed that they have a great potential to change gender relations and that 
their problems in daily life have been driving the search for alternative residential 
forms and lifestyles.
In Europe and North America architects and housing scholars with feminist 
perspectives have proposed ideas on alternative dwelling forms. For example, 
collective housing containing shared spaces and facilities for communal life 
with self-suffi cient dwelling units for each household or co-housing have been 
developed in Denmark. This approach has now expanded into other countries 
which seek to develop housing forms which combine the autonomy of private 
dwellings with the advantages of community living (Franck and Ahrentzen, 1989; 
McCamant and Durrett, 1994; Vestbro, 1997, 2000; Koyabe, 1997).
Recently, types of ‘collective housing’ have been introduced as forms of 
alternative living in Japan. A famous example is found in Kobe’s public housing 
estates built in the reconstruction process after the great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake 
in 1995. A supply of ‘collective housing’ with shared communal facilities was 
provided in order to stimulate relationships between residents (Ishido et al., 2000). 
Most of them are low-income elderly people and live either as singles or as couples 
without children. They had lost not only their homes but also their communities 
and neighbours in the disaster. This programme, based on the assumption that 
providing a communal space with a central kitchen would promote communal 
life among the residents, has been highly regarded as a community experiment, 
although there are many questions over the actual success of this approach.
Compared to men of the same generation, women have tended to demonstrate 
a stronger desire for self-suffi cient living and less expectations of living together 
with their sons or daughters in future (COGJ, 1996), which may partially explain 
growing interest concerning this collective living model among women. However, 
not only elderly but also young women with children have demonstrated interested 
in these types of lifestyle models.
According to the results of our questionnaire study conducted in 1997, which 
surveyed 935 women living in Osaka Metropolis, women with heavy childcare 
responsibilities as well as women over 50 years old living in single-detached 
dwellings located in city suburbs, show greater interest in communal life and 
‘collective housing’ (Hinokidani and Fujita, 1998; Hinokidani, 1998). The 
reasons were diverse. Young women with children supported the idea of mutual 
aid in order to reduce or rationalize their housework through collective services. 
They also considered that collective housing created a secure and stimulating 
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environment for children. Some considered that it might be more important to 
develop communal life than secure privacy in order to improve the quality of daily 
life. Those with feminist perspectives also supported the idea that both men and 
women should be involved in communal life.
Alternative forms of living that facilitate collaborative and more environmentally 
friendly ways of living have been observed in western countries (Meltzer, 2000). 
Some of the respondents of our survey demonstrated some similar environmental 
concerns and pointed out that development of communal life would promote more 
environmentally sustainable lifestyles through collaborative action, such as making 
communal space for recycling, etc. In addition, while more elderly women tended 
to consider collective housing as a residential form which corresponds strongly 
to the needs of the elderly, they also considered that ‘collective housing’ offers 
an alternative living model that enables them to develop social relations among 
people with similar needs. Accordingly, such housing is expected to promote more 
associative living with neighbours (Ueno, 1996).
Along with the positive perspectives, our survey also indicated that many 
women have negative images of communal life. They feel that the balance between 
privacy and sharing, pressurized by communal living, is delicate. Indeed, some 
recent shared housing projects have illustrated the problems many people have 
had adjusting to communal living (Koyabe, 2005). It seems more participative 
research is necessary in order to grasp the reasons why some residents prefer 
communal types of dwelling and others are more resistant. Among women who 
showed interest in shared housing, some simply wanted to feel that others are 
around and could be found in times of crisis, while others expected more and 
wished to share communal life with other residents. Especially for women living 
alone, enhancing feelings of security may constitute a major reason to look for 
shared housing. The design of shared housing may differ accordingly.
The need for a shared sense of community can be satisfi ed by other dwelling 
types too. Another example is cooperative housing. Today’s cooperative housing 
in Japan has evolved since the 1970s, and has been linked to the idea that such a 
housing system would enable future residents to participate in decision-making on 
both project and dwelling design, and would strengthen the sense of community 
among residents. In accordance with this assumption, some projects have provided 
various shared communal facilities and outdoor spaces such as communal gardens, 
playgrounds for children and day nurseries (Endo, 1995; Shinohara et al., 2002).
The pursuit of alternative living also intersects with the challenge for institutions 
and public bodies in developing residential space. Examples can be found among 
current service housing projects for the frail and elderly. Housing complexes 
with shared communal playrooms for children and daycare facilities have been 
developed and provided through the housing market too. However, taking into 
consideration that the most signifi cant aspect of these alternative residential forms 
is the autonomy of residents, which may be assured by provision of private space 
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and self-suffi ciency as well as participation in management and maintenance of 
communal facilities, it seems that current market responses to varied housing 
needs will inevitably be unsatisfactory.
Conclusions
During the past two decades, along with the increasing number of employed 
women, a new role for women has emerged, which seems to contribute the 
expansion of women’s life chances on the one hand, while increasing their 
load and responsibilities on the other. The introduction of advanced domestic 
management in technology and design did not reduce women’s burden as was 
expected. The diversity of lifestyles has also expanded in accordance with the 
increase in divorced as well as never-married women. However, the physical 
environment as well as the housing system has not progressed concomitantly. 
Changing life patterns and social problems in Japan share many common features 
with those of women in western countries. At the same time, however, traditional 
value systems concerning home, family and gender relations have been leading to 
different responses to problems at both individual and social levels.
It seems that, despite of the rapid modernization of dwelling styles, housing and 
housing related services still lag behind many western countries where housing 
policies support households who have to procure and maintain decent dwelling 
through the housing allowance or/and social housing grant systems. Households 
facing similar conditions have fewer options in Japan. Consideration of housing 
conditions by household type suggests that women-headed households are facing 
severe problems. Both one-room accommodations and the n-LDK style dwelling 
are inadequate to the need for a sense of community and for mutual interrelations 
with others, of which women are more conscious.
The conventional view of women’s roles and mothering norms seem still to 
have a great infl uence on the dwelling form as well as in living arrangements. 
Public support for the development of alternative living and dwelling types is 
limited and women face a defi ciency in terms of realistic housing options 
corresponding to their needs. For instance, the institutional provision for lone 
mother families does not provide an ideal solution. Such housing has been 
reserved only for those who cannot afford to live in ordinary houses and it has 
thus been considered as an inferior substitute to real family housing. Institutional 
residences are also infl uenced by the present social value systems. Views seem to 
have been imposed through the legal frameworks as well as daily practices. The 
reality of institutional living seems to suggest that self-suffi cient units with private 
facilities may be necessary to facilitate spontaneous participation in communal 
life among residents.
Currently, it is not only women who wish to make the pursuit of a professional 
career compatible with domestic life but also planners and politicians have become 
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more conscious about the physical environment of cities. Among other things, the 
sharp decline in the birth-rate has forced both central and local governments to adopt 
social measures to assist young and middle-aged women with double workloads. 
The increasing subsidies in the provision of a daycare centres for children as well 
as for the elderly are examples of such measures. Urban restructuring policies 
have also been expected to transform modern cities into more gender friendly 
spaces. Factors such as the integration of women into decision-making and the 
activities of housing focused protest groups may accelerate this process.
Furthermore, socio-demographic changes such as the rapid increase in the 
diversity of lifestyles, the transition of living units from family to individual, 
the rise in the need for care and increasing interests in environmental issues will 
stimulate the development of alternative dwelling models, other than ones that 
have been provided by the market. One such dwelling model may be shared 
housing, though it seems to be unstable and remains simply a social experiment 
at the moment.
More appropriate provision of housing and related services may depend to a 
great extent on the willingness to improve public policy measures. The development 
of alternative housing presents a new challenge for Japanese society: to reconcile 
the pursuit of privacy with sustainable community life and to enhance women’s 
life chances. It seems that both women and men are conscious of the degradation 
of the quality of residential life and increasingly isolated dwelling practices. The 
tendency has been to consider that living arrangements as well as housing policy 
measures are key elements in solving the problems that the Japanese increasingly 
face in everyday life.
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7 Social exclusion and 
homelessness
Masami Iwata
Flexible accumulation, as I shall tentatively call it, is marked by a direct 
confrontation with the rigidities of Fordism. It rests on fl exibility with respect 
to labour processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of consumption. It 
is characterized by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new 
ways of providing fi nancial services, new markets, and, above all, greatly 
intensifi ed rates of commercial, technological, and organizational innovation. 
It has entrained rapid shifts in the patterning of uneven development, both 
between sectors and between geographical regions, giving rise, for example, to 
a vast surge in so-called service-sector employment as well as to entirely new 
industrial ensembles in hitherto undeveloped regions … It has also entailed 
a new round of what I shall call ‘time-space compression’ in the capitalist 
world – the time horizons of both private and public decision-making have 
shrunk, while satellite communication and declining transport costs have 
made it increasingly possible to spread those decisions immediately over an 
ever wider and variegated space.
These enhanced powers of fl exibility and mobility have allowed 
employers to exert stronger pressures of labour control on work-force in any 
case weakened by two savage bouts of defl ation, that saw unemployment 




In the 1980s, Japan avoided the huge socio-economic changes and fl exible 
accommodation identifi ed by Harvey which western countries experienced 
after the 1970s oil crisis. However, Japan fi nally faced up to change in the early 
1990s, after the bursting of the bubble economy. Japanese labourers no longer 
enjoy stability under Japanese employment practices. Regular workers who have 
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depended upon long-term employment and company welfare systems have been 
increasingly replaced by independent workers, i.e. non-regular workers who can 
develop their lives outside ‘company society’. As a result, approximately 20 per 
cent of workers work on a non-regular basis according to the Labour Force Survey 
conducted in 2004. Total unemployment increased from 2.0 per cent in 1980 to 
5.4 per cent in 2003. Unemployment of young males (aged between 15 and 29) 
has remained strikingly high at 8–9 per cent.
At the same time, the family system which has supported Japanese workers has 
also changed drastically. According to the National Census, the average number of 
people per household was 3.22 in 1980, but had dropped to 2.67 in 2000 (Statistics 
Bureau, 2003). Nuclear families with children have been increasingly replaced 
by single households and couple-only households. In the 2000 Census, single 
households and couple households accounted almost half of total households. In 
addition, the 2000 Census revealed an increase in unmarried people. In the age 
group between 30 and 34, 42.9 per cent of males and 26.6 per cent of females are 
unmarried. It also reported that the proportion of married men aged between 25 
and 34 and the proportion of those with children are related to the level of annual 
income (Cabinet Offi ce, 2005). In other words, the increase in numbers of non-
regular workers with low incomes has led to declining birth-rates and shrinking 
family size. Increasing numbers of people are falling out of the family system at 
the same time as the family is shrinking – which undermines the family’s capacity 
to provide support for its members.
It is in this context that new social problems have arisen in Japan. For instance, 
from the mid-1990s, many cities have experienced a shock increase in rough sleepers 
in parks and around train stations, and increases in unemployment and numbers 
of non-regular workers among young people. The new word, freeter, emerged in 
the Japanese language to describe part-time, non-regular workers under 34. The 
word NEET (Not in Employment, Education or Training) was also exported from 
the UK to describe characteristics of growing numbers of unemployed youth. 
According to a Cabinet Offi ce report (Cabinet Offi ce, 2003), the number of freeter 
was 4.17 million in 2001. The number of NEET was estimated at 630,000 in the 
2003 Labour Force Survey. Rates of high school dropouts are also linked to these 
phenomena. Domestic violence including child abuse and abuse of the elderly has 
also become more acute. These social problems have been discussed under the 
integrated term of social exclusion in Europe. However, the term is not frequently 
used in Japan. This chapter will discuss problems of street homelessness after 
1990 in Japan in terms that have been used in social exclusion debates.
The concept of social exclusion came into focus along with ‘inclusion 
policy’, as they were advocated to replace equality strategies in European social 
democratic states, which were seen as no longer effective in a global market which 
is ‘indifferent to social cohesion’ (Gray, 2000: 21). At fi rst, the term was used for 
those who lived on the margins of society without access to the social insurance 
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system (often typically long-term unemployed youth). Now it has been expanded 
to include all types of social disadvantage. Percy-Smith states:
Social Exclusion has been defi ned in a number of different ways which may 
include all or some of the following elements; disadvantages in relation to 
certain norms of social, economic or political activity pertaining to individuals, 
households, spatial areas or population groups; the social, economic and 
institutional processes through which disadvantage comes about; and the 
outcomes or consequences for individuals, groups or communities. 
(2000: 3)
As the concept of social exclusion has expanded, it has been interpreted 
in different ways to meet various purposes. Levitas classifi ed three different 
discourses of social exclusion: a redistributionist discourse (RED) which focuses 
on inequalities of power and resources, a moral underclass discourse (MUD) which 
recognizes the nature of social exclusion as the morals and behaviour of excluded 
people, and a social integrationist discourse (SID) which emphasizes economic 
effi ciency and social cohesion (Levitas, 1998; Stewart, 2000; Lister, 2000). In 
terms of differences between social exclusion and poverty, social exclusion is 
sometimes taken as being more or less synonymous with poverty (Percy-Smith, 
2000: 4) or ‘simply a euphemism for poverty’ (Lister, 2000: 38). It has also been 
emphasized that social exclusion encourages a focus on social relations rather 
than distribution of material resources.
The term of social exclusion is thus contested and is often looked at critically. 
However, the following two points encapsulate the advantages of a social 
exclusion approach. First, social exclusion relates to the whole society system and 
thus we can focus who excludes who in the wider context, moving from individual 
to global levels. Second, social exclusion is a multi-dimensional and dynamic 
process with interconnections between various elements of past and present.
Homelessness often represents exclusion from society. Of course, there are 
several ways to defi ne the state of homelessness. For instance, Bramley (1988: 
26) classifi ed the homeless into seven categories from ‘people literally without a 
roof over their head’ to ‘individuals or groups living within existing households 
whose relationships and conditions are tolerable but where the individuals/groups 
concerned have a clear preference to live separately’. This wider sense of the 
defi nition has been challenged, but the majority of commentators agree that 
‘roofl ess’, that is, those who regularly sleep rough, epitomizes homeless issues and 
its severest manifestations. In this regard, rough sleepers are not only extremely 
poor people, but are also those excluded from institutions and opportunities in 
society, which is often a more critical issue. In other words, they cannot ensure 
‘social-physical places to live’ which are socially distributed to individuals and 
families according to their income, wealth, power, prestige, as well as other social 
Social exclusion and homelessness
143
characteristics (Wright, 1992; Iwata, 2003b). The fact that they do not have any 
‘social-physical place’ within the community sharply refl ects their exclusion from 
society. They are alienated in public space, as they are not ‘proper’ members of 
society, and they are often ejected from their temporary sleeping places. Wright 
describes contemporary homelessness in the United States where the moral 
underclass discourse (MUD) is dominant:
The destitute who sleep in local parks, shelters, or motels, or spend nights 
on a friend’s living room fl oor, with no fi xed residence of their own are 
people deemed out of place in the eyes of authority. And to be out of place 
means risking inspection by others, having one’s identity defi ned by others 
as suspect as ‘deviant,’ or ‘criminal,’ or as just ‘sick’. Homeless bodies, poor 
bodies, visible to passers-by, visible to the streets, are open to the public’s 
gaze, to the gaze of authority.
(1992: 1)
The British government decided to prioritize the reduction of numbers of 
rough sleepers in the Social Exclusion Unit’s Strategy of the 1990s. The unit 
publicized its fi rst report on Rough Sleeping in 1998. The prime minister writes in 
the foreword of the report:
The sight of a rough sleeper bedding down for the night in a shop doorway 
or on a park bench is one of the most potent symbols of social exclusion in 
Britain today. It is a source of shame for all of us that there are still about 
2,000 people put on the streets around England every night, and 10,000 sleep 
rough over the course of a year. There are good reasons for aiming to end 
rough sleeping. It is bad for those who do it, as they are intensely vulnerable 
to crime, drugs and alcohol, and at high risk of serious illness, and premature 
death … And rough sleeping is bad for the rest of society. The presence 
of some rough sleepers on the streets will attract others – often young and 
vulnerable – to join them. Many people feel intimidated by rough sleepers, 
beggars and street drinkers, and rough sleeping can blight areas and damage 
business and tourism.
(Social Exclusion Unit, 1998: 1)
Rough sleeping itself is thus treated as a typical and explicit form of social 
exclusion in social space. However, this special form of exclusion should 
be understood as a complicated process of inclusion and exclusion within a 
framework of contemporary socio-economic change, rather than just simply a 
surface phenomenon of visible exclusion on the street. The term social exclusion 
enables a more dynamic analysis of the phenomenon. At the same time, potential 
institutional inclusions in terms of homelessness policies need to be considered. 
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This chapter will discuss street homelessness in Tokyo by, fi rst, illustrating 
homelessness processes and practices of homeless people on the street to reveal 
characteristics of inclusion and exclusion and related multi-dimensional factors, 
and secondly, by exploring potential inclusion through homeless policies.
Routes into homelessness
The number of people rough sleeping started increasing during the period of 
socio-economic upheaval of the mid-1990s in Japan. The categorization used is 
one of ‘homeless’ and is a narrower interpretation than ones in other countries 
and falls into only one category of Bramley’s seven, as quoted above. People, 
literally, without a ‘roof over their head’ are the sole subject of homeless policies 
in Japan. Increasing numbers of rough sleepers in Japan have become a social 
problem, and hatred and criticism towards those who illegally occupy public 
space has developed, while there is also much sympathy in other quarters for 
those who can only sleep in public spaces. Regarding the growing prejudices 
against the homeless, news stories about youths throwing stones at rough sleepers 
or killing them have become more common place. In Japan, this has not been 
clearly discussed by using the term ‘social exclusion’, but has generated debate 
concerning those who are excluded from ‘socio-physical space’, which requires 
social responses.
The national government began counting of the size of the homeless population 
annually from 2000, and the national average is about 25,000. Some support 
groups strongly assert that the fi gures substantially underestimate real numbers. 
Additionally, many women and families of homeless people are often ‘hidden 
homeless’. Moving homeless people to hostels (shelters or independent centres) 
has been recommended by local governments as a strategy to improve the self-
dependency of homeless people. Nevertheless, in terms of the limited category of 
‘rough sleepers’, the population has remained stable every year. In real terms this 
means that new homeless people have appeared on streets one after another, while 
others have moved off the streets into merely temporary shelters, thus maintaining 
the offi cial fi gure,. There are two contradictory perspectives on routes or processes 
into street homelessness in Japan. One argues that increases in unemployment, 
due to the bursting of the bubble economy in the 1990s, have exaggerated or 
extended the potential for more vulnerable individuals to become homeless. The 
other argues that homelessness is a particular issue for unskilled day labourers 
based in yoseba districts. The yoseba districts are generally characterized by 
massed fl ophouses and by open-air labour markets, where individuals compete 
for ephemeral employment in the construction and transportation industries. At 
the same time, they are also widely known as a place for poor people or ‘drop-
outs’ to fi nd last-minute work and accommodation.
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This leads to the question, how did people end up on these streets, and through 
what kind of processes? This chapter will attempt to respond to this question 
with evidence gathered through a survey of homelessness conducted in the 
streets of Tokyo. Before going into the survey results, it is necessary to provide 
an overview of Japanese homelessness. Table 7.1 shows sex, age, education and 
marital histories of homeless people extracted from the nationwide homeless 
survey conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in 2003 as well 
as city-level surveys. From the table you can see that street homelessness after 
the 1990s is characterized, fi rst, by middle-aged men (average age of about 55). 
Not only does the number of homeless stay relatively stable year on year, but so 
do the average age (55) and gender (male) of the homeless. However, recent total 
unemployment rates (male) have increased among young people, and the rate 
for those in their 50s is slightly below the average. If it were true that increasing 
unemployment in a globalizing society has caused homelessness, young people 
should be more affected. Of course, it needs to be noted that the narrow defi nition 
of homelessness tends to exclude young or female homeless people who often 
disappear from the statistics by staying in institutions or friends’ houses. Yet, it 
does show that the numbers of homeless people who have appeared on the street 
cannot be accounted for simply in terms of general unemployment, but is related 
more to the characteristic unemployment among middle aged males.
Secondly, homelessness in Japan is dominated by individuals with a specifi c 
educational and marital status (Table 7.1). Their educational level is low (completed 
compulsory education only) and many of them have never married. Indeed, it 
has been pointed out before that ‘educational failure is strongly associated with 
the process of social exclusion’ (Sparkes and Glennerster, 2000). Many Japanese 
homeless people received much poorer education than the average. They also have 
not formed families. In other words, insuffi cient human capital is implicated in the 
process of becoming homeless. The lack of fi nancial capital of homeless people is 
arguably derived from negative human capital.
Table 7.1 also shows national average age, education, and marital status of 
males from the 2000 National Census as a point of reference. In comparison with 
the average, homeless people are a rather distinguishable group. As a matter of 
fact, these group characteristics have not changed since the early 1990s when 
numbers of homeless people started increasing. In this decade, middle-aged males 
with an absence of human capital have appeared to accumulate on the streets one 
after another.
In light of these broader data on the homeless we can begin to discuss street 
processes in relation to the result of an interview survey conducted by the author 
with 710 homeless people in the street in the Tokyo ward areas in 2000. Although 
various factors are complexly interconnected in the process leading to life on the 
street, processes of job loss and house loss will be focused on in the following. 
In order to understand the signifi cance of the job loss process, two jobs in the life 
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male 95.2 97.7 97.0 99.3 
female  4.8  2.1  3.0  0.7 
Age
15–19 years old  0.0  7.4 
20–29  0.6  0.6d  23.0 
30–39  3.9  6.1   3.2e  1.4e 16.8 
40–49 14.7 19.6 17.1 13.1 17.7 
50–59 45.4 47.9 45.0 49.7 15.9 
60–69 30.8 22.9 30.8 33.7 11.7 
70 and over  4.6  2.9  3.9  2.2  7.5 
median age 55.9 54.0 55.8 56.6 36.8 
Education
less than junior high 
school graduate
 2.7  1.7 75.0f  0.1 
junior high school 
graduate
60.2 60.3 25.1 
high school 
graduate
28.8 32.2 20.1 47.8 
more than high 
school graduate
 8.4  5.4  2.6 23.1 
Marital status
married 53.4  5.9 69.7g  7.0 87.8 
divorced, widow/
widower
41.2 21.0  5.9 
never married 46.6 52.9 30.3 69.1  4.3 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Toshi Seikatsukenkyu-kai, Osaka City 
University.
Notes: 
a  Year of survey, 2003; 
b  Year of survey, 2000; 
c  Year of survey, 1999; 
d includes all 15–19  year olds; 
e  includes all 15–39 year olds; 
f includes junior-high graduates and junior-high non-graduates who did not graduate 
from high school; 
g includes married, divorced and widowed.
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history of a homeless person, the main job (the job that he/she engaged in the 
longest time) and the most recent job, will be analysed in terms of employment 
type and employment status.
Table 7.2 shows that the respondents had various types of occupations in terms 
of their main job: 46.6 per cent were skilled workers including craftsmen, factory, 
transport and construction workers, 20.3 per cent were unskilled labourers and 
19.5 per cent were engaged in sales or service industries, including cooks, waiters, 
shop clerks, newspaper agents, cleaners, security service workers. Managers, 
offi cials and clerical workers accounted for 10 per cent of the sample. In relation 
to employment status, 55.9 per cent had regular employment, while 21.8 per cent 
Table 7.2 Occupations and employment status prior to homelessness (%)
In the time of main 
job
Just before becoming 
homeless
Type of occupation
managers/professional  4.1  1.9
clerical  5.9  2.5
agricultural  1.7  0.6
skilled worker 46.6 28.9
sales, service worker 19.5 13.0
unskilled labourer 20.3 39.9
others  0.6  0.5
no occupation  0.1 12.7
unknown  1.1  0.0
Type of status (1)
employer, manager  1.7  1.1
self-employed  5.5  3.5
employing others  0.8  0.8
regular employee 55.9 28.1
temporary employee 11.8 16.2
day labourer 21.3 44.2
others  0.7  0.9
unknown  2.3  5.2






were day labourers. In the period just before they came onto the street, 28.9 per 
cent were still skilled workers and 13.0 per cent were service workers. However, 
44.2 per cent were day labourers and 7.9 per cent of them were unemployed. 
About 30 per cent were still regular workers or self-employed. Using employment 
status criteria, job status can be divided into two categories: stable job and unstable 
job. The stable jobs include employers, managers, the self-employed, and regular 
employees. These are considered to be better jobs in Japanese society. In contrast, 
the unstable jobs include temporary employees and day labourers, which are 
considered lower rank jobs. From this dichotomy of stable and unstable, 63.9 
per cent had relatively stable work experiences when they were in their main job, 
which reveals that many of them used to be more included in society through their 
work. Of course, taking their educational background into account, they were 
not stable workers in large companies but many of them worked in small and 
medium-sized factories and shops. Additionally, the fact that 73.6 per cent were 
covered under the social insurance system at the time of their main job shows 
that many homeless people were also included in social institutions and covered 
by social insurance in the past. However, Table 7.2 suggests that, just before they 
came onto street, their inclusion-through-work and their socially included status 
became fragile.
The pattern of former accommodation of homeless people is very specifi c. 
The ratio of owned housing and private rented housing is relatively low. The 
proportion of job-associated accommodation (e.g. company dormitories) and 
temporary accommodation (such as inns and hostels) is high and was so even 
at the time a main job was held. During their main job 42 per cent lived in job-
associated accommodation and the proportion was 37.6 per cent just before they 
appeared on the street (Table 7.3). Many homeless people who had stable work 
experiences in terms of employment status and social insurance status had lived 
not in general housing but in job-associated housing. Types of accommodation 
can also divided into three categories: general accommodation including owned 
housing and rented housing, job-associated accommodation including company 
housing, dormitory and sleep-in facilities, and others, including hostels, inns, 
hospitals, prisons and so on. During the time of holding a main job only 47.5 per 
cent lived in general accommodation. By contrast, the rate of homeless people 
who lived in job-associated accommodation was 42.0 per cent at the time of 
holding a main job and was 37.6 per cent just before they moved to the street. 
Taking account of the many ‘never-married’ homeless, it seems that many had 
lived outside of family units and seemed to have only been included in Japanese 
society through their work. Additionally, 28.5 per cent of the homeless already 
lived outside of secure housing before rough sleeping.
Through the characteristics of past jobs and housing, we can begin to categorize 
processes into homelessness. Of course the process of those who had stable jobs 
and general housing is different from the process of those who hopped between 
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Table 7.3 Type of housing prior to homelessness





Type of housing (1)
owned house 16.2  8.5
rented house 29.3 23.4




hostel (fl ophouse)  6.6 15.5
inn/hotel  1.4  7.3
others  1.8  5.7
unknown  0.3  1.1
Type of housing (2)




others  9.8 28.5
Source: Toshi Seikatsukenkyu-kai.
unstable jobs and different types of housing. The former process involves the 
movement from inclusion in society to becoming excluded, while the latter involves 
people who were not suffi ciently included in society from the beginning. For those 
who lived in job-associated accommodation, the process of becoming homeless 
may be understood in the context of failed integration into society through work. 
These classes of employment status and housing are analysed following a cluster 
method, resulting in the following three different types:
Type 1. Fully included: stable main job and lived in general housing just 
before becoming street homeless.
Type 2. Included through work: stable main job and lived in job-associated 
accommodation just before moving onto the streets.
Type 3. Long-term excluded: unstable main job and housing.
Except for a few cases that cannot be classifi ed into these categories, among our 
sample the proportion of Type 1 accounted for 35 per cent, Type 2 28.9 per cent 
and Type 3 35.3 per cent. Type 2 cases were not expected to be so signifi cant 
before the survey was conducted as it was thought that they were included in 
society as regular workers. However, as symbolized in their housing status, their 
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link to society was only through employment and thus they became homeless 
when they lost this link.
As stated earlier, homelessness is generally characterized by never-married 
middle-aged males with a poor education. However, these characteristics 
considerably differ in each of our types (see Table 7.4). In the case of the over-60 
age group, the proportion of basic compulsory education only and never-married 
is high in the ‘long-term excluded’ group (Type 3), the ‘included through work’ 
group (Type 2) is the next, and the ‘fully included’ (Type 1) is the lowest in these 
terms. The never-married rate of ‘long-term excluded’ (Type 3) is 63.3 per cent, 
the ‘included through work’ (Type 2) is 52.5 per cent, and the ‘fully included’ 












20–29  0.4  0.0  1.3  0.6 
30–39  5.1 10.9  3.8  6.4 
40–49 19.9 20.9 18.8 19.8 
50–59 52.1 42.8 47.3 47.6 






56.8 47.5 36.7 47.1 
never married 43.2 52.5 63.3 52.9 
Education
at least junior high 
school graduate
52.3 62.2 74.9 63.2 
higher than junior 
high school
47.7 37.8 24.7 36.7 
Period of rough 
sleeping
less than 1 year 39.7 27.3 29.2 33.0 
1–5 years 41.9 42.9 40.0 41.5 
more than 5 years 18.4 29.8 30.8 25.6
Source: Toshi Seikatsukenkyu-kai.
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(Type 1) is 43.2 per cent. Of the ‘long-term excluded’ (Type 3) 74.9 per cent have 
a basic compulsory education only, but the rate is relatively lower in the ‘included 
through work’ group (Type 2, 62.5 per cent) and the ‘fully included’ (Type 1, 52.3 
per cent).
In this regard, inclusion and exclusion processes for these three types can be 
illustrated as follows. First, the ‘fully included’ group (Type 1) probably used to 
be constituted of various types of regular workers in small and medium-sized 
companies, individual proprietors or small-scale business owners. More than half 
of them have relatively good educational backgrounds and used to live in regular 
housing with their families. They were suffi ciently included in social institutions, 
that is, the social insurance system. The factors that have excluded them from 
society have been unemployment and bankruptcy under increasingly globalized 
socio-economic conditions. Their age (average 55) proved very disadvantageous 
in the changing labour market. However, it is not the only reason why they ended 
up on the streets. Unemployment has a number of associated problems, for 
example, family breakdown due to separation or divorce, disease, multiple debts, 
rent arrears, etc. which helped them onto the street. Multiple debts, especially, 
appear as a major factor in the disengagement of the fully included category 
from society. A survey of shelter users in Tokyo revealed that 30 per cent had 
outstanding debts. It is interesting to note that the group with experience of debts 
used to be regular workers in administration, management and sales services, 
had relatively higher educational backgrounds and many of them were married 
(Tokubetuku-Jinji Kosei Jimu-Kumiai, 2003)
Table 7.5 Reported period of rough sleeping of shelter 




Period of rough sleeping
less than 3 months 42.3 12.3
3–6 months 13.9  7.3
6 months–1 year 10.6 14.1
1–3 years 15.0 27.2
more than 3 years 18.1 39.0
Style of street living




other 18.8  3.7
Source: Toshi Seikatsukenkyu-kai and Otaryo Riousha Chosa.
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In contrast to the ‘fully included’ category (Type 1), the process of becoming 
homeless for the ‘long-term excluded’ group (Type 3) is relatively simple, as 
they were not fully included in society in the fi rst place. Many of them had poor 
educational backgrounds and had worked as unskilled day labourers based in cheap 
hotel lodgings and yoseba until they were nearly 60. Work in the construction 
industry has continued to shrink, as it has been the largest faltering industry after the 
1990s. Factors of age and economic downturn thus fostered unemployment and they 
had no choice but long-term rough sleeping. Typically yoseba-based day labourers 
became the fi rst group to become homeless. However, rough sleeping represented 
the vulnerability of day labourers in their daily life even during the rapid economic 
growth era. ‘One day a day labourer could stay in a hotel because he managed to 
obtain a job, but the next day, he might sleep in a park or riverbank near yoseba’ 
(Iwata, 2000). The condition was exacerbated into more regular rough sleeping after 
the 1990s. Many lost housing simply because they lost their job.
Many of the ‘included through work group’ (Type 2) were committed skilled 
or semi-skilled regular workers, but they were only able to connect to society 
through their work. Many never married or had separated from their families due 
to divorce, and lived in factory dormitories, company housing and accommodation 
provided by entertainment industries in cities. Unemployment led to the immediate 
loss of housing in the case of those in job-associated accommodation. After using 
up their savings in inns, many of them appeared on the streets. Because they are 
old and their skills and qualities are no longer required in today’s society, they 
struggle to fi nd another job.
In the background of Japanese street homelessness is the radical socio-economic 
change brought about by the growing impact of global laissez-faire relations 
(Gray, 2000). At the same time, unemployment of yoseba workers is only a part of 
the problem. Processes into street homelessness are complex. Some people were 
fully included in society and others were included only through working and were 
not able to ensure continued employment. However, lack of human capital can be 
seen as the common cause in the exclusion processes.
Policy responses to homeless problems: social assistance and 
homelessness
Generally, homeless policies and measures aim to provide income support and 
social services, such as medical services, in cases where poverty and deprivation 
are focused. In the case of loss of housing, the need is the provision of houses. 
In context of increasing social exclusion, integration into society through work, 
especially through paid work, is often emphasized. Until the establishment of the 
Homeless Independent Living Act in 2002, the Living Standard Protection Act 
(Seikatsu Hogo Ho) proclaimed in 1950 mediated social assistance for those with 
housing problems in Japan.
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Japanese social assistance sets a social entitlement to a minimum standard 
of living for all Japanese people whose income is below the defi ned minimum 
standard. The state, using local government welfare offi ces, has a duty to provide 
low-income households with a combination of eight different types of aid on a 
mainly cash basis: living aid, housing aid, educational aid, medical aid, maternity 
aid, funeral aid, vocational aid and care aid, according to their circumstances. 
Since it is a general relief measure provided without any moral judgement, it 
does not legally exclude any individual or family, and does not therefore create 
particular welfare sub-groups such as older people or single parents. Thus those 
who lose their homes or who live in inadequate houses have an equal entitlement 
under this legislation as long as their living conditions are confi rmed as being 
‘poor’. In the case of non-fi xed abodes, the government’s guidance in respect of 
this Act stresses that local government welfare offi ces have to offer assistance to 
homeless people whenever they fi nd these people within their jurisdiction and 
they are able to confi rm their impoverished state.
There are three major barriers to accessing Seikatsu Hogo Ho for homeless 
people in Japan, not including the exclusion of non-Japanese nationals (Iwata, 
2003a). First, this general relief system requires people to demonstrate that, even 
though they have fully used their assets and various ‘abilities’, they are still in a 
situation of poverty. Although this legislation covers all Japanese living under the 
poverty line, this requirement plays a role in limiting social assistance to the poor, 
such as the old, handicapped and sick. Therefore, it rarely applies to working age 
people, especially men. In reality, if a 55-year-old homeless male capable of work 
visits a welfare offi ce to claim something from the system they will probably fi nd 
that these rights do not apply to him. This situation regarding social assistance 
may be seen in many countries to a certain extent. Handler states that the main 
role of welfare policy is the preservation of the labour market and that the work 
requirement is the most important and enduring principle of welfare policy (1992: 
35).
Second, even if single people without a fi xed abode can qualify for this 
assistance, they have to be accommodated in hogo shisetsu institutions where 
they are given an aid package in kind, initially. Similarly, many homeless women 
and mothers are referred to mother and children’s homes or women’s homes. This 
‘indoor relief principle’ for the homeless is not described in the Act itself, but 
in both central and local government notifi cations. Of course, this institutional 
provision is limited to the short term as a halfway house. In addition, it must be 
pointed out that this special in-kind assistance can only be provided in some major 
cities such as Tokyo and Osaka.
Another reason for keeping this ‘indoor relief principle’ is that many social 
workers in local welfare offi ces are reluctant to fi nd rented housing for homeless 
people, as it is time-consuming for them. Some welfare offi ces are not inclined 
to pay deposits for the homelessness from public funds. In Japan, a guarantee 
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and deposit are necessary to rent private houses, and landlords do not tend to rent 
houses to former homeless people. Japan does not have housing allowance which 
can be paid directly to landlords, except housing aid stipulated in the Seikatsu Hogo 
Ho, so few landlords seek stable rent income from this form of social assistance. 
Meanwhile, social workers from local welfare offi ces have had experiences where, 
after fi nding houses for homeless people and handing over deposit and rent for the 
fi rst month, the homeless individual disappears with the money. Thus, the housing 
aid of the Seikatsu Hogo Ho is used for rent and moving cost of the poor who have 
houses but is rarely used for new housing for the homeless.
Third, Seikatsu Hogo Ho is a national law in Japan, but local governments 
put it into practice and bear 25 per cent of cost. Therefore, local governments do 
not tend to welcome the expansion of Seikatsu Hogo Ho recipients. In addition 
to this, it is hard for local government welfare offi cers to apply this Act if there is 
any doubt that homeless people are local residents. They may come under harsh 
criticism from taxpayers if they help homeless people whom the local government 
cannot be sure even reside in their communities. Local government offi ces are used 
to providing services for ‘legitimate’ citizens in their areas. They are generally 
afraid of any concentration of homeless people in their areas because of their 
‘good provision’ and fear being blamed for unsettling the everyday life of other 
citizens. Although local government welfare offi ces have duties to help all poor 
people within their jurisdictions by law, welfare offi ces have thus been reluctant to 
help people without a fi xed abode. There is, therefore, a gap between the Act and 
its implementation mediated by local government processes.
As a result, Seikatsu Hogo Ho is applied only to those who are over the age of 
65, those who have severe disease or handicap, women or single mothers, because 
they ‘can’t work’. It is easy to imagine that these limits on social assistance are 
factors infl uencing the three typical exclusion processes of homeless people 
discussed earlier.
As Seikatsu Hogo Ho social assistance has excluded the majority of the street 
homeless, major cities with large homeless populations have needed to respond 
to the homeless outside of institutional legislation. In the mid-1990s, some cities 
started to install ‘homeless measures’. According to local governments, these 
measures were ‘humanitarian assistance’ in order to relieve the misery of the street 
homeless who were excluded from public assistance. However, it was obvious that 
another purpose of the measure was to manage the occupation of public spaces 
by rough sleepers and to avoid confl icts between the homeless and ordinary 
citizens. The measures are mainly practised in the form of the following two 
programmes. One is the ‘outside-law programme’, which provides food, clothes, 
medical treatment, transportation fees and lodging costs via welfare offi ces. This 
has not been considered a very positive response but it has been implemented on 
‘humanitarian grounds’ to prevent homeless people from dying in some cases. 
The range of the provision under this programme is diverse depending upon local 
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welfare offi ces. Generous providers make special budgets for this programme, 
while less generous ones provide only leftovers from the public stores maintained 
in case of natural disasters (earthquake or otherwise).
The second is the ‘special programmes for homelessness’, which derive from 
the special programmes set up in the yoseba districts in Tokyo and Osaka in the 
1960s. As riots by day labourers happened several times in that decade, Tokyo 
and Osaka governments launched special programmes involving the provision of 
special job centres, day centres, welfare and health services, and public housing 
for families falling outside of Seikatsu Hogo Ho. When the oil crisis struck Japan 
in the 1970s, Tokyo and Osaka reinforced their welfare programmes including 
the provision of winter shelters for rough sleepers in these districts. In the mid-
1990s, Tokyo and Osaka governments decided to extend yoseba programmes to 
a wider range of rough sleepers, with special emphasis on the provision of winter 
shelters.
Based on the experiences of Tokyo and Osaka, in 1999, the central government 
launched the Independent Living (Jiritsu Shien) policy which provided special 
hostels with vocational services and other necessities for those who expected to 
return to the labour market within approximately three months (MHW, 2000). It 
also formalized the defi nition of the term ‘homeless people’ as those who have no 
fi xed abode and who sleep in the streets, parks, railway stations and other places. 
In 2002 the national government authorized a new policy, the Homeless Act 
(Jiritsu Shien Ho), as a 10-year provisional legislation and put funds aside. The 
Homeless Act is to be applied prior to social assistance, aiming fi rst to promote 
inclusion through paid work. However, when application of the system is diffi cult, 
social assistance may be provided as a last resort if homeless people can articulate 
the conditions of their unemployed situation.
Inclusion-through-work or inclusion-through-housing
Many social policies focused on street homelessness assert that social inclusion 
should be achieved through paid work. ‘Labour market participation has become 
the panacea for an inclusive society’ (Kennett, 1999: 53). Of course, as described 
above, there are a variety of methods of inclusion. For example, inclusion can 
be achieved by being housed. In some cases supplementary income is provided 
to enhance the inclusion process. Some national policies follow a step-by-step 
approach to help individuals re-enter housing or return to the labour market, 
while other countries take the housing-fi rst method, aiming at establishing regular 
housing in communities and in regular work places.
Japanese policies towards street homelessness after the 1990s are centred 
upon the Independent Living Policy through work, as I have discussed. The term, 
‘independent living’ appears key in Japanese social policies after the 1990s. Even 
though the term ‘social inclusion’ is not used, the aims of policies are to convert 
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the excluded into independent citizens without depending on the welfare system. 
This is thought to be achieved through joint elements of employment policies 
and welfare services. In this regard, it is similar to inclusion policies in Europe. 
Of course, the term in Europe includes not only independence through work but 
also independent life in the community as well as individual contributions to 
the community through various social activities. However, the goals have been 
narrowed down recently, and only independence and social participation through 
work are emphasized. The Independent Living Act for the homeless was enacted 
as a programme to transform the homeless into independent workers.
The central part of the Homeless Independent Living Policy is the provision of 
special hostel accommodation called independent living centres, where vocational 
services are offered. If welfare offi ces decide that a street homeless person can 
return to the labour market within three months, they are permitted to stay in 
the centre and receive job placement services as well as food, a bed and daily 
necessities. The centres also provide social services to prepare the return to the 
community and to help fi nd housing. Those who cannot fi nd a job within three 
months or those who are not judged as capable of work immediately are expected 
to be covered by different forms of public services including social assistance.
Within this policy framework specifi c programmes and execution levels are 
diverse, depending on fi nancial situations and the number of homeless people in 
each city. The pattern of policy execution in Tokyo will be discussed as an example 
of Independent Living Policy. From Tokyo’s experiences, the policy approach 
of inclusion-through-work can be considered from an inclusion perspective. Of 
course, it is also possible to verify effects of this policy as Tokyo has proactively 
promoted an Independent Living Policy through work.
Figure 7.1 shows an overview of the programmes and records of execution 
in Tokyo. The number of street homeless in the Tokyo ward area was reported 
at about 5,500 according to the seasonal survey conducted every six months 
(summer and winter). Among the street homeless the old and handicapped that 
the welfare offi ce judge as incapable of work receive social assistance. In many 
cases, emergency shelter is provided fi rst and then income provision for rented 
housing. For those capable of work emergency shelter can be provided for 
one month in order to assess whether independence through work is possible. 
Shelters are available around the clock and homeless people can receive food, 
a bed and other daily necessities as well as a counselling service. Shelters do 
not provide cash, such as the living aid of Seikatsu Hogo Ho, but only daily 
necessities as needed. It also needs to be pointed out that the standards of benefi t 
do not always satisfy the national minimum stipulated in the Seikatsu Hogo Ho. 
If individuals are assessed as capable of independence through work, they move 
on to independent support centres. They receive job-search counselling, bed 
and board and other daily necessities for two months in these centres. If they 
can fi nd a job, they are encouraged to stay on at the centres until they can save 
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enough money, by working, for a deposit, rent and daily living costs for the fi rst 
month in a new home.
In July 2005, 10,778 people were accommodated in fi ve shelters in Tokyo (see 
Figure 7.1). Of these, 42.4 per cent (4,565) moved on to independent support 
centres. In the judgement of the welfare offi ces, the remaining individuals were 
expected to receive social assistance, but in fact many of them reappeared on 
streets. Almost half of independent support centre residents, 2,711 people, achieved 
independence through work. Most jobs are service jobs, such as cleaners, security 
guards, waiters, etc, which require few skills. Moreover, the centres encourage 
people to take regular jobs, but many jobs are unstable in reality. The centres also 
encourage individuals to seek non-job-associated accommodation and regular 
rented housing as a rule. However half of them did not move to rented housing 
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7.1 Welfare programmes for the homeless and numbers of users in Tokyo
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provide only two months of support, thus job-associated accommodation which 
offers a job and housing at the same time is popular. As a result, many people 
end up on the street again after losing work. Those who cannot fi nd a job have 
three options: to apply for social assistance from the welfare offi ce again, to stay 
in a shelter again or to return to the street. A recent survey of those who had 
returned to street living from the independence support centres reported that some 
experienced discrimination and severer conditions at work because they were from 
the centres. Many quit or ran away from company accommodation (Kitagawa, 
2005). Many of those who were not able to fi nd a job during their stay in the 
centres claimed that their age and address in the centre hampered job seeking, 
even though they tried many job interviews. They said they gave up looking for 
jobs through the centres.
The homeless covered by the Independent Living Policy are mainly the fully 
included type and experience a relatively shorter rough sleeping period. It also 
includes those who do not have experience of rough sleeping. Comparing the 
results of the Tokyo survey discussed earlier and shelter users (Table 7.5), the 
latter have obviously shorter rough sleeping periods. Few shelter users have 
settled in tents or cardboard-box houses. It is interesting that the inclusion policy 
through work covers those who are in a relatively ‘better condition’ in spite of its 
original goal. This is also observable in the European situation. Handler states 
that inclusion policy through work does not cover the actual excluded but rather 
those just above or just below the deprivation threshold (Handler, 2004: 207). He 
also observes:
However, the workless and the socially excluded are a diverse group, some 
more employable and trainable than others, some with fewer barriers than 
others, and it is the most vulnerable who run the greatest risks. Programmes 
of inclusion based on contract necessarily exclude those who cannot negotiate 
the entry points and conditions of participation. Workfare programmes are 
evaluated on the positive outcomes, and thus, there are pressures to cream. 
Programmes that target the most vulnerable will, inevitably, have higher 
failure rate.
(Handler, 2004: 199–200)
Long-term rough sleepers are settled in parks and hardly ever participate in 
the Independent Living Policy programmes. They generally do not believe that 
shelters and centres can offer immediate jobs. They are also aware that staying 
in a room with other homeless people generates frequent troubles. They prefer 
to live on the streets, depending upon an informal economy, such as rag picking. 
Since the number of homeless on the street has not decreased, taxpayers have 
started making more complaints about them. Thus, it can be said that the goal of 
the Independent Living Act of inclusion-through-work has not achieved its goal 
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to include the most excluded street homeless people. In light of this failure, the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government added a new policy in 2004, which is different 
from the Independent Living Policy. The new policy, named the ‘Moving to 
Community Policy’, aims at the inclusion of the homeless, not through work but 
through rehousing.
The objective of the Moving to Community Policy is undoubtedly the clearance 
of homeless people who settle in large parks. Nevertheless, since the new policy 
clearly aims at clearance of all homeless people from public spaces it, unlike 
the Independent Living Policy, avoids selectivity by employability and does not 
seek to accommodate the homeless in shelters. The new policy seeks more direct 
and immediate means for the homeless to return to the community by providing 
inexpensive rented housing (3,000 yen/month (£15 approx)) to all applicants. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government rents accommodation and sublets it to the 
applicants. Six-month temporary jobs (e.g. public work, cleaning parks, etc.) and 
comprehensive living support provided by non-profi t organizations are added to 
the package of support. Although a housing allowance system is not available 
in Japan, the policy might be considered as a sort of housing allowance for the 
homeless. When the policy was fi rst recommended, some members of homeless 
support groups came out against it because the policy aimed primarily at sweeping 
out the homeless from parks. However, many homeless people and some other 
support groups welcomed the programme because individuals would not have to 
be assessed by welfare offi ces or have to stay in shelters. As a result, 661 people 
moved to rented housing from four large parks in Tokyo from summer 2004 to 
spring 2005. Only one person declined. It initially appears that the remaining 
homeless resettled within the community.
The experiences of Tokyo illustrate some of the inadequacies of the ‘through 
work’ policy, when we consider it as an inclusion policy. First, the low success rate 
of independence through work is not a surprise considering lack of human capital 
of the homeless, that is, age, lack of skills and poor educational background. For 
many, seeking work is futile. Public policies do not expand employment itself 
but just encourage ineffi cient practices. In other words, despite enhancement of 
vocational services, public policy cannot directly ensure stable employment for 
the homeless. It is true that the Independent Living Policy develops new services 
by connecting employment and welfare and expands ways for the homeless to 
return to the labour market, but it still has fundamental contradictions.
Second, the existence of Type 2 homelessness emphasizes that work is 
central for many in determining inclusion, which leads to greater vulnerability 
to exclusion. The jobs of these individuals were not marginal. Although they 
were regular workers, they easily became homeless. Thus, it can be said that 
the inclusion policy aiming at transforming them into independent workers just 
reproduces more precarious people like Type 2 homeless. As many scholars have 
pointed out, the inclusion policy through paid work only sees participation in the 
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labour market as a solution by ignoring various complexities in the processes of 
becoming homeless (Kennett, 1999; Lister, 2000; Handler, 2004). The existence 
of Type 2 homeless people in the Tokyo survey suggests that the independent 
worker cannot be equated with full inclusion in society.
Third, the Independent Living Policy basically selects homeless people based 
on employability. Thus, the homeless are exposed to many other risks or aspects of 
exclusion in places like the welfare offi ce, shelters and independent living centres. 
Moreover, those who are excluded from the policy are stigmatized as drop-outs. 
The most vulnerable people thus end up becoming even more vulnerable.
Fourth, the policy mechanism tends to attract those who recently came onto 
the streets or do not have experience of rough sleeping because of the steps of 
selection by employability. Clearly, welfare offi ces and social workers in the 
centres have a tendency to prioritize those who appear to be able to fi nd work 
quickly. However, those most excluded, who illegally occupy public spaces and 
end up in most confl ict with ordinary citizens, are the ones with the most need and 
least access to the policy.
These contradictions of the inclusion-through-work policy have fostered the 
establishment of the new policy of inclusion-through-housing. The inclusion-
through-housing policy is popular because it does not follow the steps from shelter 
to centre to work, set up by the inclusion-through-work policies. The policy does 
not tend to select or exclude people by assessment of employability. People do 
not wish to receive training based on the programme in shelters or centres, but 
wish to return to society fi rst. Yasue reports that those who have returned to the 
community through the inclusion-through-housing policy experience substantial 
pleasure from improved accessibility to social services and in exercising normal 
citizenship rights (2005).
Of course this popular inclusion-through-housing policy has several signifi cant 
problems. For example, the inclusion-through-housing policy offers only six-
month temporary jobs and does not offer any income provision. Those who moved 
to rented housing thanks to the policy are expected to cover living expenses, except 
rent, from income made in the informal economy, which often involves the same 
type of work they used to engage in on the streets. In fact, it has been reported 
that some of the participants in the programme do not have enough money for 
food (Toda, 2005). Essentially, this policy has weaker vocational services than 
the Independent Living Policy does. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
commissions support groups to visit members for individual counselling. Users 
live across Tokyo’s 23 wards and the commission cannot ensure a suffi cient number 
of visitors. The service has been criticized as it has failed to play its expected role 
(Toda, 2005). Furthermore, it depends on the whim of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government whether users can continue to live in the same houses with low rent 
after two years. Since there is no clear housing allowance system in Japan, it also 
seems diffi cult to achieve the goal of the inclusion-through-housing.
Social exclusion and homelessness
161
Conclusion
Japan’s huge socio-economic transformations have enlarged inequalities and 
undermined the stability of the middle class, yet not all people have become 
vulnerable to homelessness. From the investigation of processes into street 
homeless people in Tokyo, it appears that those who hold human capital and 
are included in society in various ways do not easily become homeless. Not 
only unemployment but also various factors infl uence the downward path from 
mainstream society to life on the streets. On the contrary, those who are integrated 
into society primarily through work as well as those in unstable jobs also can end 
up homeless. When these individuals lose a job, get older or become sick, they 
tend to appear on streets.
Young unemployed people referred to as NEET and freeter do not appear 
homeless on the streets so much at this time. The main reason may be maintained 
support from their families. Living with their parents especially prevents their 
exclusion and decline in housing status. According to the recent survey on 
NEETs, about 80 per cent of them live with their parents (JILPT, 2005). Another 
reason may be that young people are believed to be more suitable for work in 
the information industry and service industries. Today’s labour market requires 
workers in these industries. If a person has a family to live with and the family has 
a house, and if he/she is younger than 50, the risk of becoming homeless is much 
smaller. However, the more drastically the family structure and labour market 
changes in future, the larger the risk of exclusion and homelessness may become. 
In fact, some scholars have sounded a warning that the proportion of the older age 
group of NEET, between 30 and 34, is increasing and their parents, who support 
them, have started to retire from the labour market. Thus, the end of support from 
parents is coming (Kosugi, 2005).
The Independent Living Policy for the homeless classifi ed various groups of 
homeless people according to working ability and includes only those acceptable 
to the labour market. However, the policy contains some critical contradictions. 
One is that the public policies do not expand employment itself but just encourage 
employers to hire the homeless and homeless people to apply for jobs. The 
second is that the policy itself can be the process that excludes those who do 
not fall within the bounds of categorization. Effi cient inclusion policies need 
to be selective in nature, therefore, they may create new means of exclusion 
as a result. Those who are not selected by inclusion policies have started to be 
despised and stigmatized as they fail to meet the social obligation to work. The 
third is that inclusion-through-work never resolves the instability of those who 
can only link to society through work. The Type 2 of homeless people has only 
been connected to communities through work before becoming homeless. They 
have no choice but to devolve to the street when they lose their job, even though 
they have achieved the independence the policy is concerned with. Type 2 people 
need contact with society through various means, considering their lack of human 
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capital, the lack of family support and the fact that many have lived for a long 
time in job-associated accommodation. What is perhaps necessary is to regenerate 
contact with the community rather than work. The fi nal contradiction is that the 
inclusion-through-work policy is not accessible by the most excluded.
The housing-fi rst policy (Moving to Community Policy) in Tokyo sought to 
resolve these contradictions. The success of the policy may lie in the superiority 
of inclusion-through-housing over inclusion-through-work in the following two 
respects. First, as the policy does not tend to select or exclude people by assessment 
of employability it has more potential for the recapturing of multi-dimensional 
social rights through stabilization of community life. Inclusion-through-housing 
may provide greater opportunities for Type 2 and 3 people who have not been 
included in the community through normal housing practices. Yet, this also has its 
limitations since it only involves temporary work and lacks an income provision 
element. Few people can live only on rent support. Thus, welfare offi cers have 
become concerned that the housing-fi rst policy may increase the number of social 
assistance users and have begun to object to the continuation of the policy. In fact, 
many users of the inclusion-through-housing policy have become users of public 
assistance. Considering the average age of homeless people is 55, the number of 
social assistance users will defi nitely increase in the near future.
From the viewpoint of accessibility to social assistance, those who are 
registered as residents have easier access to the system than rough sleepers who 
are not regarded as formal residents. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government is 
planning to expand the policy, aiming at total clearance of illegal occupation of 
public spaces by homeless people. Meanwhile, welfare offi ces of local wards are 
basically against this direction in policy. Expansion of the policy will increase the 
number of social assistance users at the end of the day, which will also expand 
the cost of social assistance for ward offi ces. Moreover, it is generally believed 
that an increase of social assistance users will expand welfare dependency, which 
confl icts with the Independent Living Policy for the homeless.
These contradictions and limitations cannot be resolved unless policy 
addresses social exclusion directly, with homelessness policy redirected from its 
independence-centred approach. Inclusion is not a synonym for independence. 
The process of facilitation of inclusion in society should be more comprehensive 
and include through-work, through-housing, through-income approaches as well 
as the restructuring of social networks. Considering Type 2 and Type 3 homeless 
people who have the least resources, the policy needs to offer multiple processes 
of inclusion to one homeless person simultaneously, but it should not set separate 
programmes of inclusion-through-work, inclusion-through-housing and through 
income provision. At the same time, it must not exclude those who do not fall into 
each category.
In 2005, the new job programme was added to Seikatsu Hogo Ho (social 
assistance) as well as child allowance for single mothers. The new job programme 
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is to reintegrate as many users of these two systems as possible into the labour 
market. However, unlike the Independent Living Policy for the homeless, this job 
programme is based on income provision. These additions should be welcomed 
as a safety-net policy and an inclusion policy can work together to tackle both 
poverty and social exclusion. Previous homelessness policies of inclusion-
through-work and inclusion-through-housing, discussed in this chapter, critically 
lack income support measures. However, as I suggested, inclusion-through-work 
carries a number of contradictions. There is also a risk that participation in the 
job programme may become an absolute condition for receiving social assistance. 
In order to achieve better consolidation of the safety-net policy and inclusion-
through-work policy, more working age people, that is, middle-aged homeless 
people, should be accepted as users of social assistance. Moreover, the need for 
a comprehensive execution of a housing allowance system in addition to income 
support measures of Seikatsu Hogo Ho and child allowance has become urgent in 
Japan. This chapter shows that housing support is more effective than job assistance 
in the social inclusion of homeless people. Furthermore, housing support is also 
necessary for NEET and freeters to be independent from their parents and to 
be able to settle into communities. It will also help to strengthen low-income 
households and reduce their vulnerability. Today’s socio-economic changes can 
be seen in the collapse of the traditional family system and mutual aid within the 
system. In this case, greater inclusion in various processes including housing will 
become crucial. The characteristic exclusion processes in street homelessness, 
and the inadequacies of the government’s inclusion policies identify the need to 
diversify routes of social inclusion in today’s Japan.
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8 The Japanese home in 
transition




This chapter deals with the interaction of Japanese tradition and modernity in the 
re-signifi cation of the home as an owner-occupied family commodity fi tting with 
middle-class formation and the maintenance of social and familial relationships. 
The focus will be on the development of Japan as a mass homeowner society and 
modern housing culture which refl ects the particular nature of Japanese social 
relations and its peculiar manifestation of modernity. The Japanese home has 
long been culturally embedded as the embodiment of Japanese harmony and the 
canon of Japanese social organization (Daniels, 2001). However, the conditions 
of homes and families have undoubtedly been volatile and Japanese society has 
experienced radical changes in the constitution of households, social contracts 
and welfare exchanges, housing aspirations and preferences, tenure rights and 
relations as well as in the built environment and urban living arrangements.
I consider the changes in the meaning of house and home and the physical form 
of dwellings as crucial elements that have mediated the interaction between the 
self, society and the built environment in Japan’s modern era. I look at the housing 
context from the Meiji restoration in the latter nineteenth century through to post-
war reforms and, fi nally, from the post-bubble era which began with the ‘lost 
decade’ of the 1990s and has formed the basis for a new approach to governance 
and social relations in the twenty-fi rst century. In this period housing has been 
central in the interaction of conservative elements and forces of change, and as the 
basis of identifi cation and consumption that has formed a nexus of social relations. 
Previous chapters have considered in detail system elements and social relations 
in terms of policy change and socio-economic developments. This chapter aims 
to provide more of a sociological, anthropological and socio-historical context for 
the consideration of housing and social transformation, locating the home more 
centrally in analysis. This constitutes an interpretive contextual framework for 
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understanding the indigenous and comparative signifi cance of social, individual 
and cultural processes in Japanese housing and social change.
Japan can be considered an ideal laboratory for exploring the comparative 
dimensions and limitations of theories that claim to be universal, due to the 
outstanding infl uence of socio-cultural processes on social practices, and therefore 
provides an insightful context within which to examine and reconsider many of the 
assumptions concerning the home as a nodal point between the self, the family and 
wider society. Kemeny (1992) has argued that the way in which households relate 
to dwellings is an area that remains unexplored systematically by researchers, 
while the comparative signifi cance of this relationship has also been neglected 
(Ronald, 2004a). A focus of my analysis is thus housing practices and values 
and relationships between households and their homes, where family dwelling 
space has been a key point of interaction between households and society that has 
been radically transformed by Japanese modernity while maintaining elements of 
tradition and culture.
From a western housing perspective, contemporary Japan can be considered a 
mass homeowner society (Hirayama, 2003a; Forrest et al., 2003; Ronald 2004b), 
as it has demonstrated substantial market demand and policy commitment to 
owner-occupation, specifi cally in the post-war era, characterized by residualized 
public rental housing systems and the dual market characteristics of western 
home ownership orientated countries, or ‘homeowner societies’, like in Britain, 
North America and Australia. The development of Japan as a modern mass home 
ownership system, as well as the shape of social modernization, stands out in 
comparative context, as while market based owner-occupied housing systems 
have been strongly connected to processes of globalization, local housing cultures 
and practices have been similarly implicated in social divergence. Moreover, 
there is little consensus on how to interpret social changes in Japanese society 
as traditional and ethnocentric models based on western social structures and 
subjectivity are diffi cult to apply (Clammer, 1995).
Japan experienced similar transformations to western societies, where social 
preferences for home ownership and domestic privatism were largely created and 
manipulated (see Kemeny, 1992; Rybczynski, 1986). However, the characteristics 
of this transformation have been shaped by cultural forces and indigenous structures 
of social control. The nature of capitalism in Japan is also strongly differentiated 
from patterns in other modern industrialized societies. Essentially, while Japanese 
society has experienced exceptionally rapid modernization, industrialization 
and urbanization, it has achieved this through traditional and culturally marked 
social processes and relations, rather than rationalized and socially disembedded 
ones, which have maintained the hierarchical and interdependent nature of social 
relations.
Critically, the house and home, embedded socially, culturally and materially as 
ie in Japanese language and social practice, has been a conceptual and physical 
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centre in the maintenance of traditionally defi ned social relations. The idea of the 
Japanese house and family has been pivotal in maintaining a sense of continuity 
through radical upheaval and social, economic and political transformation. My 
analysis, however, illustrates that housing and the home have been far from stable 
and contiguous and have in fact been a signifi cant mechanism for the achievement 
of modernization and transformation of social identities and social relations. The 
key characteristic of ie is in fact change.
Pre-war housing: Japanese modernity and the reinvention of 
the home
The year 1868 marks the beginning of an era of modernization and rapid urbanization 
in Japan, although it is a remarkably peculiar one that has no parallels in the West. 
Although Japan had been dealing more seriously with issues of westernization 
and modernization since the arrival from America of Perry’s black ships in 1853 
demanding the opening of trade relations, 1868 marks the Meiji restoration, 
seen by many as a radical watershed for the beginning of modernization, which 
has often been equated, mistakenly, with westernization. This revolution was, 
however, deeply conservative. How many modern revolutions have sought to put 
the Emperor back on the throne? While it was in fact a revolt against exploitation 
and injustice, by calling it a restoration it refrained from casting aspersions on 
the system and did not undermine the basic fabric of social existence and social 
relations (see Clammer, 1995; Benedict, 1947). Socio-economic reconstruction 
under the Meiji regime, which sought to drive industrial capitalism, radically 
transformed the country. At the beginning of the twentieth century approximately 
15 per cent of Japanese lived in cities. By the end of the century around 80 per 
cent of the population lived in urban areas. Modernization, therefore, while from 
the outset characterized by conservatism and the preservation of cultural tradition, 
was radical.
The character of Japanese social-modernity is largely contested between those 
on one side who consider Japan essentially pre-modern (due to the persistence 
of values of group orientated values, social harmony, and hierarchical and 
authoritarian social relations) and, on the other, the epitome of the postmodern 
society (due to the lack of meta-narratives and the importance of signifi cation 
in Japanese social life). Berger (1979) suggests that modernity has fi ve major 
characteristics: abstraction, futurity, individuation, liberation and secularization. 
Japan challenges this western model for, as Clammer suggests, a characterization 
of Japanese society contains: concreteness, tradition as a way of handling change, 
group orientation coexisting with many varied if subdued forms of individualism, 
and a strong emphasis on fate and desire for continuity (1995: 57). Essentially, 
structures which mediate between individual life and the wider, changing structures 
of society are different in Japan, which has led to a form of modernity with its own 
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cultural logic. Housing and the home, I argue, has been a critical structure in this 
mediation.  
The elements of home, the house and the built environment have been a critical 
axis for social identities and have been radically transformed in order to facilitate 
social change. At the same time they have retained conservative, traditional 
elements which have maintained a level of continuity facilitating social relations 
and authoritarian control. I now consider where modernization has interacted 
with conservatism in forms unfamiliar in western modernity. The basis of this 
transformation exists in pre-war society going back to the Meiji restoration.
Reinventing the Japanese home
The Japanese home is characterized by a strong interdependence on the order of the 
family and the physical order of the house, and is thus considered the materialized 
order of the family (Engel, 1964). However, the idealized order of the house and 
home has been more important in Japanese society. Essentially the Japanese home 
has acted as a medium and embodiment of cultural values and an ideological 
system that has facilitated social change whist maintaining a vision of continuity 
which has supported social order and hegemony. In this section I consider the 
nature and role of ie in the early period of Japanese modernization where it has 
been considered a rudder for the social and moral orientation of the individual. It 
has guided institutional relations and set out the respective responsibilities of the 
state and family. Ie has also mediated changes in the physical shape of the home, 
urban living and social development.
So what is ie exactly? To speak of the traditional Japanese family is to 
speak of a very distinctive institution identifi ed by the word ie, implying house, 
family or lineage (Sand, 1998: 191). Koyano (1996) emphasizes lineage in the 
conceptualization of ie, where contiguously succeeding generations defi ne what 
the family is rather than the contemporaneously contained material unit of the 
family itself. Under the Meiji civil code (1898) ie was an organizational structure 
under which the paternal head of household held authority with a rule of one-son 
succession (Mayokovich, 1978; Nasu and Yazawa, 1973). The system arguably 
originates in Confucian doctrines and principles of loyalty to the state or the 
emperor, fi lial piety, faith in family and respect for seniority (Morishima, 1988). 
The concepts of ie system and ie society have dominated discourses and analyses 
of domestic social relations and are considered underlying structures of pre-war 
Japanese society.
The Meiji civil code essentially formalized patrilineal relations with 
responsibilities of families, particularly the head of the family, enshrined in law. 
Under this system the family head was provided with privileges and powers 
necessary to fulfi l obligations to the emperor, state and society, as well as maintain 
the name, assets and social status of the family for the next generation. There 
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was a strict division between the succeeding child and other children, with the 
eldest son, as future head of household, having clearly defi ned privileges, duties 
and obligations. Such a traditional family system reinforced normative values 
of the family, and discounted individual wishes and choices. The concept of ie 
was essentially an ideology that guided household and housing practices, and 
infl uenced socialization processes and broad-scale social relations.
Modern families can be understood in terms of the transformation of the 
idealized notion of ie into a more nucleated modern form (Ochiai, 1997) 
convergent with the concepts of modernity and owner-occupier living as well as 
tradition and continuity of the family across generations. Post-war democracy is 
regarded the source of nuclearization and enlightened rationalization of domestic 
behaviour, however, the principles of ie persist in terms of reciprocal obligations 
and welfare responsibilities of the family (Izuhara, 2000). Discourses have 
created an idealized image of Japanese family life that ignores radical changes 
in households and the transformation of its meaning and form. Essentially, the 
family has been understood in terms of this framework which has effectively 
promoted the decontextualized image of the house and home (Daniels, 2001). 
Discussions of domestic life in modern Japan have thus positioned themselves 
along an axis between two political poles of family relations between democracy 
and authoritarianism (Sand, 1998).
While elements of Japanese home life are considered constant, such as tightly 
knit cohabitant families, family privacy and the role of the wife as housekeeper and 
mother, the tradition of the Japanese home is, in large part, a construct of modern 
social reformers. Meiji (1868–1912) and Taisho (1912–26) period reformers were 
infl uenced by the rich language of the home and middle-class domesticity in the 
West. New domestic discourses emerged that sought to establish a set of norms 
and practices regarding the home as a centre of family and moral life which fi tted 
Japan. These norms eventually developed in architectural forms and socially 
comprehensive discourses. As the western concept of home was found to be 
inadequate to the Japanese situation the more novel concept of katei (household) 
was adopted by early proponents of change. Katei was strongly associated with the 
role of the modern housewife and close parallels can be drawn with the Victorian 
cult of privatism and domestic life that had emerged in Europe (see Davidoff and 
Hall, 1987).
The conception of home and household relations that emerged in the early 
modern era was, critically, a dialectic resolution between two concepts and 
structures of domestic organization. Traditions of ie were associated with a more 
aristocratic, authoritarian tradition and Bakufu (Shogunal government) custom, 
and katei, largely championed by Japanese social reformers, refl ected modernizing 
principles of family life, and intimate and romantic notions of family relations. 
These two concepts were dichotic, one being indigenous and feudal, and the other 
being modern and exogenous (Sand, 1998). The former had embedded loyalty 
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and social order in domestic relations in feudal society, the later was considered 
necessary for Japanese progress in social and industrial development. The house 
and home consequently became a battleground between forces of conservatism and 
modernization. The new domestic ideal was more middle-class and new gender 
roles and new moral meanings imbued with material practices were invented to 
provide substance to images of modern Japanese families and homes (Nishikawa, 
1995).
Japanese houses had traditionally been occupied by children and adopted 
children, parents-in-law, other in-laws, concubines and lodgers, who lived in 
integrated housing units where sleeping communally on the fl oor was the norm, 
and rooms were separated by shoji or fusuma (paper screens) which provided little 
privacy. This was considered inappropriate to conjugal relations and the upbringing 
of children and clashed strongly with new ideas of family bonds and harmony. The 
form of ie that was normalized in early twentieth-century discourses and household 
organization was thus largely an idealized synthesis of the traditional ie household 
and katei images of modern domesticity, strongly infl uenced by images of western 
middle-class domesticity, which served the interests of modernization. Thus while 
ie traditions and values had been substantially transformed, they maintained a 
sense of continuity about the permanence and centrality of family life and custom.
The synthesis of ie and katei also involved spatial transformations.
Normalising the home in Japan required redrawing its contours of domestic 
space and reappointing its interior. Two fundamental spatial problems had to 
be solved in the invention of Japanese domesticity. First, to bind family to 
place, and give the bond normative signifi cance, families had to be persuaded 
not to merely cohabit but to exhibit family solidarity in some concrete form 
… Second, to articulate the priority of family over other social groups, a 
house design was needed that would segregate the cohabitant family from 
non-kin, and the outside world.
(Sand, 1998: 193)
While husband and wife bonding and childrearing were initially the focus of 
discourse in the early modern period, parents-in-law crept back into the idealized 
image of the family home. The family meal taken from a single table also became 
iconic as it embodied the pleasures of family intimacy and ritualized family unity. 
This was far from traditional, as when and where meals were taken under the pre-
modern ie regime refl ected one’s status in the hierarchy of the house. Meals were 
also taken on individual trays with status differences making it inappropriate for 
two people to eat from the same surface (Koizumi, 1979: 318).
Most importantly, in the development of the home in modern Japan as a 
mechanism for social change, was the association of social class or social status 
with the new idea of the Japanese home. Leading up to the fi rst period of radical 
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urbanization in the 1920s the image of modern homes strongly distinguished the 
new professional middle classes from the traditional urban bourgeoisie, associated 
with feudal power relationships and traditional aristocratic houses, in the broader 
hierarchical sense. The middle classes, who were increasingly defi ned by their 
consumption of goods and household practices, were associated with western 
opulence and a healthy society.
Although the meaning and constitution of ie has been transformed, it still 
largely functions to discriminate the ‘Japanese Family’ from a more regular 
or universal notion of ‘families’. The Japanese family as ie can also therefore 
be linked to Nihonjinron and other ideologies which have asserted Japanese 
uniqueness and which function to preserve conservative social relations. 
Nihonjinron values, or theories of Japaneseness, assert that Japanese people share 
important characteristics including; the idea that they are a homogeneous group of 
people unique and distinct from other peoples; that they are naturally harmonious; 
and that society is based on hierarchical interpersonal relations that necessitate 
respect for authority (Goodman, 1992: 11). Nationalistic ideologies were central 
to the rapid industrialization and militarization of Japan, and Nihonjinron (the 
more contemporary form of these ideologies), Confucianism and other parallel 
ideologies have been critical in defi ning a common hegemony and identity, and 
have been important in maintaining stability during radical social changes and the 
erosion of meanings and identities in Japan’s modern era (Befu, 1989; Dale, 1986). 
These values are argued to represent the ruling class ideology in the way they have 
structured social cohesion, nationalistic sentiment and disguised inequalities and 
instability created by economic growth. Although Japanese homes and houses, via 
the perpetuation of a form of ie in social values, have been embedded in theories 
of Japaneseness and bound to Confucian practice, this belies transformation and 
modernization of housing and what Cannadine (1983) refers to as ‘invention of 
tradition’.
Reinventing the Japanese house
Inside and outside Japan, discourse on the Japanese house, with its ‘delicate 
elegance’ has been perceived, or at least caricatured, as the embodiment of Zen 
and harmony, and the canon of Japanese social organisation (Daniels, 2000). 
Architecturally and spatially Japanese houses are thus strongly associated with 
ie and Japanese social order. They essentialize space and defi ne social relations 
between the family within and the society without in ways largely unimaginable 
in other cultures. Modernization and social transformation in Japan thus has had 
to maintain central meaningful elements of the Japanese house whilst in reality 
the built environment of the family dwelling has changed substantially. The house 
has become multifaceted: as an object of household consumption which marks 
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social inclusion and social status; and as an object of tradition marking social 
affi liations with others within the family and community.
Watsuji, writing in the 1930s on the connection between the house and Japanese 
social life, identifi es how the built unit refl ects or structures relations between the 
self and society. While the European house has thick walls and stout doors which 
is a construction stressing individuality and separation, the Japanese house has 
sliding doors which provide an element of division but only within the unity of 
mutual trust and not as the desire for separation. Just as there is no distinction 
between individual rooms in the house, where spaces cannot be locked apart, 
there is no distinction of the individual and society as a whole. Above all the 
physical house exhibits an internal fusion that admits no discrimination (1988: 
4). The house marks the realm of inside and outside as unmistakably different. 
The house continues in Japan – and continues not just as a formal entity but as a 
determinant of the Japanese way of life (1988: 5).
The relationship both physically and socially between the interior and exterior 
of a house has been strongly emphasized in anthropological accounts of Japan. 
The concepts of uchi and soto signify spatial meanings of inside and outside 
respectively, with uchi used literally to denote the home itself. Hendry (1992) 
illustrates how individuals are socialized in terms of uchi and soto group identities 
which structure identifi cations and affi liation with groups discernible as ‘inside’ 
which are opposed to those ‘outside’. The house thus embodies the principles of 
social relations and the relationship of the individual to others. The state is also 
connected to this nexus as the fence that surrounds the house and household is 
broadened conceptually to become the boundaries of the state.
Through every age, Japanese have striven to eradicate selfi shness within 
the family and to realize fully the fusion of the self with the other … The 
house represents the realisation through the family, of a distinctive Japanese 
relationship – the fusion of calm passion with material selfl essness … The 
concept of house in Japan takes on a unique and important signifi cance as, if 
you like, the community of all communities.
(Watsuji, 1988: 4)
Clearly, the house in Japan has overwhelming social signifi cance and the 
concept of ie which ties the family to the house is strongly integrated. Its traditional 
material form, however, was far from adequate for processes of modernization and 
urbanization. Construction was based on principles of ephemerality where houses 
were considered vulnerable to the seasons, strong weather and earthquakes, 
unlike the eternal family within. Houses were fl imsy and ill suited to practices of 
modern consumption and family life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the physical unit of the house posed a problem for the social movements who had 
transformed the domestic meaning of ie. The lack of corridors and privacy, with 
The Japanese home in transition
173
rooms opening on to each other, was increasingly seen as a problem in terms of 
relations between family, servants and outsiders such as neighbours and guests 
(Sand, 1998). Nevertheless there was strong attachment to the Japanese house as 
a medium for the transmission of Japanese values and the structuring of a unique 
subjectivity which was considered essential to social order and human relations.
Demand for transformation in Japanese housing to fi t modern needs and 
to adjust to the changing relationship between people and houses became 
increasingly felt in the late Meiji period. More western-style houses began to 
appear in the Taisho period, but were unsuitable to Japanese sensibilities as they 
failed to meet many spatial criteria that were perceived as necessary for household 
relations and psychological well-being. The ‘eclectic-style house’ (wayo setchu) 
eventually emerged which incorporated both western and Japanese elements and 
facilitated many of the ideals of Katei. Male and female space, as well as family 
and guest spaces, became more differentiated. Tatami (traditional fi xed matting) 
space became associated with a place of purifi cation and segregation of the family 
from society and, most importantly, family activities became the normative focus 
of house design (Sand, 1998). The separation of work from leisure in the home 
began to be realized in house design, which increasingly enhanced the relaxation 
qualities of the home. Household management and the housewife’s role were 
also raised on the architectural agenda and became manifest in more scientifi c 
approaches to the organization of domestic space.
In 1915 the Kokumin Shinbun (People’s Newspaper) sponsored the fi rst home 
exhibition in Tokyo and published a number of essays on the ‘ideal home’ (Riso no 
katei). The model houses featured encapsulated the principles of family-orientated 
design and modern domestic management. The exhibition signifi ed the advent 
of an era in which images of the dwelling and domestic improvements became 
market commodities and exhibitions at which the houses were actually sold 
followed years later (Sand, 1998: 206–7). Identifi ed with the social characteristics 
of a new urban middle class, the house became a node between social reform and 
the emerging consumer culture.
In the period after the Second World War western building design and 
materials would be increasingly incorporated and mixed with traditional elements 
of Japanese housing (see Hein et al., 2003). What was important in this earlier 
period was that houses became normalized as consumable objects that signifi ed 
social status, and, moreover, incorporated ostensibly contradictory elements of 
westernization, modernization and Japanese tradition and continuity. In common 
with western societies were aspirational models of dwelling and dwellings, and 
a domestic set of relationships identifi ed with lifestyles and values of the middle 
class. This is not to say that the majority of Japanese at this time were middle class. 
The origin of the Japanese urban workforce had been rural and their experience as 
tenant farmers and then urban labourers was dominated by hardship. Civil society 
and individuals in this period tended to be politically docile, which inevitably 
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contributed to the lack of concern with urban planning and housing standards. 
In short, the nature of Japan’s brand of capitalism was radical and the citizenry 
passive, which contributed to the creation of poor housing and environmental 
conditions (Yamada, 1999; Sorensen, 2002).
This is a very different set of social relations compared to western social 
contexts at this time where the inadequacy of working-class housing conditions 
had led to pressure on governments to rethink housing approaches. In Britain 
poor housing conditions were associated with social unrest and class tensions, and 
pressure was put on the state to provide better housing and urban environments 
in order to resist bolshevism (Merrett, 1982). Following the return of soldiers 
from the First World War the public cry was for ‘homes fi t for heroes’ to live in. 
In Japan, alternatively, rapid social and urban change was achieved along with 
traditional values of harmony, communality and state authority. This facilitated 
the state’s ability to steer society towards economic growth and militarization 
despite poor urban conditions and considerable sacrifi ce and hardship on the side 
of workers.
The pre-war period redefi ned and reoriented Japanese society and housing took 
a lead role in both social discourse and the restructuring of living. Consumption 
and identifi cation with middle-class mainstream identities would become more 
critical after the Second World War, as would the signifi cance of owner-occupied 
housing. Critically, the ideal of early modern middle-class housing was rented 
rather than owned, and early modernizers set out the need for more ‘convenient 
and complete’ rental houses in order for progressive young couples to live apart 
from their conservative parents (Sand, 1998). Owner-occupied housing would 
become defi nitive in patterns of post-war urban development, while the new ideal 
of the family home would be modifi ed to fuel housing purchase and mass middle-
class formation.
Post-war housing: transformations in identity and space
Defeat in the Second World War caused a radical reorientation of society. Surrender 
brought about a crisis in identity and direction, and traditional nationalist ideals were 
fundamentally undermined. Modernization was considered vital to the rebuilding 
of Japan, and even more pressure was put on the singular goal of catching up with 
the West through tireless economic endeavour. By the 1950s Japan’s new leaders 
were reorienting Japanese values around a set of goals within which economic 
rebuilding would ensure Japan’s position amongst the ‘advanced’ nations of the 
world. At the same time the traditional values of the Japanese would be drawn 
upon in this rebuilding to ensure the reassertion of the society and culture.
Housing in particular became a critical element by which modernization 
could be achieved, and its role in driving economic expansion and constituting 
an aspirational residential lifestyle became central to economic and social policy. 
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The ideology of modernity manifested itself in the transformation of the physical 
landscape. House-building techniques, the development of the construction 
industry and changes in the physical forms of residential units and urban 
environments encapsulated and mediated the set of social values that dominated 
the post-war period. Social modernization could also be achieved through 
restructuring the urban and residential system in order to engineer a ‘social 
mainstream’ (see Hirayama, in this volume), which was driven by new ideological 
values that asserted the signifi cance of Japanese unity and social harmony in terms 
of middle-class identity, family self-reliance and economic productivity rather 
than hierarchy, obedience and national military strength.
The expansion of home ownership and the normalization of social mainstream, 
middle-class identities characterize this period and I will address, in the following 
section, the signifi cance of social identifi cation and social class processes in 
the relationship between housing and society. I also address the signifi cance of 
physical changes to homes and urban environments. The post-war period of rapid 
economic expansion saw Japan go from military defeat, with decimated cities and 
considerably diminished industrial capacity, to the world’s second largest economy 
within 23 years. Social and environment changes were even more dramatic than 
in the previous period, but the housing system and housing consumption, which 
would be unrecognizable to Meiji and Taisho reformers, maintained traditional 
identifi cations and authoritarian power relations.
Economic growth, home ownership and the social 
mainstream
The American post-war occupation initially set out to transform Japanese 
society in terms of ‘revolution from above’ (Dower, 1999). The process involved 
dismantling several giant conglomerates (zaibatsu) and instigating rural land 
reform by breaking up large landholdings, which were considered undemocratic 
forces. The democratizing process also called for the renunciation of ie ideology, 
and the concept of ie was removed from the new constitution of 1948 and the 
new civil code of 1947. New laws stressed individual rights and equality amongst 
family members (including greater equality between male and female members 
in principle), leaving the succession of head of household with little functional 
meaning except ritual duties. Although ie was dissolved legally it continued to 
be an organizational principle and a point of social and cultural identifi cation 
for modern families, although further abstracted from its traditional form. In part 
the result was the expansion of nuclear households, although intergenerational 
living and welfare exchanges persisted. Post-occupation governments rhetorically 
supported the process of democratization. Nevertheless, many characteristics of 
pre-war governance and urban planning continued, including the focus of state 
resources on economic development, the weak relationship between state policy 
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and civil society, the dominance of central government, unregulated corporate 
activity, and principles of self-reliance for households and neighbourhoods (see 
Sorensen, 2002; Hein et al., 2003).
Economic growth largely became an end in itself, and most resources 
were mobilized into the service of expansion while the private sector was 
given substantial freedom. While overall wealth increased substantially the 
environmental and personal costs were high. Nagamine identifi es that one of the 
major factors in accounting for the prosperity of the Japanese economy is that the 
people have opted to tolerate, rightly or wrongly, a meagre resource allocation 
for their living conditions, thereby leaving the maximum amount of resources for 
industrial development (1986: 52).
While post-war housing policy was essentially considered economic policy 
and sought to support industrial growth, it also sought to quicken the formation 
of a ‘social mainstream’. Critically, priority was given in housing subsidy to the 
expansion of the middle classes, perceived as the most self-reliant and economic-
ally productive group (Hirayama, in this volume). Thus working households 
who were best able to secure their own private accommodation were given more 
support. Owner-occupation orientated policy was thought to encourage self-help 
and the greater reliance of households on social networks rather than the state. 
This strategy was considered most likely to enhance economic development and 
stability and therefore linked economic and social objectives in state policy and 
ideology.
Signifi cantly, the intention of creating a core mainstream, owner-occupier and 
self-reliant social class to support the needs of mass economic expansion also 
strongly refl ected Japan’s approach to modernization. The concept of a social 
mainstream encapsulated traditional ideologies of social homogeneity with new 
ideologies concerning modern consumption orientated society. Moreover, home 
ownership was central to these ideologies as it refl ected both the principles of 
family based self-reliance and a unifi ed middle class. Economic fi ltering or 
‘trickle down’ was conceived to rationalize the situation of prioritizing home 
ownership and middle-class housing. This is not to say that poorer households 
were not provided for, but support for the people who were thought to form the 
core of society was given preference (Hirayama, 2003b).
Owner-occupation became defi nitive in what has been described as the ‘Japanese 
dream’, and growth of this tenure was increasingly normalized (Hirayama, 2003a, 
2003b). By the late 1950s the rate of owner-occupation had reached more than 
60 per cent, from pre-war levels of less than 30 per cent urban home ownership 
(see Hayakawa, 1990). The drive toward home ownership was increasingly 
justifi ed as a reliable and universal means for families to improve their housing 
conditions and accumulate capital. What emerged was a housing ladder system 
that had a strong hegemonic impact in defi ning social inclusion and normalized 
lifestyles, with owner-occupation representing a social ideal that reifi ed the social 
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mainstream and reinforced values associated with an ideology of middle-class 
stability. This ladder system defi ned the life-course in the social mainstream and 
dictated aspirations. Critically, ownership of a house came to signify a particular 
social status and inclusion in mainstream society while increasing household assets 
and the transformation of citizens into owner-occupiers refl ected the modernist 
ideology of Japan as an advanced social and economic power.
In the environment of early post-war Japan social and economic conditions 
made owner-occupation attainable and realistic for large segments of the 
population, even if workers could not afford a home immediately. In the 1950s 
and 1960s owner-occupied housing was more affordable and government housing 
loans provided access to necessary funds for middle-income workers (Yamada, 
1999). The economy expanded considerably and wages grew. Most working 
people were salaried monthly and Japan’s employment system assured a worker’s 
lifetime employment, which contributed to stabilizing income. By contrast, the 
growth in the levels of, and preference for, owner-occupation in western societies 
grew erratically and occurred over a longer period. In Britain, for example, it was 
not until the 1980s and the introduction of comprehensive subsidies that home 
ownership really took off. In earlier decades home ownership was not a realistic 
alternative to renting for the working classes who thereby remained ‘trapped’ in 
the rental sector. Post-war housing policy was initially dominated by welfarism 
and the building of mass public rental housing.
The transformation to an owner-occupied system was signifi cant socially 
and ideologically. It redefi ned modern Japanese lifestyles and aspirations and 
reorganized households around a model emphasized by the state and corporate 
interests. Owner-occupation not only constituted an accumulation of assets and 
provided security for current generations, it also ensured some security for future 
generations who would inherit it, involving a build up of wealth across generations 
(Hirayama and Hayakawa, 1995). It thus became integrated into the developing 
ideal of ie as it reinforced the signifi cance of the house, family heritage and 
continuity through the generations via inheritance. Land price infl ation also helped 
fuel the ‘land myth’ and the ‘fetishization of space’ where land was considered 
precious and had a special, essentialized status and was thought to increase in 
value in perpetuity (Mizuoka, 2004).
Those who bought up land in the early post-war years were able to build assets 
that increased tremendously, which emphasized the signifi cance of family land 
ownership and inheritance. The oil crisis in 1973 temporarily interrupted the 
pattern of land price increases which challenged the security of family housing 
assets. The government responded with a series of measures (see Hirayama, in 
this volume), which reinforced home ownership consumption and the cycle of 
price appreciation contributing to the formation of the economic bubble.
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Housing, modernization and the built environment
The form of the built unit of the home and urban space experienced more radical 
change in the post-war environment as a result of the interaction of tradition and 
social and economic modernization. For Hein, while planners and technocrats 
exhibited considerable continuity in approaches to the built environment, 
which refl ected the continuation of existing authoritarian and centralized power 
structures, architects believed their role was to translate the new condition of 
society into a tangible form (Hein et al., 2003: 243). The Second World War 
signifi cantly diminished stock, and subsequent policy was initially concerned 
with re-establishing an adequate number of housing units. An intensive rebuilding 
programme meant that by 1968 the total number of housing units exceeded that 
of total households. The central purpose of fi ve-year housing policy strategies 
was to improve housing conditions and enhance economic expansion, but they 
also refl ected concern in Japanese society with modernizing the residential 
landscape and facilitating self-contained housing commodities for consumption 
by the type of social mainstream, middle-class families envisioned by post-war 
governments.
The form of Japanese dwellings was transformed between the 1950s and 1970s 
with a move away from traditional wooden housing dominated by multi-purpose 
tatami mat rooms, to more modern and westernized forms. One of the ways by 
which policy-makers and developers tried to make modern housing popular was 
the large-scale production of danchi housing. Danchi are multi-family housing 
estates based on concrete structures made up of apartment blocks. These were 
considered modern housing for modern families. They materially epitomized 
an approach to spatial as well as social change in the drive toward economic 
expansion and modernization. The modernization of family space was epitomized 
by the introduction of the ‘n-DK’ model of housing layout (see Hinokidani, in this 
volume), which redefi ned space in the home in more rational terms and marked a 
new stage in the commodifi cation of dwelling units.
These modern homes were built with dining-kitchens, where householders sit 
on chairs to eat, and separate bedrooms, where individual privacy was secured. 
Intergenerational co-sleeping, although traditionally valued, was increasingly 
perceived as uncivilized and antithetical to ‘advanced’ dwelling arrangements 
in the modernized West. Privacy was a new concept in twentieth-century Japan 
and had remained a rather esoteric concept throughout the pre-war decades. 
Privacy epitomized the new values Japan was being infl uenced by from the West 
and it represented a challenge to aspects of pre-war ideology that had enshrined 
the patriarchal family as the central unit of society. While it did not refl ect an 
individualistic ethos directly, enhanced individual privacy did represent greater 
democracy in the household and a breakdown in the uniquely Japanese organization 
of space envisioned by Watsuji. Essentially, new forms of living spaces replaced 
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traditional paternal hierarchies of space within the home, with private and social 
space that family members could enjoy more equally. Waswo (2002) suggests that 
housing reformers possessed both a scientifi c and social agenda. They sought to 
change the physical environment of dwellings in order to promote public health 
and infl uence household behaviour, following the principle of modernization of 
living spaces.
Innovation in the housing sector drove a resurgent construction sector that 
became a dominant force in the economy. Danchi living promoted the dining-
kitchen style of family space which stood out from traditional arrangements and 
reifi ed more comprehensively the family image of katei reformers. Moreover, 
modern danchi living combined with the growing demand for new electrical 
goods and labour-saving devices that were more suited to modern residential units 
and lifestyles. The economic impact thus moved beyond the construction industry 
and into other sectors that contributed to economic expansion.
Waswo (2002) asserts that a particular type of family with a particularly 
middle-class make up became associated with danchi. By the end of the 1950s 
the concept of danchi-zoku (danchi tribe) had been attached to these families and 
lifestyles and for several years they became preponderant in housing aspirations 
and linked to the image of a middle-class mainstream lifestyle. The symbolic effect 
of representing modernity and modern lifestyles via the built form of the home 
can be considered a signifi cant development in re-signifying the family home 
and commodifying the built form which was necessary in expanding the home 
ownership system. Redesigning, restructuring and reconceptualizing Japanese 
homes arguably marked a process of transformation of housing from dwelling to 
lifestyle consumption.
While bank loans became more available for the purchase of a broader range 
of housing, the government also began to relax loan conditions on condominium 
and second-hand housing purchases. Although danchi were not initially built 
for sale they were, with the expansion of the tenure, progressively sold off as 
condominium units. The built environment and images of owner-occupied housing 
subsequently diversifi ed and condominium consumption became more central to 
the mainstream housing ladder.
Building techniques were also advancing in the production of single detached 
family housing. Traditional wooden housing units were increasingly demolished to 
make way for newer units which refl ected more international styles in architecture 
and the use of concrete and prefabricated production techniques. ‘Scrap and build’ 
practices (see Oizumi, in this volume), which originated in traditional wooden 
housing construction, were integrated by construction companies into modern 
concrete housing construction. The concepts of ie, middle-class lifestyle, home 
ownership and the image of modern housing had, arguably, at this point merged, 
and the government focused on sustaining the economic mechanisms necessary 
for maintaining the home ownership dream.
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We can consider the fi rst few decades after the Second World War as a crucial 
phase in the physical transformation of housing in Japan. Not only was the urban 
landscape and the character of the physical dwelling transformed, so too was what 
it represented and how households perceived this space. Housing thus has been a 
sphere within which post-war hegemony has been recreated and reasserted. In just 
a few decades Japan went from a private rental based system, with predominantly 
traditional wooden stock to a society of housing consumers with a modern housing 
stock where private ownership is considered natural. A relationship can arguably 
be discerned between the development of a post-war hegemony, the ideological 
infl uence of socio-economic expansion and modernization, and the development 
of the built environment and residential system. At the same time, while modern 
lifestyles of Japanese families have been emphasized, traditions of ie and 
Confucianism too have been emphasized by the state in housing practices as a 
means to provide a self-supporting family welfare system, to resist individualism 
and retain a collectivist ethos without recourse to universal welfare rights. The 
idea of ie as a centred family space became more important to the maintenance 
of social stability and a sense of continuity, which in turn reinforced state power 
and legitimacy. Although modernism and Japanese tradition ostensibly appear 
contradictory, they have clearly been integrated by the principle and practice 
of housing and home ownership. This integration, however, is fundamentally 
mythical and symbolic.
Within the house itself traditional and modern elements have been reinvented 
and posed against each other. For Daniels the incorporation of tatami rooms 
into modern houses particularly refl ects the juxtaposition of Japanese tradition 
and modernization. While the house is in reality a modern consumer object, the 
ideology of the Japanese home and harmonious family is perpetuated by touches 
of domestic tradition. ‘The notion of a tatami room as a place for nostalgic 
refl ection fi ts with the strict division of work and home idealized in contemporary 
Japan’ (2001: 216). For Moeran and Skov (1997) there are ‘overlapping rhythms’ 
of consumption in Japan, the quicker one indicating fast-changing fashion items 
and the slower one a ‘consumption of tradition’. For Daniels, the Japanese house 
plays between both consumption forms and embodies both ideals through its mix 
of modern and traditional elements. One is about traditional identity, family and 
values, the other about a projected modern Japan.
Ideas of East and West, of tradition and modernity, are central in Japan’s 
development of housing forms and living styles. While ideas of the nuclear family 
and the consumption of ostensibly westernized housing objects have developed, 
they have done so in the context of Japanese ideals of the harmonious family, social 
collectivism and elements of traditional housing and living. As such, housing has 
been central to social ideologies that integrate social changes into continuity.
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Housing, identity and society
The concepts of hierarchy and role are more clearly defi ned and prioritized 
in Japanese socialization processes and social relationships, and have been 
fundamental in shaping post-war housing and social-class relations. In forming 
a framework for understanding the context of changes in housing and Japanese 
society it is necessary to consider in more depth the nature of both social identities 
and social class relations which structure dwelling (in a society of mass owner-
occupation), as consumption of identity and status. I go on to address in the 
fi nal section the impact of the post-bubble economy, which has undermined the 
housing system and consequently the basis of identity, consumption and social 
hegemony.
How housing is used to express identity varies across cultures, but is a crucial 
to modern homeowner dominated societies as it is a central means by which 
middle-class social identities are communicated. All forms of identity depend 
on setting up contrast with those who are different, and these differences both 
separate and distinguish social units and also lead to various forms of interaction 
and communication (Rapoport, 1981: 12). In the case of housing, Rapoport 
differentiates the process of communicating identity internally, to members of 
one’s own group or oneself, and externally to others and outsiders. In Japan, as 
I identifi ed earlier, individuals are socialized in terms of uchi and soto group 
identities and thus signifi ers which identify affi liation with the inside group norm 
have particular salience. Uchi originates from the word used for one’s own home 
and, in the socialization process, binds the self and group identity together. As 
children get older the concept of uchi is applied to broader groups including 
neighbourhood community, classmates, etc. (Hendry, 1992). Essentially, 
relationships between the individual and the outside world are broken down into a 
hierarchy of concentric rings of affi liation. The house or home as a location, social 
space and metaphor is thus central in defi ning social relationships and identities.
Identities in Japan have been largely defi ned in the post-war period in terms of 
normalized forms of middle-class lifestyle fi tting with the prevailing hegemony 
of homogeneity. As individual identities are more strongly incorporated into 
collective ones, and homogeneous social identities, consensus and uchi/soto 
relationships are emphasized, communication of in-group identities become more 
signifi cant. Owner-occupation therefore, when considered as the embodiment of 
modern homogenized Japanese ‘mainstream middle-class’ identities, has arguably 
been critical in social identifi cation and social inclusion. The relationship between 
housing, owner-occupier status and the self thus come to the fore in the post-war 
context within the specifi c terms of Japanese social relations. For Hirayama, those 
who owned their own homes could claim that they were part of society by owning 
housing. A house not only existed in a material sense, but also represented the 
social status and attitude of its owner. Home ownership represented a symbol of 
‘inside’ – belonging to mainstream society (Hirayama, 2003a, 2003b).
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Clammer (1995) argues that identity and the individual in Japanese society 
cannot be understood in the same terms of the ‘self’ which have dominated 
western social theory (e.g. Giddens, 1991). Uchi and ie are more important to 
the self in this pattern of modernity. In a universe consisting of relationships, the 
focal point is the ie, as the ever contextualized uchi. The Japanese self does not 
relate to the Japanese other as I to You, as one individual to another individual, 
but as a member of one group to a member of another group. Society is thus not 
opposed to the self but an extension of it, with uchi and ie as the centre of social 
identifi cation processes.
The house is normally associated with signifi ers of household or individual 
status, and thus represents a social or status order refl ecting social values and norms 
to which people allocate themselves and others (Williams, 1990). This is especially 
true in modern Japanese society where there has been a long debate concerning 
the nature of social stratifi cation and class (Hashimoto, 2002). Traditionally a 
view of the Japanese as an amorphous, culturally homogenized group is a central 
characteristic of social, political and cultural discourses within and without Japan 
(Goodman and Refsing, 1992). The dominant perception is that Japan is classless 
or, at the very least, characterized by ‘new middle mass’ (Murakami, 1984) and 
is therefore not open to analysis on a social-class basis. Fukutake (1989) argues 
this is a consequence of the rise in income and consumption levels since the rapid 
economic growth of the 1950s.
For Clammer, modern Japanese class-consciousness has been primarily 
constructed around processes of consumption, seen as a continuous activity of 
self-construction or relationship maintenance and symbolic competition (1997: 
101). A critical point is that consumption, which dominates individualistic 
possesses in western contexts, does not feed self-identity and a self-gratifying 
ego in the Japanese context, but provides a social nexus of signifi cation where 
relationships between the self and others are defi ned. The self cannot consume 
alone, since consumption is to do with identity and solidarity and must as a 
consequence take place in the context of others (Clammer, 1995: 217). In this 
case class is no longer based on competition but rather solidarity communicated 
by consumption. Skov and Moeran (1995) also argue that, because of the deeply 
rooted ideology of homogeneity identifying Japanese society as a middle-class 
one, consumption differences more effectively structure the system rather than 
social-class fragmentations.
Many individuals consider themselves well off and socially undifferentiated 
from others in society. Indeed, by the 1980s between 80 per cent and 90 per cent 
of Japanese considered themselves middle-class. It has been argued that those 
who have seen themselves as working-class from the viewpoint of possession 
of assets and ‘security of life’ have stood in a subjectively perceptual duality as 
they normally defi ne themselves within the middle stratum in terms of living 
standard (Murakami, 1984). It is arguably these conditions which have led to the 
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predominant perception of Japanese society as a highly cohesive group where the 
massive majority are middle-class. Housing’s social mainstream is thus strongly 
implicated in the defi nition and practice of class or status differentiation and 
central in the ideology of social and cultural homogeneity. Class and status are 
key elements of understanding both the cultural meaning of the home and its 
relationship to broader social hegemony and ideologies.
Home ownership as a signifi er of status has been identifi ed as more important 
in societies where other markers are absent (Adams, 1984). In Japan, however, 
owner-occupier identities are more critical in mediating a particular and complex 
structure of social stratifi cation in which social differences are signifi ed along 
with inclusiveness. The mainstream housing ladder provided the perception of a 
meritocratic and inclusive basis to status differences as one’s situation on it was 
normally defi ned by position in the life-course. The existence of a clear hierarchy 
diffused the confl icts which inequalities generate, while at the same time the 
existence of a mainstream housing path signifi ed inclusion into a middle-class 
identity.
In Ozaki’s comparison (1998), whereas English homeowners explicitly connect 
housing and social status and acknowledge owner-occupation as a mechanism for 
status differentiation, Japanese resist class terms and judgements, despite clear 
distinctions between occupational groups and access to owner-occupied housing. 
She also identifi es the resistance to defi nitions of Japanese society in class terms, 
although there is a clear awareness of differences in class and status as demonstrated 
by the investment of individuals in the task of maintaining or improving status. In 
Japan consequently, relative consumption levels and the subjective judgement of 
what is seen as an improved living standard does not necessarily support the total 
picture of a classless society (Ozaki, 1998: 63). Indeed, interview research with 
homeowners (Ronald, 2004b) uncovered some consensus concerning perceptions 
of home ownership as a necessary step in acquiring social standing, although such 
discourses are normally distanced from social class assertions and largely connect 
owner-occupiers to the kind of status necessary for credit with banks, or status as 
a reliable person in a community. Ozaki concludes that Japanese people do see 
differences within the so-called middle stratum – it is just that they do not want to 
speak about them (1998: 78).
In the Japanese post-war context a structured form of social inequality 
developed, with high-income groups being able to purchase homes and lower 
income groups being forced to rent (Miyake, 1980). Within the owner-occupied 
sector, the quality of estates and housing districts has also varied according to 
occupational and income. Consequently, Ozaki (1998) argues that while the 
debate on class and status has emphasized homogeneity, the structure of the 
housing market has resulted in clear and strong divides between income-groups 
stratifi ed in the occupational hierarchy. The implication is that, despite the cultural 
assertion of homogeneity and middle-classness, which has been mediated by 
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the post-war owner-occupation system, home ownership is one of the clearest 
markers of social differences and entrance into it is fundamental to asserting 
normalized social identities. Little has been done to allot housing resources to 
poorer households and those on low incomes, and public housing has increasingly 
been provided as a sector for the ‘worthy poor’ such as the elderly and those with 
special needs (see Hirayama, in this volume). This is largely down to the focus 
of government housing loan policy on middle-class borrowers and middle-class 
properties rather than more universal subsidization and policies such as ‘right to 
buy’. Arguably, housing classes (see Rex and Moore, 1967; Saunders, 1978) were 
created in Japan, which refl ect and strengthen what would be considered social 
class divisions. This is not to say that housing classes are more signifi cant than 
social classes per se, but that in Japan, where social classes are not so clearly 
defi ned, it has greater impact on social inequalities.
The passiveness of civil society, which has facilitated the economic freedom 
and political authority of the state, can be accounted for by the degree of social 
harmony and consensus-forming activity present in Japanese social class relations. 
However, Sugimoto challenges the stereotype of Japan as a ‘consensus’ society, 
as consensus has a very different meaning in a country where the authoritarian 
basis of social control is so strong. He sees ‘groupism’, the characteristic form 
of Japanese collectivism, as merely an expression of an effective system of social 
control (1986: 67). Pressure to achieve consensus can result in the concealment of 
power relationships within and between groups rather than genuine participation 
in decision-making (Reich, 1983).
Despite collectivist currents, public welfare is rather undeveloped in Japan, 
which is contradictory to the logic of western theoretical understanding which 
has associated mass home ownership with individualistic societies and public 
renting with collectivistic social systems (Kemeny, 1992, 1995). Modern Japanese 
home ownership embodies many traditions of ie as well as the modern ethos of 
economic growth and modernization and thus encapsulates both self-reliance 
and collectivism in terms of social and economic participation. Consequently, 
the Japanese state has been able to support communalistic ideologies without 
being responsible for social conditions directly. Citizenship has been mediated 
through the image of the family as a self-suffi cient property-owning unit rather 
than through the establishment of universal citizenship rights.
Just as the Japanese manifestation of modern collectivism is divergent from 
western understandings, so is the mirror concept of privatism, especially in relation 
to the private realm of the home. Ozaki (2002) emphasizes the differences between 
the occidental concepts of individualism and privatism and the family centred, 
socially interdependent basis of Japanese privatism. She accounts for this in terms 
of the core cultural values of group-based identities in Japan. Home ownership, 
which is tacitly linked with privatism, independence, autonomy, freedom and 
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individualism in western cultures, is thus manifested in more collective terms in 
modern Japanese private tenure relations.
In western societies, variable but notable public welfare systems emerged in 
the post-war period, which has been considered an inevitable development in 
late capitalism related to the maintenance of state legitimacy (Habermas, 1973). 
This is subsequently associated with de-commodifi cation effects in society 
where the availability of public goods erodes market relations and dependency 
on waged employment. Japan, alternatively, developed a social system based on 
very limited social security and welfare spending (see Jones, 1993). Self-reliant 
families who have the security of valuable housing assets have been the basis 
of what Japanese governments have affi rmed as the ‘Japanese Style Welfare 
Society’. Despite attempts to improve welfare provision in the early 1970s under 
the Tanaka administration, by the late 1970s the government asserted the desire 
to build a welfare society based on ‘retaining a traditional Japanese spirit of self-
respect and self-reliance, human relations and the traditional system of mutual 
assistance’ (Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi, speech to the National Diet, Jan. 
1979). Japanese style welfare therefore has relied substantially on the family as a 
provider of security and social security as well as a mediator of care exchanges. 
The traditions of ie have thus been drawn upon by the state which has transformed 
residual responsibilities associated with the traditionally ideology of the family in 
its own favour. The limited role of the state has been maintained by the family, 
seen as responsible for the welfare of its members, with the circulation of housing 
assets central in this process (Izuhara, 2000; Ronald, 2004a).
What is perhaps most peculiar to Japan among the older industrialized societies 
where owner-occupation is the dominant tenure is thus the signifi cance of housing 
in welfare relationships. Economic growth and asset augmentation, necessary 
to support family-based welfare responsibilities, have been signifi cant in the 
maintenance of state legitimacy and authority. As long as the economy appeared 
to expand and the state could come up with the goods in terms of socio-economic 
development, its legitimacy has remained largely unchallenged. The state has 
been let of the hook in terms of social welfare obligations to citizens. However, 
this situation has begun to unravel in the post-bubble environment.
Beyond the bubble: fragmentation and deregulation
In the modern Japanese context, while dwelling has become consumption and 
houses ‘investment properties’, the symbolic and material strength of the family 
within has been reinforced. Status, identity and intergenerational continuity 
associated with housing ensured that elements of traditional meanings of ie 
were integrated into the modern homeowner market. Moreover, asset-based 
family home ownership has facilitated social identifi cation processes that have 
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diminished class confl icts and disguised real inequalities. It has also structured 
these inequalities and reinforced the legitimacy of a state that has provided limited 
and inequitable welfare services. The ideology of the Japanese home is therefore 
central. The modern owner-occupied home has become a container of a unifi ed 
and self-reliant family clearly identifi able within the parameters of homogenized 
social identities. While some elements of ie have been eroded in the post-war 
period, it remains critical to social ideologies and relations.
However, the housing and social system has, in recent years, come under 
tremendous strain. Indeed, the implosion of the economic bubble at the end of 
the 1980s marked the beginning of a new period of social transition dominated 
by economic stagnation and uncertainty. Again, housing has been at the heart 
of social change. At the economic level land and housing markets have been in 
decline since the early 1990s. Indeed, values of housing bought during the height 
of the land price bubble have in many cases halved. The housing ladder, which was 
the basis for family asset accumulation and intergenerational exchanges as well 
as the normative basis for social participation and status differentiation, has been 
fundamentally challenged by socio-economic conditions. Nevertheless, the house 
and home continue to be the battleground of forces of tradition and change.
At the household level, declining fertility rates and societal ageing pose 
challenges to the maintenance of the social balance, and fragmentation and 
diversifi cation of household types have become characteristic, and have eroded 
the primacy of social mainstream identifi cation. The proportion of houses with a 
couple and children living together has decreased from 46.1 per cent in 1970 to 35.4 
per cent in 1995, and the proportion of single households rose from 10.8 per cent 
in 1970 to 23.1 per cent in 1995 (Statistics Bureau, 2001). Indeed, individualized 
living practices and network-based mutual family relations have been emphasized 
in emerging household patterns (see Hinokidani, in this volume). In the broader 
context, growing unemployment and job insecurity, loss of faith in the government 
and institutional authorities, and the erosion of traditional social values have also 
challenged the consistency of Japanese modernity.
At the same time, some elements of the built environment have showed 
renewed vigour. While the overall housing market was in decline, construction of 
new apartments tripled between 1993 and 1999 (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure 
and Transportation, 2003). Tokyo in particular has seen numerous large-scale 
residential developments emerging across central urban zones (see Hirayama, in 
this volume). The state’s response to a decade of economic stagnation was to 
reassert the project of modernization. This time it has adopted the language of 
global competition and urban renaissance policy has been used as a driving force 
for change (see Saito and Thornley, 2003). The type of households the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government is seeking to attract and serve, for example, do not 
fi t the traditional criteria of ie and the social mainstream family. Specifi cally, 
urban renaissance policy related documents have engaged in discourses of 
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individualism for the fi rst time, where housing and urban conditions for people 
capable of competing in the global market are nurtured. The housing needs of the 
professional middle-class individuals are being focused upon in contemporary 
policy, while the needs of lower income families are neglected.
Deregulation and marketization have been the watchwords of twenty-fi rst-
century government. Housing has been a specifi c target. The state’s central role 
in the housing system is being gradually dismantled and even more freedom is 
being given to the private sector. The Urban Development Corporation, which 
has been restructured into the Urban Regeneration Agency, no longer supports 
social rental housing projects and now plays only a limited role in housing 
provision. The Government Housing Loan Corporation is withdrawing from the 
primary market, leaving housing fi nance to the private sector (see Oizumi, in this 
volume). Essentially, the social mainstream family is no longer being supported 
by housing policy and households are expected to become even more self-reliant 
and economically self-suffi cient.
There are numerous effects in housing relations at the household level signifying 
further shifts in the meaning and salience of ie relations and the Japanese home. 
Research has demonstrated a growing cleavage in housing wealth and approaches 
to housing and the family between generations (Ronald, 2004b). Younger 
homeowners have become stoic about the vicissitudes of the property market and 
have developed a more pragmatic approach to the home as a centre of family 
continuity and intergenerational family assets. The assumption, demonstrated in 
interview discourses, is that future generations will have to be more geographically 
mobile and independent, making inheritance of family-owned land problematic. 
There are also fewer expectations of housing or wealth transfers in exchange 
for stronger family connections and reciprocal intergenerational care relations 
(2004b: 228–33). Older homeowners, however, are more attached to traditional 
ideologies concerning the essential nature of home ownership and the importance 
of family continuity and interdependency. Most of this generation were property 
owners during the ‘golden era’ of rapid house price infl ation which may account 
for their commitment. Nevertheless, for most homeowners, young and old, there 
is a strong association of housing with a deeper discourse on the signifi cance 
of owning land and property in Japan which is often connected to culture and 
tradition (Ronald, 2004b).
In comparative context the discourses expressed in the above research are 
congruent with discourses on housing in Anglo-Saxon societies where home 
ownership has been normalized as the majority tenure (Gurney, 1999). In these 
societies too owner-occupation has been integrated with essentialist discourses on 
natural predispositions and cultural tradition. What is unusual about the Japanese 
case is the pattern of reciprocal family relations implicit in housing discourses 
which refl ect ie tradition in terms of a level of assumed continuity. That is not to 
say the family is not central in western housing discourses, but that in Japan the 
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family and home, as a nodal point of relations between the self and society within 
the traditional Japanese social nexus, is pre-eminent. The practice and ideology 
of Japanese housing and dwelling, however, is showing signs of fragmentation in 
the current phase of social and economic transition, as demonstrated by cohort 
dissonance. The character of modernity in contemporary social change is arguably 
placing more pressure on traditional elements of ie relations and ideologies, 
which have historically held together social hegemony and a sense of harmony 
and communality in Japanese social relations.
Daniels (2001) illustrates that contemporary families are far more fragmented 
than the ideals of ie and katei have asserted. Individuals within the household 
follow very separate lifestyles, largely differentiated by age and gender. As in 
individualist societies, the house as a ‘collective good’ for the family is diminished 
as technology has facilitated the fragmentation of the home (Douglas, 1991), as 
well as by spatial segregation facilitated by modern housing designs. Although 
much is made of family interaction and harmony in relation to relationships 
outside the household, the lives of household members are strongly differentiated. 
The synthesis of katei with ie in pre-war Japan formalized an ideal of family 
life and family unity, and Daniels suggests the idea of social harmony based on 
gendered, framed identities continues to be cherished. However, in practice social 
relationships in the home, as in wider society, are experiential and dynamic rather 
than static (Daniels, 2001: 225).
Conclusions
This chapter set out to demonstrate how housing and family dwelling has been 
a key point of interaction between tradition and social change in modern Japan. 
Indeed, Japanese culture has historically emphasized the house and home as a core 
of collective sociability, harmony and order, although it has also been critical to 
the structure of power and the maintenance of hierarchal relations. Contemporary 
international housing research has begun to engage with a greater level of social 
diversity concerning housing systems and to deal more concertedly with the 
interaction of social practices, identifi cation processes and the communication 
of meanings in housing and the public and private sphere (Forrest and Lee, 2003; 
Clapham, 2005).
Japan has demonstrated one of the most radical forms of modernization and the 
family and built environment have been at the heart of transformation processes. 
At the same time, the focus in Japanese social life on the house and family in 
relation to the orientation of subjectivities, tradition and continuity have meant 
that it has been a fundamental arena for the dialectic interaction of the forces 
of conservatism and change, authoritarianism and democracy, tradition and 
modernity. Despite radical changes in the family, the organization of dwelling 
and housing units, the ideal and ideology of the house and home have mediated 
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a sense of continuity and stability in social relations during radical periods. 
While contemporary urban environments and Japanese houses resemble nothing 
traditionally Japanese, they are the modern incarnations of ie and the embodiment 
of Japanese life and cultural heritage. Indeed the house and family have been both 
containers of cultural integrity and engines of modernization.
This chapter has emphasized the unusual elements of Japanese homes 
and housing context as a way of establishing a framework for socio-cultural 
understanding. The pattern of modernity in Japan has many unique social elements 
and it is diffi cult to fi t Japan into western housing models. However, many of the 
Tiger economies of East Asia have aped the policy structure and approach of the 
Japanese state to housing, families and household-based welfare. Indeed, while 
there has been an overemphasis in analyses of Japan on asserting uniqueness and 
incomparability, we should consider Japanese housing normatively. As in many 
western societies, Japan has experienced during modernization the embedding 
of home ownership and a normalized, consumption orientated, housing ladder 
in discourses and social practices. Housing policy has also been important in 
welfare relations and economic growth, and has been a basis for social stability 
and political legitimacy of the state, as it has in other industrialized societies. 
Housing in Japan has not legitimized the state through the ideology of ‘property 
owning democracy’, however, as is evident in western homeowner societies, but 
in terms of a less familiar model of family based housing consumption and asset 
augmentation (see Ronald and Hirayama, in this volume).
Japan demonstrates a rather extreme form of housing commodifi cation with 
consumption central to social relations and identifi cation processes that are 
shaped by culturally embedded features. This process started in the pre-war era, 
where the shape of the family was renegotiated and housing began to represent a 
commodity. In the initial post-war era housing became central in defi ning a new set 
of socio-cultural values, where middle-class and social mainstream identifi cation 
were critical to social harmony. This also manifested itself physically in the form 
of homes and houses and the construction of towns, cities and communities. In 
the post-bubble environment, however, economic neo-liberalization and other 
forces of change are fragmenting households and undermining the homogeneity 
of families, lifestyles and aspirations which have been integral to the process of 
modernization. Whether or not the concept of ie and the ideologies attached to 
home ownership consumption can stand up to new pressures is now in question.
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9 Situating the Japanese 
housing system
Richard Ronald and Yosuke Hirayama
Introduction
This book has explored key aspects of the housing system in Japan, identifying 
how they are deeply embedded socially and economically, and, moreover, bound 
up reciprocally with patterns and processes of social change in Japan’s post-
war era. While each chapter has focused on diverse policy elements, economic 
developments, social structures, family relations and household meanings and 
practices, a number of characteristics have consistently re-emerged in consideration 
of Japan’s specifi c housing system pathway and social history. The tendency for 
family homes, property assets and housing policy to be increasingly central in 
the nature of social, political and economic transformations is strongly evident, 
especially in Japan’s post-bubble environment. In this fi nal chapter we begin by 
considering more explicitly the unifying forces and traits identifi ed, which link 
the chapters of the book, in order to initiate some informed speculations on the 
role of housing and the nature of socio-economic transformations.
In the second part of the chapter we address the comparative importance of 
housing and the manifestation of forces for convergence and divergence between 
societies in an increasingly neo-liberalized global context. We consider the broader 
picture in terms of how the Japanese system may be interacting with forces of 
globalization, which may lead to greater differentiation between Japan’s social 
structure and housing system, and other societies. We also attempt to identify, 
or situate, Japanese society and its housing system within the frameworks and 
models established in the western literature. Japan’s housing, economic and social 
systems stand out somewhat against the normative background formed from 
studies of housing and societies in western contexts, and our analysis illustrates 
how housing practices and policies infl uence, and are infl uenced by, broader 
transformations. We assert the relative salience of a Tiger, or East Asian, housing 
system model by identifying convergent systems aspects across the region. The 
main convergent element in a globalized context seems to be greater individual 
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risk and enhanced household vulnerability to global economic fl uctuations, and 
the main divergent element is how each society reacts.
Transitions in the Japanese housing system
It is useful to begin by summarizing the main elements in the development of 
the Japanese housing system. In the immediate post-war period the Japanese 
housing system was developed in order to cope with a serious housing shortage, 
particularly in the war-devastated cities. People were living in poor and miserable 
conditions and were in desperate need of shelter. In addition, the tremendous 
speed of urbanization as well as the rapid increase in the number of households 
put stress on the demand for dwellings. In response to the crisis situation caused 
by housing shortage, the government systematized housing policy measures in the 
1950s in order to promote the mass production of dwellings and housing related 
industries began to develop in the 1960s. Associated with vigorous economic 
development, housing construction expanded at a striking pace and consequently 
the quantitative housing problem was largely mitigated by the 1980s. Although 
the qualitative aspects of housing problems such as overcrowding and lack of 
basic amenities have been highlighted since the 1970s, the provision of quality 
housing has steadily increased, which encouraged a decrease in the ratio of 
substandard housing to less than 10 per cent by the 1990s. Taking the extremely 
poor conditions of housing immediately after the war into consideration, it is 
reasonable to presume that the post-war housing system has operated relatively 
successfully in terms of providing people with respectable dwellings.
The role of housing in post-war Japan’s development cannot and should not 
be addressed only within the context of housing provision itself. The housing 
system, which has particularly focused on the mass construction of housing and 
the promotion of middle-class home ownership, has been deeply embedded in 
the formation of post-war social and economic orders. High-speed economic 
development nurtured the middle classes and in turn the increased acquisition of 
owner-occupied housing further accelerated economic growth. It was assumed 
that the majority of people could lead a standardized life-course by climbing 
up socio-economic and housing ladders to become a homeowner, and that the 
promotion of home ownership had a stabilizing effect on social organization. As 
the prices of land and housing rose dramatically, owning a house meant that the 
owners could realize considerable capital gains. The post-war housing system was 
thus characterized by the interconnection of: high-speed economic development; 
large-scale housing construction; the expansion of middle-class home ownership; 
the accumulation of capital gain based housing assets; and social stability centring 
around property-owning middle-class families.
The government operated housing policy measures to allot the largest part of 
public funds to families with middle incomes and to encourage them to purchase 
Situating the Japanese housing system
195
or build their own housing. It was apparent that the priority was the formation of a 
social mainstream by means of middle-class home ownership promotion, with the 
intention of supporting economic development and social cohesion (Hirayama, 
2003). Of housing policy measures, the expansion of low-interest mortgages by 
the Government Housing Loan Corporation was emphasized in particular, while 
the direct provision of public rental housing was marginalized. In post-war Japan, 
where the government put explicit priority on economic prosperity, the concept 
of universal social rights to housing was never adopted, as was refl ected in the 
nature of low-income housing policy. The promotion of home ownership was also 
assumed to play a part in forming political stability. The conservative government 
led by the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) facilitated the mass construction of 
owner-occupied housing in order to obtain political support from the construction, 
housing and real estate industries, and regarded the promotion of middle-class 
home ownership as an effective means of maintaining the property ownership 
based social core of political order.
The last decade of the last century, or Japan’s ‘lost decade’, marked the period 
in which Japan’s social, demographic, economic and institutional systems began to 
restructure fundamentally. As the chapters of this volume have demonstrated, over 
the years the reshaping of the housing system has refl ected and accelerated social 
transformations. We should now turn attention to cross-chapter convergence in 
addressing the understanding of the interconnection of housing and social change 
in contemporary Japan. Obviously, there have appeared new ways in which the 
housing system has become embedded in social transformation.
First, the emergence of a more volatile, uncertain economy has inevitably 
impacted on the reorganization of the housing system. Since the bursting of 
the bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s, associated with a long, deep 
recession, the prices of land and housing have dropped sharply for the fi rst time 
since the war. Since the Japanese home ownership system was closely implicated 
with the capital gain based economy, a swell in capital losses of residential property 
eroded the traditional mechanisms of home ownership promotion. Households 
who purchased housing during the bubble period are now suffering negative 
equity and the burden of mortgage repayment for properties that are declining in 
value. As Hirayama’s chapter stressed, Japan as a ‘homeowner society’ has begun 
to experience a new phase where home ownership can no longer promise security 
in terms of asset augmentation, and the conventional housing ladder system is no 
longer necessarily expected to maintain its effectiveness.
Housing and home ownership became increasingly central to the maintenance 
of social stability in the post-war period and the meanings attached to the family 
home were transformed to reinforce patterns of social formation and reinforce 
the sense of stability during periods of rapid social and economic change. The 
relationship between housing, stability and social identifi cation in Japan was 
highlighted in the chapter by Ronald, which illustrated the dynamic role of 
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housing tradition and practices in the Japanese context. Social fragmentation 
and the erosion of economic stability have undermined the sense of security 
and continuity associated with home ownership, which has exacerbated social 
conditions and the viability of housing practices established before the 1990s.
A factor which supported high-speed economic growth was the sustained 
development of the housing and construction industries. Mass demand for 
dwellings was generated continuously by the system of ‘scrap and build’ as well 
as by sustained urbanization and the increasing number of households, which 
formed a relatively non-competitive business environment for the housing related 
industries. Reliance on the construction sector was a key feature for post-war 
governments in pursuing economic growth. As Oizumi demonstrated, however, 
the housing industry is no exception, and has suffered extensively from the post-
bubble recession. Businesses related to housing construction have become unstable 
and are now experiencing a more competitive environment resulting in hardship, 
particularly among small-sized house-building companies. While the ‘scrap and 
build’ system is now severely criticized in terms of environmental sustainability 
and waste related issues, the housing and construction sectors are increasingly 
pressing the government to maintain demand for house building.
Second, the magnitude of demographic change should be highlighted in 
understanding the transitional condition of the Japanese housing system. The 
most important element of transformation, demographically, is the substantial 
and rapid decrease in the total population. It is forecasted by the National Institute 
of Population and Social Security Research that the population for the whole 
nation will drop from 128 million in 2005 to 118 million in 2030, and then to 101 
million in 2050. One implication is that the maintenance of large-scale housing 
construction will become next to impossible due to an unavoidable decline in 
demand for housing. This will inevitably encourage the reorganization of the 
housing industry and the construction based economic development system. 
Moreover, in Japan the speed of social ageing is the highest and the fertility rate 
is one of the lowest in the world. Although the government has launched a series 
of policy measures to encourage the fertility rate to increase, its sustainability 
remains to be seen.
The chapters by Hirayama and Izuhara looked at the role of the baby-boomer 
generation in transforming housing conditions. The trajectory of this cohort 
has been central to the shape of contemporary relations, and drove the socio-
economic development of post-war Japan. Baby-boomer households climbed up 
the housing ladder relatively smoothly, along with high-speed economic growth, 
and essentially triggered the rapid rise in house prices of the bubble era. This large 
cohort is now approaching their old age and it is presumed they will instigate new 
trends in society and the housing system in the near future. Izuhara gave a detailed 
examination of a new policy concern in the ‘ageing society’, that is, the turning 
of housing stock into cash fl ow. Many households belonging to the baby-boomer 
Situating the Japanese housing system
197
generation own their own housing and have considerably valuable property assets. 
Within the context of social ageing and augmented housing wealth, as well as a 
more volatile economy, the government has begun to examine the implementation 
of new policy measures by which the conversion of housing stock into cash fl ow 
is expected to stimulate the economy and restructure the economic conditions 
of ‘asset-rich, cash-poor’ older people. According to the analysis, however, it is 
likely that the idea of asset-based social policy will not necessarily produce the 
expected consequences.
Third, the structure of social inequality relating to housing has been reshaped 
since the beginning of the ‘lost decade’. The post-war housing system, which 
was explicitly biased towards the promotion of home ownership, particularly 
for middle-class households, generated a large disparity between those with low 
incomes and those with higher incomes, between singles and family households, 
and between renters and homeowners. However, as long as the economy developed 
and households climbed up the socio-economic and housing ladders, the ‘feeling 
of middle-classness’ encompassed the broader part of society, and low-income, 
young renters, who had prospects of becoming middle-class homeowners, tended 
to regard themselves as members of the middle class. In this context, the home 
ownership oriented housing system effectively manipulated social inequalities 
(see Hirayama’s chapter). Over the last decade, the diversifi cation of household 
formation and the prolonged recession have made it increasingly diffi cult to conceal 
social inequalities. An emerging new structure of inequalities is characterized by 
complexity and instability, with various determinants including employment and 
income stability, household type, the timing of house purchase and the balance of 
asset and debt.
Hinokidani’s chapter explored the role of family changes and gender as an 
increasingly important parameter in the formation of housing inequalities. While 
the post-war housing system was organized around the ‘standard family’ or ‘male 
bread winner’ model, there has been a tendency for single women and lone mother 
households to increase. Female-headed households outside of the ‘standard family’ 
model have been placed at a disadvantage in both the housing and labour markets. 
Since the middle of the ‘lost decade’, the numbers of homeless people have 
increased at the very bottom of society, representing profound transformations 
in the socio-economic structures of contemporary Japan. ‘Social exclusion’ is 
a relatively new concept in Japan, and policies have yet to thoroughly explore 
or address socio-economic restructuring. As Iwata’s chapter demonstrated, with 
theoretical and evidence-based analysis, homelessness should not be understood as 
a mere extremity of traditional poverty within the framework of social inequality, 
but is a particular form of social exclusion.
Fourth, the government has geared its housing policy towards expanding the 
role of the deregulated market in providing and fi nancing housing, which has 
accelerated the fundamental restructuring of the housing system (see chapters 
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by Hirayama, Oizumi and Sato). The most signifi cant change in terms of the 
organization of the government’s housing policy is the projected abolition of 
Government Housing Loan Corporation that has been the very central pillar of 
the home ownership oriented housing system. As regards to low-income housing 
policy, public rental housing provision will undoubtedly be further residualized. 
The legal system of tenant protection has also been deregulated, which has 
inevitably led to less secure tenure for tenants, particularly among low-income 
groups (see Sato’s chapter). Since the bursting of the bubble, the fi nancial 
deterioration of the government sector, which has reached or exceeded crisis 
level, has eroded the fi scal basis of conventional housing policy measures. In the 
context of the stagnant economic situation, as well as the forecasted decline in 
demand for housing, the business world, particularly the housing, construction 
and banking sectors, has strongly pressed the government to retreat from the 
provision of housing and mortgages in order to reduce government competition 
with private businesses. The consequences of the change in the basic direction of 
housing policy can already be seen. As Oizumi’s chapter stressed, the privatizing 
of mortgage supply is likely to undermine access to home ownership, especially 
for households with low fi nancial credibility.
The chapter by Sato highlighted the role of the ‘company society’, where 
the lifelong employment and seniority systems and the provision of a variety of 
employee benefi ts were regarded as the norm, and were key elements in reinforcing 
the housing system. It has been a feature of the Japanese system of housing 
provision that large corporations have provided their employees with company 
housing, rental subsidies and mortgages for house purchases. During the long 
recession in the 1990s, however, an increasing number of corporations began to 
retreat from their in-house housing systems, which paralleled government policies 
aimed at forming a more liberalized housing market.
Indeed, the system of housing provision in Japan has been in a new stage of 
transition since the 1990s. The changes in the housing system have refl ected 
and reinforced the shifts in Japan from an industrialized, Fordist and Keynesian 
country to a post-industrialized, post-Fordist and more liberalized country. The 
post-war traditional system of housing provision has already been broken up 
and the future shape of the housing system is unpredictable. However, it is most 
probable that a more volatile economy and a more greatly differentiated society 
will increasingly interact with a more market oriented housing policy. What is 
certain is that housing will continue to play a signifi cant role as a catalyst for 
socio-economic transformation.
The Japanese system in a globalized world
So far we have considered the nature of transformations in Japan and the salience 
of housing in Japan’s future. How does the case of Japan prove illustrative of more 
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universal processes and relations between housing, society and socio-economic 
development more globally? We now consider, more broadly, some of Japan’s 
social, political and economic features in terms of how they have been facilitating 
a particular shape of social transformation. Specifi cally, we consider the particular 
brand of Japanese capitalism and how the approach of the state has mediated 
globalizing forces, as well as the impact of increasing individual risk brought on 
by social and economic change. In the following section we return to the role of 
housing and how the Japanese system can be located or conceptualized within a 
comparative framework.
In debates on the role and effect of globalization, on one side there have been 
assertions that advanced industrialized societies are becoming more integrated 
economically, and convergent in terms of institutional practices and structural 
processes. Indeed, Japan demonstrates many hallmarks of convergence with 
globalized social and economic trends: increasing deregulation and marketization, 
residualisation of social provision, social fragmentation and the breakdown of 
traditional institutions and values. Within each chapter we have demonstrated 
different aspects of these trends in the housing system. Nevertheless, as we 
shall consider shortly, Japan fi ts poorly with western system models and 
development pathways. Critically, there are a number of reasons to expect that 
while Japan becomes increasingly intertwined with networks of global capital 
and multinational corporate control, local systems and practices will become even 
more differentiated from other industrialized societies.
The Japanese approach to policy, planning and production that stimulated the 
unprecedented speed and level of growth make it stand out amongst industrialized 
nations. The Japanese ‘miracle’ has been explained in terms of political economy 
by many analysts. For Johnson (1982) the Japanese state has played a central 
role in prioritizing economic goals based on a strong consensus with industry. He 
refers to this kind of approach as the ‘developmental state’. Schaede and Grimes 
(2003) refer to ‘economic nationalism’ in describing the mutual coordination 
of policy and markets between government ministries and industrial sectors. 
Henderson and Appelbaum (1992) classify Japan as a ‘plan rational’ country as 
the state sets national goals, intervenes in order to direct the economy as a whole 
and regulates constituent sectors. The pattern of economic and political control 
of internal interests is described by Schaede and Grimes in terms of ‘permeable 
insulation’ in that the response to global and local challenges is neither one of 
retreat or denial, nor one of full acceptance of global standards and practices. It 
‘permits entry and market competition in areas where that is the best approach 
for existing market players, while protecting (or allowing self-protection) in less 
competitive sectors’ (2003: 244).
In the developmental or plan rational state bureaucrats and political leaders are 
compelled to get on and organize growth using whatever methods are to hand. 
Japanese capitalism can thus be characterized as non-liberal as the state plays 
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a key role in managing competition and guiding markets, but where corporate 
concerns trump political ones. Jones (1993) suggests that Japan differs from 
liberal regimes in terms of central direction and the sense of individual rights. It 
is not conservative corporatist or social democratic, following Esping-Andersen’s 
categories (1990), as there is no incorporation of the interests of the working 
classes, and as such it is conservative corporatist without worker participation, 
laissez-faire but not liberal.
Essentially, Japan has resisted global rules for its domestic markets and has 
attempted to manage globalization by controlling both the speed and reach with 
which global rules and markets affect domestic players (Schaede and Grimes, 
2003: p. xi). Since the 1990s the Japanese government has had to respond to 
new economic realities and domestic stagnation, and while there has been 
substantial pressure for deregulation of protectionist policies, there has been a 
concerted attempt by some elements of government to shield Japanese companies 
from global competition and the full vigour of market forces. Critically, while 
policy changes have focused on greater marketization, liberalization has not led 
to convergence with the Anglo-American model of minimally regulated markets. 
The nature of change and reform in Japan, and whether this change follows a neo-
liberal agenda, is diffi cult to untangle.
When considering social change in Japan it is necessary to retain an appreciation 
that capitalism, production and consumption have not been normalized by 
globalizing forces, and thus Japan does not respond to external forces in ways its 
position in the global economy would imply.
The ubiquity of government intervention, of industry associations as drivers of 
sectoral policy, and of corporate governance for the benefi t of the management 
rather than shareholders, mean that Japan’s response to the generic pressures 
of globalization remains distinctive.
(Schaede and Grimes, 2003: 254)
This is not to say Japanese capitalism is unique, or that it contrasts with a single 
type of normal capitalism or modernity. What is important is that the case of Japan 
illustrates diversity in practices of capitalism and processes of modernization 
that are shaping social transformations in the era of intensifi ed globalization and 
network enterprise. The pattern of social modernization illustrates the dichotomy 
between the two forces. On the one side there have been calls for more discipline 
and assertion of traditional values, while on the other there has been a demand for 
reform and institutional change more fi tting with global economic demands. The 
dynamics of these two forces are particularly evident in the government, which has 
been trying to adjust to the post-bubble landscape. The Koizumi administrative era, 
with prime-ministerial confl icts with his own party, epitomized this contradiction 
within Japan’s ruling elite.
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The redistribution of risk from institutions to individuals can also be considered 
a main feature of global convergence. Strong globalization theorists perceive 
individuals as actors in markets whose actions are structurally determined, which 
is consistent with methodological individualism where individuals are considered 
able to objectively assess the level of risk inherent in competing courses of action. 
However, individual risk perspectives are mediated by social norms of what ‘risk’ 
is, and, in Japan, features and perceptions of risk and social inequalities have 
taken on a particular form.
Clammer argues that individualization and the set of subjectivities associated 
with western modernity that are related to the management of risk have not 
developed in Japan (1995). Furthermore, models of ‘risk society’ (Giddens, 
1991; Beck, 1992) exclude sociological responses to risks involving community 
solidarity, networks of cooperation and self-help, and political and economic 
management of such risks by states, companies and institutions, which are, 
while under attack by neo-liberal forces, fundamentally evident in Japan. At the 
same time, while unemployment, exclusion from the housing system and even 
homelessness are increasingly manifest, few mechanisms have been developed 
to deal with the individualization of risk outside traditional social structures, 
company society and family based welfare provision. Essentially, risks are being 
increasingly felt in Japanese society, largely as a result of the long-term recession 
and its knock-on effects on labour and housing markets, but are being negotiated 
within a social framework that strongly resists individuation and risk, and where 
institutional and individual responses to risk are less predictable.
Clearly, indigenous aspects and processes have had a critical effect on how 
globalization has infl uenced Japanese society. Housing and home ownership 
sectors, which structure relationships between macro social and economic factors, 
and micro household relations, are mediated by elements that remain substantially 
localized. Housing can thus be considered a central node between universal and 
local processes of change and consolidation. While growing residualization of 
social housing provision and the growth of home ownership are universal trends 
across advanced industrial economies, these trends are having differentiated 
effects in each context. Indeed, housing has constrained the homogenizing effects 
of globalization. Due to its embeddedness, the housing system is likely to be 
central in facilitating the process of diversifi cation.
Contextualizing the Japanese housing system
We now address, explicitly, how the Japanese housing system can be integrated, or 
not, with established models of housing and society. We draw upon both established 
modes of understanding developed from empirical European and North American 
cases, as well as emerging understandings of convergent patterns and radical 
differences among the group of East Asian societies, or Tiger economies, which 
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have demonstrated many similar approaches to housing, governance, citizenship 
and family asset building to the ‘Big Tiger’ – Japan. Numerous scholars have 
debated ad nauseam about the nature and impact of growing global integration, 
both culturally and economically, in which the Japanese case provides some 
unique insights on the infl uence of housing as an integral part of state, corporate, 
family and individual interests which mediates the infl uence of the global and 
local.
Since the 1960s housing has been increasingly seen as a central element in social 
divisions and the structure of social and economic systems across western societies 
(see Rex and Moore, 1967; Kemeny, 1992). A number of models have been 
asserted, accounting for different tenure patterns across industrialized societies 
as a way of compressing the evidence and providing a more holistic approach 
to understanding relationships between variables in various social conditions. 
However, Japan, as an established industrialized country within an East Asian 
regional nexus and a Shinto–Confucian–Buddhist cultural tradition, has been 
fundamentally problematic to categorize or fi t within established comparative 
housing models.
Some authors have attempted to fi t Japanese housing policies with European 
housing and policy regimes, which neglects key differences in interrelationships 
between housing, employment and welfare, as well as the impact of social class 
alliances, that are fundamental to housing systems and welfare capitalist regimes 
(see Esping-Andersen, 1996; Doling and Ford, 2003). Other approaches have 
drawn comparisons with America as post-war policies were initially set down by 
occupying American forces which attempted to establish a strong hegemonic model 
for economic development and market-driven liberalism. While Japan focused 
on economic expansion, established a strong corporate sector and emphasized 
private property rights, private consumption and home ownership, its brand of 
capitalism and social policy followed an indigenous logic and strayed wildly 
from recognizably western patterns. Essentially, Japan fi ts western typologies, 
categories and assumptions very poorly. The housing system is an exemplary 
case.
In terms of housing, Donnison and Ungerson (1982) distinguish between 
countries with, fi rst, institutional or comprehensive policies, and, secondly, those 
with residual or social ones. In the former governments take responsibility for 
housing its population and housing is seen as a productive sector of the economy. 
In the latter governments only intervene in a residual way to support those whose 
needs are not met by the market. Japan demonstrates aspects of both. In national 
plans the Japanese approach has often been comprehensive, taking an overall 
view of housing needs, especially in the period of housing shortage, and housing 
has been seen as an economically productive sector. However, in terms of access, 
market forces have been central with increasingly residualized public housing 
provision and subsidies directed at stimulating middle-class home purchases.
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Kemeny’s model of housing and society (1992, 1995), which emphasizes the 
role of tenure, also struggles to capture the character of the Japanese housing 
system. He differentiates between individualistic, home ownership dominated 
systems where public rental housing is residualized and effectively a separate 
category from the ‘normal’ housing market (dualist type), and collectivistic, 
rental dominated societies where public and private renting compete and the state 
can maintain substantial control over the housing market (unitary). Critically, 
Japan, which has been dominated by the policy and principles of self-reliant, 
family based owner-occupation, fails to meet the individualistic criterion and 
demonstrates more socially inclusive and collectivistic values. Japanese and 
Confucian values ostensibly contradict the association of housing consumption 
with an individualistic ethos, as it is the self-contained household itself which 
structures social relations and community responsibilities (see Ronald’s chapter). 
At the same time, structures of public provision, associated with more collectivistic 
regimes, have been largely underdeveloped and households have been left with 
comparatively few social security safety nets beyond household savings and 
assets, and family support.
In light of the institutional system of housing, as Sato’s chapter demonstrated, 
while the Japanese housing system partly fi tted into the dualist model in terms 
of the explicit social division of the owner-occupied sector and the residualized 
public housing sector, it differed from the model due to the considerably large-scale 
provision of employee housing and other employee benefi ts relating to housing. 
The formation of the company society has been a critical element marking the 
difference between Japan and other industrialized societies.
What is perhaps more insightful in the Japanese case is the connection Kemeny 
makes between home ownership and welfare systems. The principle of allocation 
of housing is essentially based on ability of households to pay rather than principles 
of fairness and equity. Housing, social policy and welfare are not structured around 
universal citizenship rights and do not decommodify social relations as much as 
in European societies. It thus seems that while Japan appears more collectivistic 
and less individualistic, principles of markets and individual consumption still 
apply, and are in part structured by owner-occupied housing consumption, which 
acts as the basis for family asset accumulation, welfare exchange and reciprocal 
obligation.
East Asian housing systems and welfare regimes
Despite some similarities in the commodifi ed nature of private housing and the 
residualized nature of public housing, it is not particularly useful to attempt to push 
the square peg of Japan into the round holes of western regime and policy typologies. 
In recent decades, however, along with the industrialization and development of the 
Little Tiger economies in the East Asia region (including Singapore, Hong Kong, 
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Taiwan and South Korea), models of a Tiger regime type or an East Asian policy 
or welfare approach have emerged, which to greater or lesser extents also account 
for patterns of socio-political development in housing and social policy in Japan. 
Indeed, there has been a growing consensus in social policy discourse that East 
Asian experiences are distinctive from Euro-American models (Kwon, 1998), but 
there is no agreement on the precise nature of East Asian exceptionalism. There are 
concepts of ‘Oikonomic welfare states’ or ‘Confucian welfare states’ (Jones, 1993), 
and ‘Japan-focused East Asian welfare regimes’ (Goodman and Peng, 1996). The 
causes of East Asian exceptionalism have often been conceived in terms of culture 
or the role of the state, which are arguably inadequate in capturing the character 
of social policy approaches in the region (White and Goodman, 1998; Holliday, 
2000) that demonstrate substantial within group variation. The key aspects of East 
Asian social policy are that, fi rst, it has been primarily driven by the requirements 
and outcomes of economic development policy, and secondly, the role of the 
family features prominently in social policy and welfare arrangements.
For Wade these societies have been economically successful because of the 
‘government market’ in which the state takes a major role in ensuring specifi c 
industrial sectors have developed in ways consistent with perceptions of national 
interests (1990: 27). Japan, in this case, has been a model of government–business 
cooperation. This relationship developed before 1945 and also underpinned rapid 
post-war economic development (Morishima, 1982). Essentially, Japan and the 
Little Tigers all demonstrate elements, to greater or lesser extents, of a specifi c 
type of corporatism that strongly links corporate objectives with social policy. 
This relationship is particularly tight in the case of housing policy.
Holliday’s (2000) model of a ‘productivist world of welfare capitalism’ attempts 
to situate the East Asian group of Tigers as a recognizable and independent 
category within Esping-Andersen’s conceptualization of capitalist welfare 
regimes (1990). In the productivist world social policy is strictly subordinate to the 
overriding policy objective of economic growth. Everything else fl ows from this: 
minimal social rights with extensions linked to productive activity, reinforcement 
of the position of the productive elements in society, and state–market–family 
relationships directed towards growth (Holliday, 2000: 708).
The principle of a Confucian, productivist or East Asian policy regime works 
as a unifying concept to the extent that these societies demonstrate a shared 
state paternalism and top–down processes of economic prioritization, with the 
government taking a considered and active role in guiding markets. However, to 
argue that they have a shared social structure, policy system, housing culture and 
value system is misleading. There is considerable variety in the state–market mix 
and the point at which the state intervenes. If a distinctive regime type exists, it 
is one that facilitates the manifestation of a range of policy systems, as there is 
signifi cant within-group variation. For example, at one level a division can be 
made between one group of societies, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, 
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characterized by low social welfare spending (in relation to GDP), and a second, 
including Singapore and Hong Kong, with a substantially higher degree of 
spending and state control. Deyo (1992) attributes this to degrees of urbanization 
and corresponding differences in the need for government provision of social 
services. This is evident particularly in the state involvement in the public housing 
sector in Hong Kong and Singapore.
Doling (2002) demonstrates how the nature of this divergence between the 
two groups has infl uenced the development of housing systems. Singapore and 
Hong Kong have experienced strong state control over land and high levels of 
state provision. Public housing has come to dominate both systems although in 
Singapore public provision has consistently focused on family home ownership 
through the public leasehold of owner occupied housing units, where the state 
holds a market monopoly, essentially controls land transactions and fi nances loans 
through state-managed compulsory savings. In the 1980s Hong Kong shifted its 
policy focus towards owner-occupation with the sell-off of public rental housing 
units and increased subsidy to serve the interests of expanding levels of home 
ownership, although considerable support of the public rental sector continues 
in many respects. Japan, Taiwan and Korea have had weaker controls and more 
selective state intervention, with subsidy being used to ensure that the housing 
needs of low-income groups are met within a market framework. Key differences 
thus exist in state–market and private–collective dimensions in housing policy and 
provision. Doling develops a typology of systems within this region (2002). One 
category emphasizes ‘State Provision’, and includes Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Another category features ‘Selective Intervention’ and is followed by Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan.
Housing is central to, and illustrative of, approaches to socio-economic 
development and policy in these societies, and there are a number of key 
similarities in housing regimes and household practices, even though the built 
environment, housing policies and value systems vary radically. For Doling 
(1999) it is the pattern of ‘housing provision chains’ that unifi es Tiger societies 
as an ideal-type and differentiates them from western types. In each stage of the 
development, construction, and consumption chain, the relationship between state 
and market has a substantial effect. In the Tiger societies the state asserts itself at 
the developmental stage with highly directive fi ve-year plans and state control over 
the economy affecting speed, location and nature of development. Construction 
is carried out by private companies and housing sold as a market good in terms of 
ability to pay. Doling thus asserts that East Asian housing policy regimes appear 
to constitute a distinct type.
Japan is strongly convergent with this type as the state strongly intervenes 
in the housing system (most directly in terms of the Government Housing Loan 
Corporation, but also through the Urban Redevelopment Agency, etc.), but with 
principles of family based consumption and household asset reliance at the heart 
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of housing and broader social relations. While state policy and institutional 
support is fundamental to the housing system, the house still represents a family 
object that is consumed and regulated in a market, and not as a public good. 
Doling identifi es two other types of chain in industrialized societies. One is the 
Liberal type, in which markets rule at each stage largely unfettered by the state. 
Housing is seen as a private good and sold or leased on the ability to pay. This 
type essentially refl ects the qualities of an Anglo-Saxon model. The other is the 
Mainland European type, where the development stage is strongly determined by 
the state, but construction is carried out by the private sector. At the end, allocation 
and pricing are institutionally regulated by principles of need and fairness
While Doling identifi es unifying elements within ostensibly diverse housing 
systems in East Asia, it is also important to note the signifi cant relationship 
between housing, the social system and social control in these societies, which 
is very different from patterns identifi able in the West. In Japan housing can be 
seen to contribute to state legitimacy in three important ways. First, construction 
and housing consumption have driven economic growth with knock-on effects in 
other sectors. Economic growth has been the basis of the legitimation of the state, 
which is paternalistic, subtly authoritarian and dominated by a single party (the 
Liberal Democratic Party). Secondly, housing has been the basis of family security, 
and as long as the state has provided adequate means for middle-class access to 
privately owned housing, families have largely taken on themselves substantial 
responsibilities to provide for retirement, family welfare and social security. 
Privately owned housing assets have become central to individual retirement 
provision and welfare strategies and the state remains far less accountable than in 
other advanced societies. Thirdly, owner-occupation has provided a central means 
of identifi cation for the social mainstream and middle-class lifestyles, which has 
supported the formation of hegemony uncritical of the capitalistic state. Similar 
sets of relations are apparent across East Asian societies and similar approaches 
to housing have been identifi ed (see Lee, 1999; Chua, 1997).
In western societies housing policy has been seen to support social relations 
and the legitimacy of the state in very different ways. Crudely speaking, in 
societies where social rights are stronger and the infl uence of social alliances 
on the left have been more successful, demands for social rental housing have 
led to greater state provision and market involvement, and a larger proportion of 
quality rental housing distributed on principles of equity and fairness. Sweden 
and the Netherlands are often cited as typical examples of this approach, in which 
state support of the social rental sector is perceived to mutually reinforce socio-
democratic hegemony. Alternatively, in more market-liberal societies, principles 
of ‘property owning democracy’ have been more important to the legitimacy of 
governments who have pursued neo-liberal agendas. The principle is the shift of 
focus on citizenship rights from universal social rights to ones based on property 
ownership, where the expansion of owner-occupation is conceived to enhance 
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citizenship and market-liberal hegemony. Britain, Australia and America are more 
typical of this approach.
Japan, along with the other Tigers, thus not only demonstrates divergence from 
western modes in its housing system and provision chains, but also in the set of 
social and political relations which link state authority to housing policy. Housing 
also, therefore, provides an insight to the nature of East Asian or productivist 
welfare regimes that accounts for the success of soft authoritarian regimes that 
have provided minimal social rights, but have sought to ensure economic growth 
which has, for the most part, facilitated welfare resources for households via 
owner-occupied housing assets. In recent decades, global economic fl uctuations 
have led to greater volatility in international housing markets, which has been felt 
in the East Asian region (specifi cally in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian currency 
crisis). As families rely on their housing assets as the basis of welfare and security, 
with little recourse to other state services, there is much greater vulnerability to 
the vicissitudes of global markets.
Conclusions
It has become increasingly clear that housing in Japan, along with other social 
institutions and practices, has entered a new phase of change dominated by greater 
insecurity and competitiveness. At a broader level, transformations in socio-
demographic constitution and relations, business and employment practices, and 
institutional structures of welfare and support are having fundamental impacts in 
Japan, which, although apparent across a number of industrialized societies, are 
more strongly felt in Japan. How these factors interact and resolve themselves in 
the coming years will be particularly insightful for other societies dealing with 
these changes at a more gradual speed. However, they will also refl ect the peculiar 
social, economic and political make-up of Japan, which must be understood in 
terms of its own path and pattern of modernization and global integration.
In the case of Japan some specifi c economic, political and social factors will 
have particular salience in the next decades. Economically, Japan has become 
extensively integrated into the East Asian economy in the last decade, and has 
shifted production facilities and substantial amounts of investment into the region. 
Economic sustainability in Japan is consequently now bound more strongly to 
the stability and growth of China and East Asia, as well as emerging patterns of 
economic fl uctuation and competition locally and globally.
Politically, Japan’s current administration has demonstrated a commitment to 
structural deregulation and neo-liberal practices. Within political, administrative 
and business elites, neo-liberalizers are in confl ict with conservative elements who 
seek to protect the integrity of Japanese systems and markets as well as traditional 
(and sometimes nationalistic) values. This confl ict is unfolding in a climate of 
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growing political aggravation in the region involving Japan, South Korea, North 
Korea and China.
Socially, as we have examined, Japan is in a process of realignment and 
fragmentation, which is exacerbated by the breakdown of ‘company society’, 
the impact of the baby-boomer generation, diversifi cation of the family and life-
paths, and growing anomie and frustration among younger generations who fi nd 
traditional values and expectations alien to their experiences of employment, 
society and family life. Increasingly, life in Japan is dominated by feelings and 
experiences of insecurity and risk.
Housing is an embedded social, economic and political element, and has 
been at the heart of processes of transformation. Housing will take on an even 
more prominent role in a world where macro economic changes are increasingly 
distributed to individuals and households whose security and welfare reside in 
the stability and prosperity of housing property assets. At the same time, access 
to housing assets and disparities in the market will increasingly exaggerate the 
manifestation of social inequalities and feelings of exclusion.
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Glossary
bakufu military government under shogunate rule
chano-ma Japanese-style dining-living room
danchi multi-family housing estates made up of concrete apartment blocks
danchi-zoku danchi tribe
dankai no sedai post-war baby-boomers 
freeter part-time, non-regular workers under 34
fusuma framed and papered sliding doors used to form room partitions
hogo shisetsu shelter and non-monetary aid facilities provided as a form of 
public assistance
ichioku so churyu popular phrase meaning a social situation where all 100 
million of Japan's population (now around 126 million) regarded themselves 
as members of the middle class
ie family, household, lineage, home, or house
Jiritsu Shien Ho Homelessness (self-help) Act
Jutaku Kinyu Kouko Government Housing Loan Corporation (GHLC)
Jutaku Kinyu Shien Kikou Housing Loan Support Agency (HLSA)
Jutaku Toshi Seibi Koudan Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
(HUDC)
katei home, family, or household
Kokumin Shinbun The People’s Newspaper
Koteki Kaigo Hoken new social insurance scheme 
kouei jutaku public rental housing
kyuyo jutaku company housing provided for employees
mai homu my own home
Nihonjinron theories of Japaneseness
Nihon Jutaku Koudan Japan Housing Corporation (JHC)
niwatsuki ikkodate jutaku single-family house with garden
riso no katei ideal home 
ryo dormitory-style employee housing provided for singles
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seikatsu hogo public assistance to maintain the minimum living standard
Seikatsu Hogo Ho Living Standard Protection Act
shataku company housing provided for employees’ families
shogun general (= leader)
shoji sliding paper door
tatami traditional fi xed matting
Toshi Kiban Seibi Koudan Urban Development Corporation (UDC)
Toshi Saisei Kikou Urban Renaissance Agency (URA)
uchi and soto  inside and outside (socially and spatially). Uchi often used 
literally to denote the home itself
wayo setchu eclectic style incorporating both Japanese and western elements
yoseba low-income or poor districts characterized by mass fl ophouses and 
manual day-labour markets
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